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# ***JPRS Report***

## **Soviet Union**

### ***Military Affairs***

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# Soviet Union

## Military Affairs

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### CONTENTS

13 February 1989

#### MILITARY-POLITICAL ISSUES

Akhromeyev Explains Resignation as Chief of Staff [TASS, 25 Jan 89]	1
GLAVPU on Tasks of Reports, Elections Following 19th Conference [KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL No 17, Sep 88]	1
GLAVPU Seeks to Tighten Work on Party Admissions, Candidacy [VOORUZHENNYKH SIL No 17, Sep 88]	5
Role of Senior Command in Delay of Military Restructuring [A. Petrenko; KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL No 17, Sep 88]	8
GLAVPU Effort to Assure Elections Conform to 19th Conference Principles [KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 19 Oct 88]	12
Military Clique Decried, Reform Proposed [P. Ventur; XX CENTURY AND PEACE No 11, 1988]	13
Baltic Military District Party Conference [M. Ziyeminysh; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 28 Dec 88]	15
Meetings Select Candidates for USSR Deputies [KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 31 Dec 88]	15
Open Line to Discuss Military Affairs Created [KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 31 Dec 88]	16
Sorokin Chairs Meeting on Interethnic Problems [KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 6 Jan 89]	16
Reader Suggests Advance 'Discussion' of Defense Budget [IZVESTIYA, 21 Jan 89]	16
Reservists Rally Becomes 'Battle' for Uzbek Secretary [V. Kovalenko; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 24 Jan 89]	17
Career of Baltic MD Commander Profiled [V. Zadubrovskiy; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 25 Jan 89]	17

#### MILITARY SCIENCE

Combat Training Chief On Tactical Training Changes Based On 'Qualitative Parameters' [V. Khazikov; KRASNAYA ZVEDA, 7 Jan 89]	20
---	----

#### WARSAW PACT

Akhromeyev Calls NATO Force Figures 'Distorted' [Moscow International, 25 Jan 89]	24
Lushev Appointed Commander of Warsaw Pact Forces [Moscow Radio, 2 Feb 89]	24
Kulikov Released From Pact Duties [TASS, 2 Feb 89]	24
Warsaw Pact: Correlation of Force Strengths, Armaments [PRAVDA, 30 Jan 89]	24
Soviet Commander, Envoy on Hungarian Withdrawal [Moscow TV, 2 Feb 89]	31

#### ARMED FORCES

Georgian Opinion Poll Considers Draft Avoidance [ZARYA VOSTOKA, 13 Apr 88]	32
Some Military Collectives Fail to Use Electoral Opportunity [Yu. Shevchenko; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 17 Jan 89]	32
Draft Criminal Laws: Proposals on Military Authority [V. Bakharev; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 17 Jan 89]	33

#### GROUND FORCES

KMT-10 Mine Clearing Device [Ye. Osadchiy, M. Kozelskiy; TEKHNIKA I VOORUZHENIYE No 8, Aug 88]	35
MT-LB Film Trainer System [V. Subbotin; TEKHNIKA I VOORUZHENIYE No 8, Aug 88]	36
Examination of BREM-1 Armored Repair/Recovery Vehicle [G. Korotov and V. Knyazkov; VOYENNYE ZNANIYA No 9, Sep 88]	36
Change to Defensive Doctrine Disrupts Regimental Officer Training [Yu. Pakhomov; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 15 Dec 88]	38
Far East MD: Officers' Map Ability, Training Weak [N. Astashkin; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 28 Dec 88]	41

## AIR FORCE, AIR DEFENSE FORCES

Air Force: Results of 1988 Socialist Competition Mixed [V. Maskayev; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 10 Dec 88] .....	43
Aviation Training Said to Violate Rule of Radio Silence [V. Molchanov; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 27 Jan 89] .....	44

## NAVAL FORCES

Commander, Northern Fleet Criticizes Commanders, Staffs, Political Organs For Lack of Realism in Training [F. Gromov; KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL, Oct 88] .....	46
Northern Waters Naval Buildup Denied [V. Tatarnikov; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 28 Jan 89] .....	50

## STRATEGIC ROCKET FORCES

1st Deputy CINC on Restructuring, Missile-Artillery Troops Day 1988 [Yu. Yashin; KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL No 20, Oct 88] .....	52
--	----

## SPECIAL TROOPS

Military Transport Directorate Responds to Complaint on Guards Facilities [Yu. Vorontsov, V. Novikov; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 4 Jan 89] .....	57
---	----

## CIVIL DEFENSE

Airborne Troops Transport Money, Valuables From Leninkan [V. Zyuvvin; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 21 Dec 88] .....	58
--	----

## REAR SERVICES, DEFENSE INDUSTRIES

Ministry of Radio Industry to Produce Refrigerators [V. Zaramenskikh; EKONOMICHESKAYA GAZETA No 48, Nov 88] .....	59
Chernyshev Weighs Problems in Industrial Conversion [V. Chernyshev; TASS, 2 Feb 89] .....	60

## DOSAAF

Yazov Views Restructuring of Military Training [KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 28 Jan 89] .....	61
Former Air Force 1st Dep Chief of Staff on Modern Military-Patriotic Education [G. Skorikov; PRAVDA, 10 Nov 88] .....	63
Belorussian DOSAAF Membership Declines by 300,000 [SOVETSKAYA BELOROSSIYA, 7 Nov 88] .....	65
Plenum of Uzbek DOSAAF Central Committee [PRAVDA VOSTOKA, 16 Nov 88] .....	65

## MILITARY EDUCATIONAL FACILITIES

Kuybyshev Engineering School Fills Vacancies on Competitive Basis [N. Kalmykov; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 13 Dec 88] .....	66
--	----

## MILITARY HISTORY

Role of Defensive Offense in 1944 Defeat of Germans in Ukraine [P. Repin; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 25 Jan 89] .....	67
--	----

## FOREIGN MILITARY AFFAIRS

Withdrawal of Vietnamese 'Volunteers' From Cambodia [V. Nikanorov; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 21 Dec 88] .....	69
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### **Akhromeyev Explains Resignation as Chief of Staff**

*LD2501154689 Moscow TASS in English  
1518 GMT 25 Jan 89*

[Text] Moscow January 25 TASS—The main principle of the development of the Soviet armed forces is now to secure defense sufficiency—i.e. a desire to have an army and a navy numerically essential for reliably repulsing aggression—and to ensure such sufficiency predominantly on qualitatively new parameters, Marshal of the Soviet Union Sergey Akhromeyev said in an interview published in the Moscow NEWS WEEKLY on Wednesday.

He said the High Command, troops and naval forces were being trained in the conduct of defensive operations. "In agreement with our allies we began to reduce and change the organisational structure of our troops. We are giving a defensive character to the bodies of armed forces in Europe as a whole".

The marshal remarked with regret that the North Atlantic Alliance has not so far manifested any positive changes concerning a solution of matters which arouse the Soviet Union's concern.

The USSR is still encircled by U.S. military bases at which combat aircraft and navy vessels are stationed. The number of the bases does not diminish. Fifteen U.S. carrier-based strike forces are either already deployed or ready for deployment in seas adjacent to Soviet territory.

The marshal described the situation as abnormal that at a time when the Soviet Union is reducing its armed forces by 500,000 men, the West has decided to station U.S. F-16 bombers in Italy and to modernise tactical nuclear weapons in Europe.

"One should not think that the Soviet Union and its allies will completely unilaterally disarm while members of the North Atlantic Alliance watch without taking adequate measures themselves."

Akhromeyev refuted conjectures that appeared in the West concerning an alleged connection between the announcement of a reduction in the Soviet armed forces and his replacement as chief of the USSR General Staff.

"A reduction in our armed forces by 500,000 men will be the result of a large amount of analytical work, including that done by the military. Naturally, the leadership of the General Staff took part in the work together with others from the very outset".

He explains his resignation from the post by saying that at the age of 66 it was already difficult for him to perform the diverse and complex duties which require 14 to 15 hours work a day.

At present Sergey Akhromeyev is an adviser to Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev. He referred to his successor—Colonel-General Mikhail Moiseyev, the present chief of the General Staff, as a competent and industrious general who is distinguished in the armed forces for his high qualities.

### **GLAVPU on Tasks of Reports, Elections Following 19th Conference**

*18010252a Moscow KOMMUNIST  
VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian  
No 17, Sep 88 pp 3-8*

[Lead Article: "To Reports and Elections—Maximum Democratization and Efficiency"]

[Text] In accordance with the CPSU Charter and the decisions of the 19th All-Union Party Conference, this year an election campaign is being held in party organizations. The Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy has determined its dates in the armed forces. In October and November election meetings are to be held in party groups, and in shop organizations, organizations operating with the authority of primary party organizations, and in primary party organizations. Party conferences of large units, military educational institutions, formations, military districts, groups of forces and fleets will be held in December 1988-January 1989.

The fact that this election campaign will take place under the beneficial influence of the results of the work of the 19th Party Conference, and the July 1988 CPSU Central Committee plenum, gives it particular importance and a fundamentally new character. The resolution, "On Reports and Elections in Party Organizations," approved at the plenum, states: They must become an important stage in the practical implementation of the instructions developed by the conference on deepening restructuring, carrying out reforms of the political system, further democratization of the life of society in the party, and they are called upon to further in every way activization of the party masses, to enhance the role and responsibility of party organizations and committees, and to confirm political leadership methods in their activity.

The reports and elections in army and navy party organizations will, undoubtedly, be an exacting and all-encompassing examination of the activity of all party elements in implementation of the decisions of the 27th CPSU Congress, the all-union party conference, and the July Central Committee plenum. And it is very important that the essentially revolutionary, truly democratic atmosphere of the conference, the businesslike tone, openness and sharpness of discussions, irreconcilability toward shortcomings, and creative search for ways and guarantees of making the process of modernization irreversible, which reigned there, are present as completely as possible in the work of the election meetings and party conferences. It is namely this that predetermines to a

decisive extent their high ideological-political and organizational level, the free exchange of opinions, thorough analysis of the state of affairs, and self-critical and principled approach of the communists toward assessing the work of the party organizations and election organs.

In the preparations under way for the forthcoming meetings and conferences, I believe that the most essential task of political organs, and party committees and buros, is to awaken in communists a feeling that they are masters in their own party house, and to summon in each CPSU member and candidate member an inner need to look soberly and clearly at himself, the activity of the election *aktiv*, and his comrades in the party organization, and to think, analyze, and find reserves and capabilities for improving party work in the key directions. How can restructuring be accelerated, and move irreversibly to the channel of real deeds? What already existing experience should be consolidated and multiplied? In what way can conservatism of thinking and the mechanism of retardation be removed, and party influence be strengthened on forming in people a consciousness and psychology that meets the spirit of the times, and on achieving a qualitatively new level of military and naval training, and state of military discipline. Communists must give exhaustively objective responses to these and other vitally important questions at the meetings and conferences.

The main thing today in restructuring is practical actions and moving to concrete results in all spheres of party and military life. It is increasing the independence and vigor of primary organizations, and the activeness, initiative and responsibility of communists. It is deepening democratization, expanding glasnost, and creating on this basis a moral and political climate in the collective that furthers the complete opening of people's creative potential and energy. It is accelerating modernization and ensuring highly effective ideological and mass political work. It is building up qualitative indices of strengthening combat readiness. Efficiency of reports and elections amounts to determining precisely what it is necessary to do for this in each party organization, and each party committee, buro and political organ, and to developing a specific plan of actions, and setting out to implement it without delay.

At the center of attention of the election meetings and party conferences, indisputably, will be first of all questions associated with the implementation of the political directions of the All-Union Party Conference on the need for reorientation of defense construction to primarily qualitative parameters. Understandably, they cannot be examined with old approaches and criteria. The method of simple statement in reports and speeches of the growth or decline of evaluations on types of military training, and enumeration of the names of communists who are conscientious toward organizing training and improving their professional skill, and of those who are working half-heartedly, gave us nothing in the past, and

is all the more unacceptable today. Here thorough collective thinking and a combined search for ways and methods of bringing party work into accord with the complexity and novelty of the tasks are required. On what is it necessary to concentrate them most of all? Apparently on improving the activity of the party organizations, party committees and buros, and the political organs, in ensuring that communists play a vanguard role and set the example in improving the level of military skill and technical ability of the personnel, and in perfecting the command and control system. This is to be accomplished through introducing the recommendations of military science into cadre training and the educational and indoctrination process. And it is accomplished through developing the initiative of people, by whose creative, conscientious labor and selflessness a qualitatively new level of combat readiness, military training and discipline is ensured. It is necessary to think seriously about how to raise the authority of honest, initiative-filled, competent labor, and to erect a firm party barrier to the psychology of mediocrity, arbitrariness, carelessness, and non-fulfillment of promises, and to root out window-dressing, showiness, deception, indulgences and oversimplification in military training, and the alienation of the personnel from it. A particularly principled examination and businesslike resolution await these problems in the party organizations of headquarters, directorates and military scientific establishments, whose communists are called upon to be out front in the development of the theory and practice of shifting military organizational development to qualitative parameters.

The work of the election organs and party organizations in further strengthening military discipline also requires the most careful businesslike analysis. The time has come to gain an understanding, by large scale accounting, of why practical implementation of the requirements of the CPSU Central Committee, and USSR Ministry of Defense on instituting and maintaining firm law and order in units and on ships, is proceeding so unequally in various military collectives. It would be advisable to generalize the valuable experience and the indoctrinating and organizational activity of communists, which brings tangible results in uniting multinational military collectives, and enhancing a conscious attitude on the part of people toward observing Soviet laws, the requirements of discipline, and the norms of our morality. At the same time, it would be advisable to uncover the reasons for, and name those guilty of unsystematic and rushed work, and mass measures that are calculated for production volume, the direct consequence of which most often are instances of non-regulation relationships, absences without leave, drunkenness and other disciplinary infractions.

Communists who stand aside from vital work with specific individuals, and do not display concern about people, undoubtedly deserve to be held strictly accountable. This is all the more true of those who themselves commit disciplinary violations, are indifferent, permit

bureaucratic red tape in the examination of the legitimate requests of soldiers, or who flout social justice in deciding cadre, housing and other questions. However, it is not enough to uncover and say frankly who specifically, where, and what work is not being accomplished properly. It is necessary to require that such party members and candidate members answer for their inertness and spiritual callousness. It is important to find at meetings and party conferences a mechanism for influencing party committees and buros, and comrades in party organizations, that will help all communists, without exception, to become true advocates of strong, conscious discipline.

One of the spheres that requires unconditional, more active, application of the efforts of party members is restructuring of ideological and mass political work. The task of tasks in this today and for the long-term future is to bring to the profound consciousness of all categories of military personnel the revolutionary spirit, and the ideological-theoretical and practical richness of the decisions of the 19th All-Union Party Conference, and the July CPSU Central Committee plenum, and at the same time to involve the personnel in the urgent implementation of their requirements. At meetings and conferences it is necessary to investigate attentively what is being done on this plane by political organs, party organizations, and party committee buros. Have all party sources, means, forms and methods of ideological indoctrination been put in operation? How are the modernization of Marxist-Leninist training of officers, political study by warrant officers, and political classes with soldiers and sailors, sergeants and petty officers going, and their liberation from routine, idle talk and stereotype? Are communists persistently mastering the ability to conduct an honest, direct conversation with people, which is not removed from real life? A demanding analysis of these questions will help to uncover and consolidate all that is best, reveal shortcomings and set about to eliminate them, and achieve an increase in the spiritual potential of restructuring.

Experience shows that the influence of party organizations on accelerating the processes of modernization and democratization of military life depends largely on the activeness and enthusiasm of intra-party work. The party organization can be turned into a truly dynamic political force, the acknowledged vanguard of the military collective, only if it itself affirms healthy intra-party relationships, based on honesty, fairness, and modesty of the communists, and an environment of openness, creative discussion, freedom of opinion, conscious discipline, party comradeship, and unconditional personal responsibility and efficiency. It is necessary to take care that the participants in meetings and conferences assess the moral climate in their party collective, and the work of committees and buros, from this point of view. It is time to ask ourselves strictly: "Are we working and living as today requires?" And to pose anew the question of the political and moral attitude of each communist for the

state of affairs in the collective, for his personal contribution to restructuring, and for fulfilling the CPSU Charter, and party decisions. Along with this, it is necessary to define precisely a system of measures that makes it possible to make every party member and candidate member an active, uncompromising fighter to root out in the party and military environment any manifestations of bureaucratism, haughtiness, self-conceit, crudeness, disdain for peoples interests, and the habit of transferring responsibility for one's own shortcomings and omissions to others.

So that the election campaign will contribute its maximum to the further democratization of all intra-party life, and the meetings and conferences take place in a spirit of democratism, glasnost, particular demandiness, and businesslike solving of urgent problems, it is necessary to eliminate completely poor organization, administrative pressure, formalism in their approach and conduct, and to incline all communists toward strength, comradely dialog, collective advice, seeking of ways to accelerate restructuring, and principled criticism and self-criticism. Experience has proven that when people know that they will be given an opportunity to talk about what troubles them most, and what has pained them and worn them out, and when they are confident that they will be heard, and that their critical remarks and suggestions will have an effect, then no one will have to be persuaded to follow the lesson of truth and to be principled. Those who have something to say and propose will take the floor. And if political department workers, and party committee and party buro secretaries and members merely change tactics, and adopt a more secretive way of scheduling in advance who is to speak and about what, and show partiality in editing their own parts of speeches, a frank, interested party discussion may not occur. Even outward attributes of imagined democracy, in the form of free microphones set up in the hall, will not save things. And this past fall at a meeting of the Northern Fleet party *aktiv* there were also a number of other incidents. Those who desired to speak from their seats took a microphone in one hand, and a piece of paper taken from their pocket in the other, and, stammering from uneasiness, read stock phrases. No, what is needed is not playing games of democracy and freedom of opinions, but ensuring them in actuality, which bureaucratic contrivances hardly facilitate.

It is known that the report sets the tone for an open, businesslike discussion at a meeting or conference. But, this is true only if it is the fruit of collective creativity, and is distinguished by innovative content and form, specificity and sharpness in posing problems, and thorough, all-round, well-argued analysis of the state of restructuring party work, and constructive criticism, directed at specific individuals. Quite understandably, the secretary alone is not able to prepare such a report, even less the instructor on organizational party work in the large unit political department, which, unfortunately, is still frequently practiced.

A different approach has a much greater effect, when all party committee and bureau members, the entire apparatus of the political organ, and the widest circle of communists from among military personnel of various service and duty categories, without exception, are brought into the analysis of the state and fruitfulness of party work and degree of its modernization. Their thoughts, conclusions, and generalizations enable the person preparing the report, as though with the eyes of all party members in the unit, ship or large unit, to look at the course of restructuring, results achieved and unrealized opportunities, and to give an objective assessment of the style and methods of work of each party committee or party bureau member, or political department worker, and of the attitude of each communist toward his job. Here it also becomes clear who is who, and the true essence of the party committees and bureaus and organs of political leadership is illuminated, from the standpoint of the progress of restructuring, development of democracy and glasnost, and the introduction of a spirit of party comradeship. Such a report, as a rule, stings people to the quick, does not leave them indifferent, and summons the desire to continue the discussion in the same analytical, self-critical key.

It is precisely non-standard approaches, both to the preparation of reports, and to the prior familiarization of communists with them, that merit support and dissemination. Last fall report topics were given in advance to the party *aktiv*, and to all communists, in many primary party organizations in a number of large units and military districts, and were published in large-circulation and daily newspapers. This made it possible, not only to enrich the reports by taking into account the opinions, remarks and suggestions made by CPSU members and candidate members, but also helped all party members orient themselves correctly and attune themselves to a businesslike, principled discussion.

Preparation of the draft resolution requires no less painstaking, multi-plane, specific work, with the participation of a large number of communists. In their letters to the editor, party activists Lt Col A. Kazikov, Capt 3d Rank V. Zavyalov, and others, quite correctly posed the question of the need to rid the decisions made at election meetings and party conferences of duplication of party wide instructions well known to everyone, empty verbosity and unaddressed declarative appeals, and about making them specific. Resolutions become truly businesslike in nature when they incorporate the collective intellect and proposals of communists. The experience of recording in them the names of the communists toward whom the greatest complaints were made at the meeting, with the establishment of a time for checking corrections made to shortcomings uncovered in their behavior and style of work.

The decisions of the All-Union Party Conference, and the July CPSU Central Committee plenum open up extensive opportunities for further democratization of the elections of party organs. The statutory right of

communists to decide themselves who to entrust with leadership of the party organizations has been placed on a real foundation. It has been recommended that broad discussion of candidatures and secret voting be ensured everywhere at the elections of party committees and bureaus, and that there be a complete opportunity to place on the ballot a larger number of candidates than the number established at the meeting of the electoral organs. It is of fundamental importance that from now on primary party organizations can propose their own candidates for party committee, party commission or political organ. The statute of the All-Union Party Conference on limiting the term of service at the same leadership position to two terms in a row, beginning with the current reports and elections, is being implemented. Needless to say, this does not mean that those who have already been members of the electoral party organ for a long time must necessarily "go into retirement." It is the statutory right of communists to decide themselves who to elect, and who not.

Great trust assumes great responsibility. It is a matter of honor and conscience for each meeting participant to take care to ensure that truly active, initiative-filled, and authoritative CPSU members are elected to party committees and bureaus, and as party organization secretaries; people who are capable, not in word but in deed, of moving restructuring forward, and are able to work with people and achieve practical results. In the electoral process as nowhere else, discretion, humanity, and honesty are needed, and extremism is impermissible.

It is known that during the reports on the course of restructuring in the past year, through the will and insistence of communists, many inert party organization secretaries and members of party committees and bureaus, who did not justify the hopes placed on them, were replaced. However, there were also instances, if only singular, when principled, demanding party leaders were deprived of trust. It is also no secret that in a number of places the old bureaucratic, secret decision by the commander, political worker or political organ representative, as to who was to be secretary and members of the elected party organ, could not be avoided, a clear violation of the norms of intraparty democracy. Such phenomena took place in individual party organizations in the Transbaykal Military District, and in military construction units.

Extremes, no matter from where they originate, are always harmful. Attempts to deprive the political organ of its lawful function, of the right and duty to engage in the selection and placement of party cadres, are unjustified. But, just as unjustified under today's conditions is the desire of some political departments of large units and units to foist "their" candidates on party organizations by willful pressure. Indisputably, sometimes it happens that the situation requires an individual from outside to be advanced to the position of secretary. But, it is necessary to convince the communists of this, and not to apply administrative pressure on them, flouting

democratic party norms and principles. The fact that in a number of places they have ceased ensuring that elections are truly secret, cannot help but cause disquiet. It is a rather frequent phenomenon for the ballot box to be set on the same table where the ballots are issued, and if a communist wanted to cross out someone's name or write in a new name, it would be under the vigilant observation of the commission members, making this an awkward thing to do. Is this not where the 100 percent "yes" votes come from, and is this practice to the benefit of democratization?

The organization of reports and elections, and concern about painstaking and thorough preparation of meetings and conferences, is a vital job for the political organ. And the main thing in this job is vital work with communists, and specific assistance to the *aktiv* in the affirmation of democratism and efficiency. Workers from the political organ cannot be allowed, as happened in some places previously, to visit the party organization a day, or even a few hours before a meeting or conference, hastily familiarize themselves with the reports and draft resolutions, and hurriedly set about to modify and revise them. Nor can the state of affairs be considered normal when to some party group or company party organization, numbering three or four communists, a like number of representatives of higher party organs came to the election meeting, while none at all came to other such meetings.

A new, more attentive and effective approach requires an attitude toward the critical remarks and suggestions expressed by communists at meetings and conferences. People are acting correctly where they reject the practice of generalizing these remarks only following the end of the entire election campaign, and after a lengthy compilation of verbose plans for the implementation, and do this generalizing effectively. In the political directorates of the Belorussian Military District and Baltic Fleet, they took this approach. The most important, socially valuable critical comments and suggestions are examined without delay at sessions of the military soviet and in the political organs, and the communists are immediately informed about the measures taken. The methods, needless to say, can vary, but the main thing is that well-founded criticism not remain unanswered, and that not a single sensible suggestion drown in paper.

There are no trivialities in the preparation for and conduct of meetings and conferences. Everything must be done in accordance with intraparty norms and rules. And it is to be done in such a way that the reports and elections truly become a turning point in the consciousness and work of communists, charge them up for practical actions and for achieving real results in restructuring, and enhance the energy, initiative and sense of responsibility of each.

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### GLAVPU Seeks to Tighten Work on Party Admissions, Candidacy

18010252b Moscow *KOMMUNIST*  
*VOORUZHENNYKH SIL* in Russian  
No 17, Sep 88 pp 26-29

[Unsigned Article: "Into the Party—Only the Deserving"]

[Text] The party commission at the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy familiarized itself with the work of party commissions at the political organs of a number of large units in Moscow Military District, as well as the Higher Combined Arms Command School imeni RSFSR Supreme Soviet on admittance into the party, and with the course of fulfillment here of the requirements of the CPSU Central Committee resolution, "On Serious Shortcomings in the Work of the Tashkent Oblast Party Organization on Admittance into the Party and Strengthening of Party Ranks." The report by Col V. Shunkov, party commission secretary at the district political directorate, on this question was heard.

The results of the inspection showed that party commissions, reorganizing their activity under the leadership of the political organs in the spirit of the present requirements for party membership, have begun to utilize existing capabilities more widely and to increase their influence at all stages of the work in party organizations on admittance into the CPSU and indoctrination of young communists. The party commission at the political department of the large unit where Maj N. Bykov is secretary, has some positive experience in this plane. At sessions it does not limit its work to examining the decisions of primary party organizations on questions of admittance into the party. Here all party commission members and candidate members have specific assignments, associated with studying on the ground the political, professional and moral qualities of those desiring to enter the CPSU, and with preparing them for this important event. In individual discussions with the soldiers they become familiar with their service, training and social work, and help them understand better the program and regulatory requirements made upon communists. In addition, they participate in party committee and buro sessions, visit party meetings in company and primary party organizations that are examining files on admittance into the CPSU, and help secretaries provide openness, frankness, objectivity, and an instructive charge to the discussion of requests.

Maj N. Bykov and other party commission members strive to participate actively in the indoctrination of young communists, and conduct lessons with them on the study of the CPSU program and charter, and the decisions and documents of the Central Committee on questions of party organizational development and intra-party life. And it is natural that, among those admitted recently into the party are officers, warrant

officers, and sergeants who are rated excellent in military and political training, and are high class-qualified specialists. The majority are justifying the title communist, and are consciously fulfilling their service obligations and having a positive influence on matters in those units and subunits in the party committees of which they entered. Thus, in the regiment where Maj V. Patrashchuk is party committee member, last year six men from among the officers and warrant officers were admitted as CPSU candidate members. All are leading soldiers. With participation of party commission members, the party committee is watching attentively as they carry out their stage of candidate membership, and is helping them correctly determine their place in the daily service and affairs of the party organization. The new party members made it possible to strengthen the party organizations of the subunits, and to reinforce their political influence on the men. Almost half of the companies led by communists became "excellent."

At the same time, many shortcomings on questions of admittance into the party and strengthening party ranks, noted by the CPSU Central Committee, also exist in the inspected party organizations, and in the activity of party commissions at political organs. In a number of places in this important sector of intra-party life, required restructuring essentially did not take place.

Party commissions do not always display concern about forming a base for party growth in the units, and at times judge it formalistically, according to the number of non-party officers and warrant officers. Some of them do not carry out any purposeful indoctrinary work with future party members. Manifestations of unscrupulousness in the selection of candidates for admittance into the CPSU have not been eliminated, which leads to hasty, erroneous decisions. The poor knowledge of those entering the party, and the inadequate preliminary work with them, are indicated by the fact that in the district recently party commissions have refused to admit 4.5 percent of the CPSU candidate members approved by the primary party organizations.

The practice of selecting the new generation for the party has still not become truly open in a number of party organizations in the Guards Motorized Rifle Taman Division, Guards Tank Kantemir Division, and the Higher Combined Arms Command School imeni RSFSR Supreme Soviet. Here and there the requirement about examining files for admittance into the party at open party meetings is not being fulfilled, and formalism in carrying out such meetings is permitted. As a rule, two or three communists speak at the examination of requests for admittance into the CPSU at these party meetings, and non-party individuals present at the meetings do not express their opinions of the candidates. Such a shortcoming as haste, and to a certain degree an indiscriminate approach to admittance into the CPSU, is still particularly characteristic in the work of certain party commissions and primary party organizations in military schools. It is difficult to ensure the quality of

new party members when, for example, at the school imeni RSFSR Supreme Soviet last year, out of the total number of admitted CPSU candidate members, 60 percent of the files were examined at 16 party commission sessions in a two month period.

The role of the tenure as a candidate member has been downgraded in the party organization where Maj K. Avtukh is secretary, and in certain others. CPSU candidate members frequently also remain outside of the field of vision of party commissions. In some of them the party commission members do not have specific assignments on this matter, are rarely present at the meetings and party committee sessions where questions of admittance into the CPSU are examined, and do not take part in the discussions of the requests.

Work with CPSU candidate members is being conducted poorly. Often the schools of young communists, where party candidate members are also enrolled, are inactive or do not bear the necessary indoctrinating burden. Not all CPSU candidate members are heard about their period of candidature, as is provided for by the Party Charter. Party commissions did not define their own role clearly in working with CPSU candidate members, and often forget about them after approving the decisions of the party organizations about admittance.

As a result of this, a portion of the CPSU candidate members does not display itself in practical work, and commits gross violations of military and party discipline, and some are removed from their party candidate membership or quit, as not passing their period as candidates. Thus, last year alone more than six percent of CPSU candidate members in the district were brought to party accountability, and this year their number increased to eight percent. Approximately three percent of the party candidate members were removed or quit under paragraph 16 of the CPSU Charter. This indicates serious neglect in the work with CPSU candidate members, both that of the primary party organizations, and that of the party commissions.

The party organizations and party commissions of the inspected units still do not always observe the requirement of the Party Charter and the CPSU Central Committee Resolutions concerning the Tashkent Oblast Party Organization, requiring high demandingness and strictness with CPSU members for an unconscientious and formalistic attitude toward the submission of recommendations. In one of the units of the Guards Tank Kantemir Division imeni Yu. V. Andropov, Sr Lt M. Loskutov, a CPSU candidate member, grossly violated military discipline and did not display activeness in social life. However, at the end of his candidacy period he was given favorable recommendations by communists Maj Yu. Kharlamov and Capt L. Bobylkov. The subunit party organization and unit party committee, which accepted him as a CPSU member, did not display the required principles in assessing Loskutov's conduct. The party commission at the political department did

not confirm this decision, and refused to accept Loskutov into the party. At the same time, those who recommended him were not brought to accountability for the poor quality of their recommendations.

It has been noted that in the Moscow Military District, and other districts, groups of forces and fleets, party commissions at political organs still do not always thoroughly analyze the true motives of people, which are prompting them to enter the party. This is especially true with respect to officers. In a number of cases concealed self-interest is not discerned in the aspiration of some officers, who associate party membership with career advancement, to become party members. This is furthered by the deep-rooted practice by which non-party individuals are not even named to command positions at the company level. There are no non-party commanders and chiefs at battalion and higher levels. The fact that military personnel sometimes enter the party not out of a desire to dedicate their lives to struggling for its ideals and program objectives, is indicated by existing instances, even if extremely rare, of moral degradation, drunkenness and abuse of their official positions.

The lack of discipline of some CPSU members and candidate members discredits the party organizations and the authority of the party, and does not stimulate the desire of non-party soldiers to follow the example of the communists in their deeds and actions, or to enter the ranks of the CPSU. Some party commissions and primary party organizations do not always conduct a consistent struggle to clean the party ranks of those who violate party discipline, or do not fulfill the obligations of a CPSU member defined in the Party Charter. Many instances are still found when in some party organizations a very strict attitude toward violators of party and military discipline has not been created. At times they approach lightly the second admission to the CPSU of those removed for actions that discredit the title of party member.

This example was cited. An appeal of his removal from the party by Capt S. Solodkin, who is serving in one of the units in the Siberian Military District, arrived at the party commission at the Ground Forces Political Directorate. He was admitted into the party the first time in 1978 when he was a student in a communications school. In 1984 S. Solodkin was removed from CPSU membership for drunkenness and physically assaulting subordinates, when he was serving in the Group of Soviet Forces Germany. After he was sent to the Siberian Military District, already in 1985 he was again accepted as a candidate member, and a year later as a full CPSU member. He was assigned as a company commander, and then as a battalion chief of staff, although it was known that he had been crude and had assaulted his subordinates. Last year the party organization learned that Solodkin had concealed the fact of his prior removal from the CPSU, and that he had not learned his lesson from this; he is continuing to taunt his subordinates. The party organization gave him a strict reprimand, and the

party commission at the political department also left this man in the party. Several communists in the party organization wrote a letter to the district political directorate protesting this outrageous instance of lack of principles regarding S. Solodkin. Only the party commission at the district political directorate removed him from the party, for deceiving the communists, abuse of his duty position, crudeness, and systematically insulting his subordinates. Sensing unprincipled support of certain communists in the party organization, who lacked the capability to assess his misdeeds critically, he believed that he could remain in the party.

In this regard, the opinion is expressed that those removed from the party should not be readmitted, or that the reasons for removal for which restoration of former communists into the party is not authorized should be expanded. Bribery, misappropriation, and fraudulent submission of false reports have been defined as such reasons in the CPSU Central Committee Resolution on the Tashkent Oblast Party Organization. Party commission workers believe that abuse of one's duty position for selfish purposes, conviction for criminal offenses, drunkenness, and moral dissoluteness should also be included.

Party commissions at Armed Services political directorates must pay more attention to the problem of party admittance and strengthening party ranks. So far they do not display the necessary activeness, at times work in the old way in this important area, and are slow to restructure in the spirit of present day requirements. The positive experience of party commissions at the political directorates of military districts, groups of forces and fleets, and at large unit political organs, is not being well studied by these party commissions, along with the departments of organizational party work.

The 19th Party Conference armed us with precise and clear instructions on the development of party ranks. It has been ordered that the practice of regulating their replenishment through a "schedule of allocations," which frequently creates obstacles to admittance into the party of leading initiative-filled people, be resolutely done away with. The chief criteria from which to proceed in assessing the qualities of an individual joining the party are his political position, real participation in restructuring, attitude toward his work, and moral make-up. It has been acknowledged to be advisable to take into account the opinion of the collective in which the individual is working, and to examine at open party meetings questions of his admittance. To implement these requirements fully and without delay means actually to increase the contribution of party organizations, political organs and their party commissions in the struggle for the purity and strength of the party nucleus in the army and navy.

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### Role of Senior Command in Delay of Military Restructuring

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[Article by Lt Col A. Petrenko: "Overcoming"]

[Text] "Are there, in your opinion, notable results in restructuring? If yes, how are they manifested?" Officers from various military districts answered the express questionnaire conducted by this office, in which these questions were contained. The majority of them were unanimous: There has become more light and glasnost in our relationships. Finally the positions of paper are yielding, and more trust is being placed not in it, but in the individual, his conscience, actions and deeds. One of the most objective criteria of the effectiveness and quality of any labor, including that of soldiers—the end result—is more and more insistently taking its rightful place. Tutelage, overcautiousness and the replacing of junior personnel by senior has been reduced.

"Finally we have been allowed to work," stated Lt Col S. Pavlushchenko, one of the officers in the Sevastopol Mtd Rfl Regt. As it turned out, much was contained behind this phrase. In past times, let us say before restructuring, during a month two or three commissions worked in the regiment, sometimes simultaneously, and dozens of various kinds of inspectors and monitors. They came from everywhere, all the way up to the very highest levels. People were "jolted" and replaced, but there was little benefit from this: The regiment chronically lagged. From this, far-reaching conclusions were drawn. The commander, political officer, and party committee secretary turned out to be among the guilty. They were removed as if by crews, in the figurative expression of Lt Col S. Pavlushchenko; i.e., all in a group. This cadre reshuffling at the regimental level worsened cadre stagnation at the lower levels. In some battalions up to 60-70 percent of the officers were in their positions for five years or more. Not that there was any reason to be surprised. The regiment deputy commander for political affairs said bitterly that for many years practically no one was interested in whether there were among the officers those who were deserving of promotion. Apparently, a widespread stereotype developed that in a lagging collective there are not, and cannot be those who could be encouraged, awarded and promoted.

Then the deleterious practice of "chopping heads" ceased. The regimental commander and his closest assistants were given the opportunity to look around and see how they should get to the heart of the matter. Pushing, through the use of dressing down, punishments and numerous inspections, was replaced by true, and not artificial concern about people. They provided, if not everything, then at least what was most important for the repair and maintenance of equipment; regulated the duty time of officers and warrant officers, and returned

to them their days off, about which many had already forgotten; and took care to raise the prestige of conscientious labor performed for the benefit of the collective. In particular, in but one year (in the words of Lt Col S. Pavlushchenko, an unprecedented case) they sent two battalion commanders to the academy—Majors I. Momot and V. Maykov. The place of one of them was taken by his "protege," Maj A. Reyrov. Captains A. Dikerman and V. Vitovich, who had been "sitting around too long" as company commanders, moved to the next step. Lt Col V. Sakharov became chief of artillery.

A fresh breeze blew in the stagnant regimental life. It motivated the idle moods that a number of officers, who had been hastily numbered among the unpromising, had developed, and blew away out of many hearts indifference and lack of confidence in their own capabilities. People revived, straightened their shoulders, and previously absent inspiration appeared in their work. This promptly had its effect on the results of the collective. At the final inspection, a principled commission, operating in the spirit of the times, for the first time in several years gave the regimental an overall "good" evaluation.

Nevertheless, why did the deputy regiment commander for political affairs, party committee secretary and other officers, who on the whole optimistically assessed the results of restructuring, continue to complain that overcautiousness, and lack of trust in the intellect, experience and energy of people are still occasionally seen? More than that, let us pose the question more broadly. Why does one still frequently hear from military people in conversation that the hopes that they and their co-workers placed on restructuring are, alas, not yet being justified? Why is there no decrease, but to the contrary, an increase in the number of letters in the editors' mail concerning phenomena not seen even in past times, not to mention present times? Have people begun to write more, having placed trust in glasnost, and in the possibility and irreversibility of changes? Undoubtedly. But is this the whole matter?

The previously mentioned express questionnaire also contained this question: "On whom, in your view, depends most of all the tempos at which changes in army life will occur?" And here almost all those questioned were unanimous in their opinion: on leaders, on those who lead the military collective or occupy higher rungs on the service ladder. The officers also cited arguments which, in their opinion, confirmed the rightness of this conclusion. Capt S. Berezovskiy, a political officer in one of the airborne regiments, expressed this thought: Due to the specific nature of the army organism, the characteristic features of which are one-man command and the strict subordination of those lower in position to those higher, it is namely on them, the leaders, that the tempos at which, and whether in general, the living and working conditions of many people, their subordinates, will change.

But the question arises: What is keeping some of them from displaying to the maximum their organizing restructuring initiative? Is it obsolete thinking? Probably; this must not be disregarded from calculations. But, I will express my own, perhaps contentious, opinion: This is not the main thing. It is very doubtful that leaders, people who are as a rule very experienced and competent, would not know what needs to be restructured in our life, or how to restructure it. The difficulty is something else. It is found in the lack of desire of some of them, brought up on humble exactingness toward themselves, to change anything fundamentally. For any reconstruction of the existing order always involves additional difficulties, which not everyone wants to take on his own shoulders. It also means reconstruction of the privileges of some, and possibly even their complete destruction. Honest, conscientious people embark upon such reconstruction painlessly, since for them the main thing is the cause. It is precisely to them that we owe the first results of restructuring. Their exact opposites are chained in every way to the old style, and safeguard and defend privileges that are important to them.

Lt Col N. Petukhov was serving as regiment commander in the Siberian Military District. He did not shine with particular successes as a commander. Under his leadership the regiment traditionally was among the laggards. On the other hand, he was successful in another area. In what, namely? In creating all kinds of benefits for himself and his family, at the expense of the state in the person of his regiment, which he, in essence, turned into his own estate. He organized the repair of his apartment on unit funds, using a free "work force," his subordinates. Materials, stone tile, paint, wallpaper and other construction "trivialities" were bought by his subordinates at enterprises in the city. He appropriated to himself the gas range and curtains that belonged to the regiment. Willfully, according to the principle, "I steal what I want," he used alcohol to deal with those who went for supplies. He did not disdain food products, which he took without a twinge of conscience from the soldiers' table. And he did not only take that which was in short supply—meat, "red" fish delicacy, and apples—but also potatoes and groats, which he could have bought without difficulty in a store.

Even this is not all. This man, who was invested with considerable authority and trust, comported himself like, excuse the expression, an unrestrained princeling. He was haughty, pretentious and lacking in self-control. What are just these facts worth? Communists, apparently thinking that membership in the party buro would strengthen the authority of the regiment commander, elected Lt Col Petukhov to the buro. But he frequently ignored (even when he was the speaker) the sessions of the party organ, alleging that he had more important things to do. When the communists lost patience and decided to criticize the commander, and quite mildly, in the report, he demanded crudely and categorically that the report be rewritten. Having learned that it had been decided not to invite him to the meeting for choosing

new buro members, he became outraged and, literally slamming the door, left the session. Then he went to one of his battalions and asked the communists to go to the party meeting to refute the criticism levied against him, as well to propose his candidature to the party buro.

The question arises: can it be surprising that, in a regiment led by this man, military training, discipline, and the cohesiveness of the officer and soldier collective would be so lamentable? No. This is all natural. But we are not talking about this. The strangest fact is that, having been removed from the party a second time (the first time he was shorn of his candidate's card while still commanding a platoon in school; removed for lack of discipline and negligent fulfillment of his duty responsibilities), Lt Col Petukhov is again trying to work his way back into the party. And there are people, communists, leaders, who are helping him in every way in his effort. During my discussion with the party commission secretary at the district political directorate, Col N. Dmitriyenko, the former regiment commander, phoned him in order to take him aback with the "happy" news that he had collected recommendations for his next admittance into the party.

"And why, really, should we be surprised?" Commented Col N. Dmitriyenko. "He has many defenders in division headquarters, who even after he was removed from his position took him under their wing, and insisted on putting him on their staff."

What should be the attitude toward a communist, even more so a leader, who has stained his honor? This is a rhetorical question. The answer, I believe, is clear to everyone. In our complex, turning point times, everyone must meet high expectations, and especially a communist leader: for moral purity; for style and method of work and interaction with subordinates; for the state of affairs in the collective he leads. Unfortunately, and the example of Lt Col Petukhov confirms this, at times these expectations still are not present. You see, he was not carrying out the outrages, to call a spade a spade, that we are talking about, in a vacuum. Both division headquarters and the political department, as well as the district political directorate, knew of his unsuitable leadership methods. They knew, but essentially did nothing following the lead of the protectors of this officer who had lost his right to lead. Only when the communists posed the question of removing the regiment commander from the party were they forced, as it is customary to say, to react. Only is this not late? How many souls did the unsuitable example of this leader succeed in corrupting? And even continue to corrupt already after he was removed from his position? For his removal, essentially, turned out to be a transfer to another, no less responsible position, now already in division headquarters. And why are those who protected him, and are even today protecting this leader who has compromised himself, not called to task, and not given their due? Or why do they not speak in the party way, in the spirit of the times, at the political

department and in the district political directorate, with those who for the third time are opening the party door to this former communist who has stained his honor?

Incidentally, it looks like such, frankly speaking, connivance is not a rare thing. It is difficult, if possible at all, to find an instance in other collectives when a communist was held responsible for one or another misdeed by those who recommended him for the party. So that, unfortunately, the responsibility of the recommender for the recommended, which is frequently being discussed today from various rostrums, still remains in many cases merely talk.

Everyone I have had the occasion to meet of late, and our readers in their letters, practically in one voice state that finally we have turned our faces toward military training, which, as it should always have been, is becoming the foundation of the life and activity of the collective in which they are serving. But, again there are those who note that there are still too many pretexts under which training time is spent for purposes far from improving military skill—various economic and construction projects, delivery and preparation of materials for these projects, and of spare parts for equipment, training resources and other attributes of the soldier's life. "We are literally suffering from the unbelievable amount of economic projects. And when commissions arrive, we depict for them a parody for a military training exercise. "And we are bringing the soldiers up against this background," Sr Lt B. Kotchenko, a deputy company commander for political affairs from Transbaykal Military District, writes with alarm. The seemingly universally condemned practice of naming so-called "responsible individuals," and using officers to replace junior commanders, has turned out to be a lie. "Things have gone to the point that a vehicle will not leave the park unless an officer is designated its senior occupant," exclaimed Maj A. Ivanov bitterly. And battalion chief of staff, Maj B. Sevryukov, expressed himself still more definitely. "I know that many officers, having returned after fulfilling their international duty in the Republic of Afghanistan," he wrote, "consider that to have been a happy period. There they truly served and really felt themselves to be commanders."

All of us military people must be prepared at any moment to meet the enemy with weapon in hand. But, honestly, it is mind-boggling to read such lines, in which life in a combat environment, filled with danger and against human nature, is considered preferable to everyday peacetime life. This means that the disarray that reigns in the collectives where they are serving has made these officers sick to death. And this is also to the "credit" of those who rose to current leading positions owing to some patronage, connections, or even open intrigues and abuses. It is they who have brought to some army collectives attitudes not characteristic of our army—crudity, self-conceit and self-interest. Moreover, it is their fault that in past years one-man command was frequently interpreted as one-man power, and it in turn

as total permissiveness, which not only at the lower end of the officer pyramid, but even in higher spheres, at times throttled initiative, and subjected those who disagreed to persecution.

Is there any reason to be surprised after this that the sprigs of independence and of a creative attitude toward work in many officers, warrant officers, sergeants and soldiers were suffocated? That many of them even today are waiting for changes, but cannot, and at times are fundamentally afraid to undertake something in order to bring them closer. "I don't have the strength to fight." "We have already been agitated and called upon so many times, and then so many times the promises were not fulfilled, that I already don't believe anything." Such admissions were also contained in those express questionnaires mentioned above.

How can we rid such people of the psychology of the "little man," or the "little screw," on which not much depends in the complex army organism? How can we return to them their lost hopes, and along with them the strength and energy for the new struggle? This is not an easy question. But it is necessary to find an answer. For every individual is a real or potential supporter of restructuring. And on him, on each, largely depends how the collective in which he serves will live: vitally, and filled with life in accordance with our so interesting and engrossing plans, or as before; i.e., far from always as it should be.

Most of all, and this is not subject to doubt, today special support is needed by honest, just, and active people, who are capable of taking on themselves the responsibility for success. It is precisely they who have the capability to break that evil circle of intrigues and abuses with which some leaders have surrounded themselves, and to bring order in the collectives which they lead.

The time has clearly come, as many suggest, to rid our collectives of idlers, demagogues and drunkards. Much has already been done in this direction in recent years. Much, but not yet everything. Still rather often both commanders and party organizations display amazing indulgence toward officers who are doing little or nothing in their work, or using alcohol. In one of the divisions in the Belorussian Military District, the political department chief placed a bulky package on the table. In it were papers accompanying the service, if it we can call it so, of Capt G. Melentyev. Eight (!) times he was convicted by an officers' comrades court of honor, and more than once the court recommended his discharge from the army (his sins are always the same—an unconscientious attitude toward his duties, and drunkenness). But the documents were returned to the division with enviable consistency, saying: reeducate him. But this captain in no way wanted to be reeducated, and enjoying the patronage of high officials from the cadre organs, continued to carry out his tricks, and punctually received his pay and allowances for this contribution. And when the time came for the new court, the ninth by count, the

officer refused to go to it, having judged correctly that nothing good would come of this "democracy." I am sure that here are also the roots of the apathy and indifference that some of them have toward restructuring as a whole, and toward their own participation in it. Moreover, it is with the help of such instances that the notorious psychology of the "little screw" discussed above is formed.

Furthermore, we today at times clearly do not pay enough attention to those who in past years lost faith in the possibility of changes, and for whom apathy and indifference have replaced prior social activeness. These people, despite all their minuses, have a great plus: despite past defeats, and betrayed consciousness and psychology, as a rule, they did not lose their honor, conscience and worth in the battles and compromises. And they are still frequently counted among the idlers and demagogues, and people react toward them accordingly. In one of the large units I met an officer who commanded a company for six years. Why did he "sit idle" so in this position? There was a time when the company was considered the best in the regiment. "Our Maltsev (the name of this officer) gave up, he lost his former qualities," the political department chief answered the above question. But, this assertion was far from the truth. The company commander was not false to his principles, but simply lost faith in himself. A confirmation of this is the fact that, after the intervention of a higher cadre organ, he was named a battalion commander. And again the officer's star rose: the collective he led was among the leaders.

A way out of such, unfortunately, not uncommon situations can also be found in increasing the activeness of party organizations. You see, a collective of communists, who think and act alike, is a great force. It can support those who have given up, protect those who are being persecuted for their criticism, and help those who have lost faith in the success of that which they are serving.

Recently I returned from a trip to the Carpathian Military District. I was in a regiment there that is today considered one of the best in the division. Almost all those with whom I met give credit for this to the party committee secretary, a principled, active and energetic man. There is in his character also a trait of good will, and a sensitive attitude toward people. How many of them he gave back faith in their abilities, and in justice, which were undermined in the unforgettable period of stagnation. One such individual is Capt S. Ayusheyev. There was a time when this officer, having grown tired of the disorder and the endless nerve-racking conditions that accompanied his service, had thrown up his hands at everything. But the communists, and especially the party committee secretary, who was only a little while before this elected to his current post, did not allow him to shut himself up in his misfortunes and vexations. They punished him for his misdeeds, but they also helped and supported him. In particular they influenced the battalion commander under whom the young officer was serving, and who had directly tried to cut the sharp

angles in his character. Today Capt S. Ayusheyev is a company commander, and an active participant in the restructuring processes that are going on in the regiment. And when we talked, the communist stated directly: I do not know what would have become of me had it not been for the participation of the party activists and party committee secretary.

Here reality turned still one more facet to us. Yes, today we have proclaimed the slogan: "Restructuring needs the individual." However, I think that it is necessary to add: The individual is needed everywhere, but especially at the head of the party collectives. "It is necessary to regenerate completely in the party an atmosphere of principles, openness, discussions, criticism and self-criticism, conscious discipline, party comradeship, and unconditional personal responsibility and efficiency." The 19th All-Union Party Conference posed this task. And there is hardly anyone who would take it upon himself to dispute the thought: Whether a particular party organization will succeed in solving it depends most of all on the secretary. If he is spineless and, so to speak, kowtows to the boss, and has only an "official" point of view on everything, it will be difficult to expect that the party organization he heads will conduct itself as a catalyst of acceleration in the given collective.

Unfortunately, there are times when individuals end up at the wheel of party organizations who are not capable of fulfilling the functions placed upon them. As a rule, the reasons are always the same, and their roots go back to the stereotypes of the past. In the battalion that Maj V. Ivashchenko commanded in his day, the secretary was recommended "from above," and the communists did not want to "spoil their relations" with their supervisors. This was true although, as it became clear later, they knew the recommended officer, Capt V. Vlasov, perfectly well, and not from the best standpoint. As a result, it was necessary to re-elect a secretary less than six months after the elections, due to alcohol abuse. In another battalion they almost elected a lieutenant who had arrived not long before, and who, by virtue of his youth and short term of service as an officer, lacked both sufficient experience, and the necessary authority. The principle: anybody, just not me, was in operation. Although, and this is not subject to doubt, for a communist this principle, especially in our turning point time, must be different: "If not I, then who."

This, by the way, is applicable to us all, regardless of our duty and military rank. It includes those who throw up their hands in bewilderment, saying, such hopes were placed on restructuring, and they are not being justified. Without fear of being categorical, I note that it is precisely here, in the hope of an all-powerful "uncle," who will come and change everything in accordance with our impressions of the ideal, so that we will only have to reap the fruits of his efforts, where one of the most powerful brakes to restructuring is concealed. Somehow, unnoticed, a stereotype took root in our consciousness: Anyone is at fault, only not we, for the shortcomings that

even today keep us from living and serving with maximum benefit, both to the cause and ourselves. But can the question really be put in this way? There cannot be among us military people those who do not need restructuring (regardless of the subject of discussion—a change in the way of thinking, psychology, or style and method of activity), since all of us are guilty to one extent or another, both for the fact that so many painful problems have accumulated in our army life, and for the fact that some of them, unfortunately, are truly being solved too slowly. For the destiny of any collective in the final analysis takes shape from the deeds of the people who comprise it.

Recently I heard from Lt Col V. Kovalev, a delegate to the 19th Party Conference: "At times we resemble people who have regained consciousness after a long hibernation. We have regained consciousness, opened our eyes and seen that it was too costly to us. So much rubbish has accumulated in our party house, and in our military house as a whole, that before we are able to sweep it out the door, we may become stuck in it, like in a swamp." Yes, we have begun to see many things clearly, and even today are continuing this process. But this enlightenment bears not only a bitter burning taste, but also an entirely tangible aftertaste of joy. For in each of us in whom beats an honest heart, in practically an instant there awoke a further desire for changes. We unconditionally believed in restructuring, and intently and impatiently awaited results. And our hearts are glad when we see the return of moral health encompassing more and more people, previously numbed consciousness emancipated, and the barricades destroyed behind which working for show, deception, indifference, and dozens of other results of the bad memory of the period of stagnation defended themselves against our, frankly speaking, not overly decisive onslaught. Nevertheless, there is still no end of work. Whether we will do it, whether we will overcome the difficulties that, unfortunately, are still considerable in our past, depends, let us say again, on all of us together and each individually. This is today's reality, which is ever more insistently making itself known.

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**GLAVPU Effort to Assure Elections Conform to 19th Conference Principles**

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[Unattributed article: "From Analysis—To Action"]

[Text] The conclusions reached from analysis of the electoral party meetings begun in the army and navy party organizations have been discussed in the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy. It was emphasized that political organs, party committees and buros have taken measures to ensure that the reports

and elections of party organs take place in strict accordance with the instructions of the CPSU 19th All-Union Conference, and the July 1988 party Central Committee plenum, and are marked by embarking upon energetic practical actions to improve party influence on solving assigned tasks.

The majority of the electoral party meetings that have been held are characterized by a high ideological-political and organizational level, and by a businesslike atmosphere of democratism and frankness. The election reports and presentations are exactly assessing the position of each communist on restructuring, and the personal contribution made in achieving higher quality indices in subunit and unit training, and in strengthening organization and order. The level of criticism and self-criticism has grown, and many constructive proposals are being introduced, which indicate that there are a growing number of communists who are taking an active position in the renewal of all aspects of the life and activity of the military and labor collectives, and who are prepared to operate in the spirit of today's requirements.

Demandingness toward the party aktiv and the electoral organs for the level of work and its results, and the ability to respond by action to the trust of the communists have been noted. Instances when their activity for the reporting period have been recognized as unsatisfactory have become more frequent.

Democratic principles of promotion, and elections of party organs and their secretaries, including elections with alternative choices, are being used in many party organizations. At the meetings that have been held, approximately half of the party group organizers and party organization secretaries have been chosen from two or more candidates.

At the same time, the level of leadership of the electoral campaign, and the nature of party meetings, do not everywhere fully correspond to CPSU Central Committee requirements. Due to insufficiently skilled assistance and attention from political organs, the electoral meetings in some party organizations are not distinguished by thorough analysis of the ideological life of the party organizations and of intra-party work, political approaches to ensuring combat readiness and military training, and a high example set by communists. The causes of lagging in military and political training are often being revealed superficially in reports and addresses. Activeness is still low in the search for effective measures to improve military discipline. A tendency has appeared toward lessening criticism of one's own shortcomings and omissions.

The Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy directed the attention of political organs, party committees and buros to the necessity to improve the effectiveness of preparing for and conducting reports

and elections in party organizations. It has been recommended that a businesslike discussion in party organizations of practical ways to affirm qualitative parameters of personnel training and indoctrination, as well as measures aimed at developing the initiative and responsibility of communists for the area of military service entrusted to them; their leading role in raising military skill; and the example they set in observing laws and military regulations, be distinguished as subjects of particular concern.

In connection with the high demands placed by the CPSU Central Committee on the level of work to strengthen military discipline in the army and navy, ways of implementing them and methods contributing to enhancing the activeness and responsibility of each party member in the prevention of crimes, accidents and gross violations of law, must be worked out at the electoral party meetings. Each electoral meeting must become an example of thorough analysis of ideological life and intra-party work, unity of word and deed, principled comradesly criticism, and of a skillful approach to the development of the program of party work for the future.

It is necessary to organize the work of urgently implementing proposals, critical remarks and decisions made. It is necessary to ensure skillful instruction of the aktiv in the local areas immediately following its election, especially on questions associated with the content and methods of party work, and experience in its restructuring. Particular attention is to be paid to assisting party groups and party organizations where the work of the party group organizers and secretaries, or elected party organs, has been recognized as unsatisfactory.

Political organs at all levels should think through questions associated with their reports at the forthcoming party conferences. The reports should provide an all-round analysis of the course of restructuring party political work, and involve conference participants in an interested discussion of measures to improve it further. The resolutions being approved by the conferences must buttress principles and objectivity in assessing the activity of political organs, with the development of key directions for improving the forms and methods of the political approach to solving the tasks facing the forces.

It has been recognized as necessary to illuminate effectively and systematically in the army press the course of the electoral party meetings and conferences, and positive experience and shortcomings in their preparation and conduct. The army and navy community is to be informed in detail about the restructuring of party work, practical implementation of decisions made, and critical remarks and proposals made by communists.

In November, along with the electoral party meetings and conferences, reports and elections for army and navy komsomol and trade union organizations will be completed. Therefore, effective party influence should be

realized, in the interest of fulfilling CPSU Central Committee requirements on increasing the role and activeness of social organizations in democratization of the life of military and labor collectives.

It is necessary to display interested attention toward everything new that is engendered in the life of the komsomol and trade union organizations, strengthening their authority in the collectives in every way, and to achieve greater initiative and independence.

Primary concern must be placed on ensuring that each electoral meeting becomes a kind of accelerator of restructuring, and contributes to the growth of the personal responsibility and consciousness of the communists.

**Military Clique Decried, Reform Proposed**  
*18120053 Moscow XX CENTURY AND PEACE*  
*in English No 11 1988 pp 2-4*

[Article by Major Pavel Ventur]

[Text] I've served in the army for more than two decades and, as a military professional, I've read with interest your publications about the army and society. They contain much truth, but this truth is incomplete—the authors look at the life of the military from outside. If you had an opportunity to observe the army organism from inside, you would have seen an even more gloomy picture.

Servicemen, second only to prisoners, are the biggest part of USSR citizens deprived of rights. Of all political rights they have only one determined by the "Disciplinary Regulations of the USSR's Armed Forces:" "the right to lodge a complaint against unlawful actions and orders of his commanders, violation of rights and preferences granted by the service or refusal to be provided with the established allowance..."

However, this curtailed right is restricted by so many reservations and official limitations for its use that in fact nobody wants to resort to it. The more so that being completely, slavishly dependent on his commanders and chiefs, serviceman driven to despair and ventured to lodge a complaint, at once turns into an object of organized oppression and very often, of victimization. Now we are fully aware of the consequences of the most substantiated complaint in the conditions of civil life, whereby in the conditions of army life "boomerang" hits a complainer more harshly.

But the dialectics of military life is so that, on a level with the masses deprived of rights, there is in the Army Forces the omnipotence of leaders. A successful career is the only way from the bottom to the top. Only vertical social movement can secure a man's status in the conditions of

military service. But the conditions of vertical movement are such that they secure the selection of the upper echelon of military leadership by this military leadership itself. There is no way there for officers having no ties.

That's what I call a military clique.

A presence in the country of a military clique, a military-industrial complex and militarism—is a real fact while the mentioned military clique will always vehemently seek to prove that we have never had, have and will never have such things. It'll be more correct to consider that the military clique consists of those (vitaly interested in militarism) who "are serving in the Arbat Military District" (the Arbat area in Moscow houses some high military institutions—Tr.) as they are called in the troops. The military clique are military dynasties closely bound by service, family and protectionist ties. These are dynasties that never get touched by the press—they are elite dynasties.

An example from my life. Recently one of my colleagues, a colonel, retired. On parting, he sighed: "When I began my service as a lieutenant, General Sh. was a commanding officer. Now, after three decades of service, I've been transferred to the reserve by another General Sh., also a commanding officer—he's the son of the first."

A funny story having rather deep meaning from army life: "Is it possible for a general's son to become a marshal?"—"No."—"Why?"—"A Marshal has his own sons." The army-navy elite is closely intertwined with the Party, state, scientific-technological, production, transport and trade elites. The knots joining these elites form a definite system which is a military-industrial complex, with all consequences resulting from this fact including militarism.

The remaining servicemen (apart from the high command) are simply dependent people. And not only soldiers but also officers, many of whom are oppressed by military service, and sometimes hate it. But an officer, who in his youth made a wrong professional choice, has no right to abandon military service voluntarily. He is enslaved for a quarter of a century, at least. This is the reason why some of them resort to drunkenness, breaching discipline to break away from the army even with a "black military-service card"—break away from military routine to save personal dignity, restore human self-esteem and at last feel himself a real citizen: a professional destructor rather than a professional creator.

Such sad thoughts come to an observer when he or she looks at the army from inside. I think the main reason of the present negative phenomena connected with army service is the deformation of consciousness developed during the years of Stalinism as a result of which the principle of one-man management transformed into the principle of absolute power. One-man management envisaged control of leaders both from the bottom and the top. Absolute power suppressed control from the

bottom and "famed" control from the top. Due to gradual unification and levelling, this control from the top at last stopped to bother the power and its carriers and reoriented itself only to checking the results of this power functioning.

The main instrument of absolute power is the functioning system of cadre bodies ("cadres" as they call it in the army), hence servicemen understand the ominous sense of sayings: "cadres can do everything," "if you are summoned to the cadres—you must wait," etc.). The web of this system has entangled the Armed Forces, deadened its inner processes, formalized conditions of officers' service, by elite's order it worked out selecting mechanism for uninterrupted reproduction of absolute power. Today even KRASNAYA ZVEZDA (RED STAR) army newspaper calls for putting the cadre bodies under the control of the army public.

Alas, at the moment we cannot do without the Armed Forces and the principle of one-man management. So what can be done? My suggestions, in brief:

**First**, the Armed Forces can be reduced both on the basis of mutual agreements with probable opponents and on the basis of realization of the new policy in defence construction determined by the 19th Party Conference of the CPSU—a policy which takes into account the change of priorities (the Conference materials declare: "From now on defence construction must be oriented primarily to qualitative parameters—both in technology and the Armed Forces composition.")

**Second**, purge the Army and Navy from military cliques who slow down democratization in the army and the demilitarization of society, in general.

**Third**, deprive cadre bodies of their prerogatives and transfer the function of promotion and transference of military personnel to the army public.

**Fourth**, withdraw defence enterprises, research, design, test and construction organizations (up to disbandment of military-construction formations) from the direct subordination to the Ministry of Defence and more actively introduce a cost-accounting system into them.

**Fifth**, the Armed Forces can and must be humanized, Leninist concept of one-man management rejecting absolute power must be restored, the legal rights of servicemen (as USSR citizens) must also be restored, work of commanders, chiefs, political bodies must be placed under the control of army public.

**Sixth**, military units must be placed under the control of local Soviets, while army Party organizations—under the control of local Party committees.

**Seventh**, the army must be regarded as an element of people's diplomacy—meetings with servicemen as probable opponents must be organized.

**Eighth**, priorities in political and educational work with servicemen in the Army and Navy must be changed in the interests of demilitarization of mass consciousness and education in the spirit of peace.

Such complex of practical measures could not only curb "socialist militarism" but also solve the most acute social problems in the Army and the Navy (violation of human dignity of the first-year soldiers, evasion of military service, drunkenness and drug addiction, etc.).

I understand the possible consequences, nevertheless I ask the editors to publish my letter.

#### **Baltic Military District Party Conference**

18010302 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
28 Dec 88 First Edition p 2

[Article by Lt Col M. Ziyeminysh: "Dictated by Life"]

[Text] On the eve of the beginning of the party conference of the Baltic Military District, its participants—including A.M. Brasauskas, first secretary of the Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee, V. Byalyas, first secretary of the Estonian Communist Party, D. Romanin, first secretary of the Kaliningrad Obkom and V. Namestnikov, responsible worker of the CPSU Central Committee—held businesslike meetings with the personnel of the advanced guard Sevastopol Red Banner Motorized Rifle Training Regiment imeni Latyshskikh strelkov. The guests familiarized themselves in depth with the life and living conditions of the personnel and with the training and educational process. The problems of international education were also the focus of frank discussions.

The discussion on the pressing subject begun in the regiment was continued in the lecture given at the conference by O. Zinchenko, member of the Military Council and chief of the district's Political Directorate, in the report of Col Yu. Bushev, secretary of the party commission under the district Political Directorate and, in the speeches of the commander of district forces Col Gen V. Grishin and the comrade delegates Yu. Grekov, V. Maldov, B. Duda, A. Garkushi, V. Chernogo and others.

Speaking at the party conference were member of the Military Council and chief of the Political Directorate for Ground Forces Col Gen M. Popkov and First Secretary of the Lituanian Communist Party Central Committee A. M. Brazauskas. Ya. Vagris, first secretary of the Latvian Communist Party Central Committee, participated in the work of the conference.

#### **Meetings Select Candidates for USSR Deputies**

18010310a Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
31 Dec 88 First Edition p 1

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA reports: "Selecting USSR Deputies—Mandates of Trust"; first paragraph is KRASNAYA ZVEZDA introduction]

[Text] Army and Navy party and Komsomol organizations are making their recommendations for the advancement of candidates as USSR People's Deputies.

The North Fleet political directorate held a conference that included the chiefs of political organizations and party activists. They discussed possible party candidates for USSR People's Deputies and fleet party organizations introduced a 15-man candidacy. After a thorough analysis the conference approved the candidacy of communists who had received the widest support in party organizations—CPSU Central Committee General Secretary and Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium M. Gorbachev, First Deputy Chief of the Soviet Army and Navy Main Political Directorate Admiral of the Navy A. Sorokin and Military Council member and Chief of the Navy Political Directorate Vice-Admiral V. Panin.

During their meeting communists from the Transcaucasus Military District Political Directorate proposed District Commander Colonel General I. Rodionov as the Communist Party's recommendation for USSR People's Deputies. The commander's candidacy was also supported at an open district headquarters and directorate party meeting.

The Soviet Army and Navy Main Political Directorate held a meeting of Armed Forces Komsomol organization representatives at which they discussed the candidacy for USSR People's Deputies. This work was first done in local Komsomol organizations in units and ships and at Komsomol activist meetings in major units, groups of forces, districts and fleets.

At the meeting they decided to support the proposed candidacy and recommend to the Komsomol Central Committee that the following comrades be the Army and Navy Komsomol candidates for USSR People's Deputies: subunit commander Senior Lieutenant D. Averin; Army and Navy Main Political Directorate Deputy Chief for Komsomol Work Lieutenant Colonel I. Yefimov; major unit Deputy Political Section Chief for Komsomol Work Captain Lieutenant M. Nenashev; Warrant Officer School Komsomol Committee Secretary Warrant Officer A. Lipin; military construction unit Komsomol Committee Secretary Warrant Officer I. Reznik; subunit commander Senior Lieutenant A. Pushkarov; missile unit Komsomol Committee Secretary Senior Lieutenant A. Uvarov; Perm Military Technical Aviation Academy imeni Leninist Komsomol Cadet Starshina S. Shanin and Sergeant Yu. Shatrovenko.

The expanded plenum of the Sverdlovsk Oblast War and Labor Veterans Council recommended Chairman of the Soviet Committee of War Veterans Marshal of Aviation A. Silantyev and Chairman of the Sverdlovsk Veterans of War and Labor Organization A. Sidorov as this social organization's candidates for People's Deputies.

**Open Line to Discuss Military Affairs Created**  
*18010310b Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian*  
*31 Dec 88 First Edition p 1*

[Announcement: "You Are Invited To Call In"]

[Text] Glasnost is lifting the curtain that has screened many issues and problems whose wide-spread discussion even recently has been unpleasant. And if things did reach the point of discussion, it was often good-natured, superficial and monotonous. This subject matter also included the Army. Perestroyka is also compelling us to develop a critical understanding of the processes that are taking place in the Armed Forces and is sensitizing our attitudes toward problems and shortcomings. People want to know as much as possible about their army—about the service, the life and the leisure time of soldiers and officers, about "dedovshchina" and barracks hooliganism, opposition to the friendly associations of people from the same area and other such negative phenomena that have disturbed the army organism in some locations.

Who is guilty and what are the roots of evil? How do we tear these roots out and remove them from the army work-day? What has already been done? These are the questions that we get in letters from the relatives and close friends of soldiers and also from readers who are not indifferent to what is going on in the army and how the army is doing today.

Therefore a soldier's collective from one unit is inviting you, respected comrades, to an open, frank dialogue about everything that you are interested in and everything that is upsetting you about the subject of the army. Participants will include:

- Unit Commander Lieutenant Colonel A. Korchagin;
- Deputy Commander for Political Affairs Major S. Tyaglov;
- Party Buro Secretary Captain A. Potapov;
- Komsomol Committee Secretary Warrant Officer A. Matkovskiy;
- soldiers with various lengths of service, workers from military justice...

We feel that we will get calls from the fathers and mothers of our soldiers, their loved ones, soldiers in the reserves and those who are being called up and whose service is still up-coming. We also feel that we will get

calls from commanders, party and Komsomol activists and soldiers from other army collectives who would like to find out about the experiences that this unit has had in solving a wide variety of issues and problems.

While the "Open Line" is in operation, calls to the unit will be maintained through Moscow. The telephone numbers are 559-57-11 and 559-57-09. The "Open Line" will operate on Saturday, 7 January 1989 from 1000 until 1300 hours.

**Sorokin Chairs Meeting on Interethnic Problems**  
*PM2001090389 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA*  
*in Russian 6 Jan 89 Second Edition p 1*

["Our Correspondent" report: "To Educate Internationalists"]

[Text] A session of the Interethnic Relations Commission under the Soviet Army and Navy Main Political Directorate was held 5 January. It ratified regulations on interethnic relations commissions (groups) to be elected by servicemen's meetings in units, on ships, and at education establishments or to be set up in combined units [soyedineniya] and large strategic units [obyedineniya] for the purpose of constantly studying and analyzing interethnic relations within servicemen's collectives, drafting proposals for the improvement of soldiers' internationalist education, and promptly solving conflicts that may emerge on the grounds of nationality.

It was noted at the session that the negative phenomena that recently emerged in the Transcaucasian republics and other regions of the country as a result of retreat from the Leninist principles of the nationalities policy, breaches of legality during the personality cult period, and the ideology and mentality of the times of stagnation have not bypassed servicemen's collectives and demand constant attention. Specifically, there was an analysis of the work done by commanders, political organs, and ideological cadres in the Transcaucasus Military District—which was recently visited by a group of officers from the Main Political Directorate—on the military-patriotic and internationalist education of servicemen and the consolidation of their sponsorship ties with local public organizations.

The commission's session was chaired by its chairman, Admiral of the Fleet A.I. Sorokin, first deputy chief of the Soviet Army and Navy Main Political Directorate.

**Reader Suggests Advance 'Discussion' of Defense Budget**

*PM2501123589 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian*  
*21 Jan 89 Morning Edition p 6*

[Letter from G. Skorik under the general heading: "From the International Departments' Mailbag"]

[Text] Money for Defense [headline of letter]

After familiarizing myself with USSR Finance Minister B. Gostev's report "On the USSR State Budget For 1989..." at the session of the USSR Supreme Soviet, the following question occurred to me. A total of R20.2 billion in expenditures appears in the state budget's expenditure column for defense capabilities, a sum used "to maintain USSR Armed Forces personnel, material and technical supply, military construction, and other outlays."

According to press data, U.S. military spending needs total approximately \$300 billion. According to USSR Gosbank reports, the U.S. dollar exchange rate is approximately R0.6-0.7. Evidently, we should spend a minimum of approximately R200 billion on defense. If that's the case, then the following question logically arises: At the expense of which state budget items is our real total defense expenditure put together?

I believe this kind of question would not arise if our military budget were deciphered in detail and subjected to detailed discussion before being adopted, as is the practice in other countries. This is a great deal of money and it comes from our taxes.

#### **Reservists Rally Becomes 'Battle' for Uzbek Secretary**

PM2601113589 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA  
in Russian 24 Jan 89 First Edition p 1

[Report by Captain V. Kovalenko: "Rally of Military Reservists"]

[Text] As already reported in the press, the first republic rally of military reservists, held on the initiative of the Uzbek Komsomol Central Committee, has ended. It examined organizational questions and discussed problems concerned with accelerating military-patriotic work with young people in the republic. V.P. Anishchev, second secretary of the Uzbek Communist Party Central Committee, could hardly have supposed that instead of delivering a brief report on the activity of military reservists in the republic he would have to "battle away" for almost 2 hours at the rostrum. He was "bombarded" with questions. They were concerned with the fact that a critical moment has arrived in the military reservists' military-patriotic movement, which has now existed in the republic for 3 years. It is impossible to continue on enthusiasm alone. An internationalist serviceman from the Chilanarskiy Rayon Military-Patriotic Club in Tashkent was the first to ask a question.

"We work until 1700 or 1800 hours at our own enterprises. Then comes the 'second shift'—the club and the youngsters. At work if they don't actually put a wrench in the works they nevertheless look at you askance: What do you do down there in the basement? It is time our movement received official status."

"Men, you have certainly misinterpreted me," the speaker answered from the rostrum. "I was talking about work on a voluntary basis. And as for doing it officially? Enroll at the teacher-training institute at the faculty where military instructors are trained."

The fact that this response did not satisfy the rally was immediately clear from the reaction in the hall.

Ye. Vorobyev, chairman of the Zavarshanskiy City Military Reservist Council and holder of the Order of the Red Star, spoke:

"I have been an enthusiast for 3 years now. Without a material base we will go under. Our enthusiasm is constantly running up against bureaucratic brick walls."

"That is not just your problem. The bureaucrat is our common enemy. We have spoken about this at all levels. We need to fight him together. A decision has now been made to recruit internationalist servicemen to the apparatuses of leading organs—the party Central Committee, the republic Komsomol, and the Council of Ministers—so that you have your own representatives there who will pursue your line...."

But the young men did not let up in their pressure. They criticized the republic press and television for inadequate and sometimes even distorted coverage of military-political education. They asked about perpetuating the memory of the dead, and raised many other problems. Some of them were solved there, on the spot—for instance, the creation of an action group that will carry out an analysis of the problems of military reservists in all regions of the republic. Afghan veteran V. Melnichuk, an instructor at the Uzbek Komsomol Central Committee Sports and Mass Defense Work Department, is at its head. V. Anishchev promised to give an answer to the remaining questions and suggestions within 6 weeks.

Many military reservists were surprised during this heated debate that A. Nasyrov, first secretary of the republic Komsomol Central Committee, did not even once attempt to join in the discussion. Did he not dare to, or was there nothing to say?

Yes, the republic youth leader does indeed have quite a few problems.

#### **Career of Baltic MD Commander Profiled**

18010172 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
25 Jan 89 p 2

[Article by Maj. V. Zadubrovskiy: "Trust and Duty"]

[Text] The first stage of the pre-electoral campaign has been completed: in accordance with the Law on Elections, the nomination of candidates for the USSR people's deputies is ending 2 months before the elections. The formation of election districts must be completed in

this same time—the same ones for election of people's deputies from territorial and national-territorial okrugs. Election districts must be formed in military units as well.

As in the entire nation, in army and navy collectives this stage has displayed the people's growing political activity, their aspiration to nominate to a high organ of state power active fighters for perestroyka, principled, responsible leaders capable of new thinking. Among the candidates for deputy are well-known political and public figures, the foremost workers, kolkhoz workers, representatives of the intelligentsia, army and navy.

Typically, many representatives of the army and navy were nominated as candidates for deputy at a meeting of servicemen at military units. Today our readers describe how two candidates came through this process.

There is a strip of red cloth with the date of the upcoming elections at the soldiers' club entrance. The hall is cramped, filled with personnel. There is a tribune, a presidium. There is one question on the agenda for the general meeting: the nomination of territorial okrug candidates for USSR people's deputies.

Whom did the soldiers nominate as their candidate for people's deputy?

From the speech of Lt Col I. Kuchugurnyy:

"...Considering the importance of our task of improving the nation's defensive capabilities, and the situation as it is unfolding in the Baltic region, and here in Riga, the unit officers, Party, Komsomol, and trade union organizations have all formed the opinion that our best representative in this high organ of state power, representing the interests of the military electorate, will be the commanding officer of the Baltic military district, Lieutenant General Fedor Mikhaylovich Kuzmin."

It would be customary to write that this man is well-known in the formations and units. But we must digress from the stereotype. Lt Gen Kuzmin arrived in the military district quite recently, therefore it is necessary to introduce him to the voters.

Fedor Mikhaylovich Kuzmin was born into the family of a kolkhoz worker in 1937, in the village of Kopanovka, Yenotayevskiy Rayon, Astrakhan Oblast. His father, kolkhoz worker Mikhail Ivanovich, volunteered for the front during the first days of the Great Patriotic War, and died in the autumn of 1941. His mother, Mariya Pavlovna, worked in the kolkhoz.

At an early age, Fedor Mikhaylovich decided to dedicate his life to the difficult profession of the Soviet officer. At the age of 13, he went to the Ordzhonikidze Suvorov military school. Upon graduation, he remained true to his choice of professions, and applied to the Leningrad

Higher Joint Command School imeni S.M. Kirov. Upon his commission as an officer, he served in military garrisons in the Far East, Central Asia and the North of our Motherland.

There are two sons in his family. Mikhail, the elder, chose to follow his father's footsteps. Upon commission as an officer, he served his military and internationalist duty in Afghanistan. He was awarded the order of the Red Star and a "Valor" medal for showing bravery and military valor. He was wounded. He returned to his unit after hospitalization.

Lt Col I. Kuchugurnyy supplemented the commanding officer's biography:

"I know Fedor Mikhaylovich Kuzmin from serving together in the Central Troops Group, where he commanded the acclaimed motorized rifle troops of the Irkutsk-Pinsk division, fulfilling the duties of garrison chief. From the very first days of service, right after his arrival in the unit, he put all his energy into improving the unit's combat readiness, and bettering the everyday life of the combined unit."

Shortly thereafter, a plan to bring all garrison units up to combat readiness was revised. Issues of residential space were affirmatively resolved. Officers and ensigns who had waited over 2 years for apartments received lodgings.

Up to yesterday, the deputy's mandate was considered by many to be an unavoidable appendix to the responsibilities of command. The psychology of both the electorate and the candidates whom they nominate for people's deputy is now changing. Not only a high calling, but an enormous responsibility, a laborious task is connected with the election. Above all, deeds are expected of the deputy. Even upon nomination, problems arise which demand his decisions.

"The industrial training center has turned into a long-term construction project. We request your intervention..." "We don't have a sports hall. The stadium is filled with cars..." "Back in 1983 our club was supposed to be torn down as obsolete. But they're not building a new one..." "More than 60 people live in our dormitory. But the local authorities won't register them, since the rooms are unfit for occupancy. Repairs are needed, but where are the officers and ensigns supposed to settle? Help us..."

Notes taken during the meeting do not exhaust all the questions troubling the personnel. The speakers stated the questions openly, embellishing nothing, and not smoothing out the rough edges.

The Law on the Election of USSR People's Deputies requires that each candidate for people's deputy have his own pre-electoral program. What sort of program does Lt Gen F. Kuzmin have?

"In my practical experience," the commanding officer said in his speech, "I will direct my efforts to fulfill the decisions of the 27th Congress of the CPSU, and the

19th All-Union Party Conference, toward the realization of the Soviet defense doctrine, the transition to qualitative parameters in troop training, the support of combat readiness of the combined unit and subdivisions on a level which meets modern requirements. I consider the main goal for 1989 to be: the liquidation of "grandfathering," raising the culture of personal contact and proximity of officers in relation to soldiers, the creation and support of well-codified, just conditions of service and everyday life for the personnel."

In this unit, the pre-electoral program of the candidate for people's deputy concerned the sphere of his everyday work. With no less interest, the meeting's participants listened to concrete proposals linked to the problems and concerns of the region and territory, whose people's interests Lt Gen F. Kuzmin must advocate, if he is elected a people's deputy.

The candidacy is put to a vote. The decision is confirmed by a forest of hands.

**Combat Training Chief On Tactical Training  
Changes Based On 'Qualitative Parameters'**  
*18010334 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
7 Jan 89 First Edition pp 1-2*

[Discussion between Lieutenant Colonel I. Yesyutin, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent, and Lieutenant General V. Khazikov, deputy chief of the Main Combat Training Directorate of the Ground Forces: "Revive As An Art"]

[Text] Targeting on qualitative parameters in the further development of the armed forces and the practical steps taken by the party and the state in their reorganization in accordance with the new military doctrine, inevitably presume a restructuring of the entire system of Army and Navy training. One of the most important trends in the efforts to further upgrade their combat readiness is perfecting the tactical training of the troops and naval forces. The state of affairs in this area is today's topic of a discussion between Lieutenant Colonel I. Yesyutin, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent, and Lieutenant General V. Khazikov, deputy chief of the Main Combat Training Directorate of the Ground Forces.

**Yesyutin:** At the end of last school year I had the opportunity to attend three tactical exercises in the Carpathian Military District. All of them were two-sided which, as we know, makes it possible for the trainees to display particularly clearly their tactical skills. However, it was precisely tactics that were lacking. Neither side took the trouble to try clever ideas or take daring and original steps. The situation kept changing but, strangely, the subunits did not act according to circumstances but, rather, on the basis of a predetermined plan. I recall that suddenly helicopters appeared in front of the guard tower. They made a height maneuver, simulated the launching of missiles and, making a sharp turn, flew to one side.... The movement looked beautiful. The trouble was that their own subunits would have already occupied the positions at which the missiles were aimed.... It turned out that the helicopter pilots were unaware of this fact....

Comrade Lieutenant General, what is today, generally speaking, the situation concerning tactics? What did the annual results indicate?

**Khazikov:** Tactics and tactical training were problems which were discussed with great concern at the meeting of the Ground Forces Military Council, at which the results of combat and political training were analyzed. The task was set of reviving tactics as a combat art. This problem, however, is not one affecting exclusively the ground forces. It appears that the importance of tactics has been downgraded in the other branches of the armed forces. This was repeatedly manifested in the course of last year's exercises. Concepts on some types of battle and ways and means of work by commanders and staffs seemed to have remained on their old levels and become an obstacle to the development of tactics.

**Yesyutin:** What is this related to, Vadim Nikolayevich?

**Khazikov:** The reasons are numerous. To a certain extent the present shortcomings were passed on to us from the time of stagnation. It was precisely the so-called ostentatious and beautiful tactics that were learned by the present generation of tactical officers in the course of their formation, according to which the main criteria were either speed, fire or drill. Today it is no easy thing to break down a mentality which took years to develop.

**Yesyutin:** However, we also hear the view that stagnation in tactics occurred much earlier than our overall stagnation. This was related to the fact that the military commanders who rose in the ranks during the Great Patriotic War and who, in postwar times, assumed leading positions in the Army, absolutized their front-line experience. In order to earn a high rating, commanders were forced to adapt, and it was thus that experience turned into stereotype....

**Khazikov:** I believe that, conversely, the first postwar decades advanced tactics a great deal. All structural components of our military art were enriched with new ideas with the appearance of nuclear and other mass destruction weapons. I began my career as an officer as a squad commander, in 1956, and I remember how actively tactics were being developed at that time. Many researchers were then working in the forces. Furthermore we, practical workers, did not blindly follow the manual.

No, the ossification of tactics began later, in the 1970s. It began with a seemingly good step: establishing exercises with field firing as the main criterion in tactical training. Priority was given to fire, to creating good conditions for hitting the targets, and commanders concentrated their entire energy on it. Why did they need tactics, such as an outflanking movement or an envelopment?... The exercise would be given a high mark if there were holes in the targets. Furthermore, the safety measures encouraged "avoiding unnecessary complications." The main thing was for no one to stream ahead or fall behind. Naturally, however, this is no longer tactics.... This being the case, gradually tactical training in squads and exercises on the company level gradually were reduced to naught. The result was that at the final inspection in one of the units of the Kiev Military District, no single company commander was able to line up the company in a line of vehicles abreast, i.e., to carry out a most basic assignment.

**Yesyutin:** It was noted in the review of the Army exercises which were held within the framework of the "Autumn-88" command-staff exercise, that today tricks, the desire to outsmart the enemy in terms of reconnaissance, to detect his intentions, and to overcome him with nonstandard maneuvers were few on the training battlefield....

**Khazikov:** This confirms yet once again that we have become a kind of hostages to our self-created idol: exercises with combat fire. I witnessed the report submitted at the final inspection of a battalion commanded by Guards Major N. Sergeyev. His fire was that of an expert. However, there were no tactics on the field. The subunits came up to the starting strip and attacked. One can't lose for winning. This was not tactical training but a simple exercise. Everything was subordinated to fire. The field was flat, there were no trenches, shell holes or obstacles. God help us if the crew would be jolted while taking aim....

**Yesyutin:** It seems to me that you are opposed to firing during exercises. Yet firing means the actual hitting of the targets, without which there can be no victory.

**Khazikov:** I do not deny the role of a fire hit. However, combat experience also favors skillful tactical action. To gain the upper hand over the enemy as a result of a precise calculation and military cunning has always been considered the first quality of a commander. Today, when we must undertake the solution of problems with fewer forces, it is not numbers that will win but skill, which makes it twice as important. Actually, who must be defeated? A strong, a professionally trained enemy. Here as well we must be familiar with the enemy's tactics and his strong and weak sides.... Training with combat fire, naturally, is necessary but must not be absolutized.

**Yesyutin:** In your view, what are the ways leading to improvements in tactical training? You mentioned that company and squad tactical exercises have been reduced to naught....

**Khazikov:** This is not to say that they are not taking place. They are, but how? On foot, by drill. Is the soldier given an adequate concept of modern combat in training without infantry fighting vehicles, tanks, or armored personnel carriers? For example, how can we train people to occupy a defense sector without the use of IFV? What kind of training is this? They should be able to dig them in, the crews should have a range card, the squad and company commanders should place weapons in their defense stronghold.

**Yesyutin:** Why do they go into the field without vehicles?

**Khazikov:** Simply because we are short of training vehicles for tactical exercises. Four or five would go to practice fire and five or six would be used in driver's training. Furthermore, according to official rules, no more than 15 percent may be in a state of repair or servicing. In practice their number is always higher. So, nothing is left.... Furthermore, we are not allowed to use vehicles other than training vehicles for tactical training and exercises. This is yet another stumbling block in tactical training. A new order is being drafted. However, deputy commanders in charge of armaments do not like it. They find it better for no one to use such vehicles, so

that they can stay clean in the motor pool. Those who are in charge of combat training would like to use them. In a word, there is a conflict of interest. This problem remains unsolved.

**Yesyutin:** We know that there are some, sensitive spots, so to say, in the tactical training of the troops. What can we expect in the long term?

**Khazikov:** First let me mention that soon all training vehicles and weapons will be equipped with laser simulators for firing and hitting targets.

Exercises with the use of such simulators were held last year in the Carpathian and Baltic military districts, at the rally of deputy commanders of troops of districts and groups of forces in charge of combat training. At those exercises the subunit commanders were no longer concerned with having an even battle line or headlong advance. They gave greater thought to the use of the protective features of the terrain, and on how to survive and preserve the subunit. Tanks which were under "fire" stopped, a light would start shining over them, they would release smoke and would be unable to fire.... The possibility exists objectively to assess who applied knowledgeable tactics and who was more or less well trained.

**Yesyutin:** So, what is the problem, Vadim Nikolayevich?

**Khazikov:** It is one of technical delay. We developed simulators for earlier-model tanks. Today, however, we need new ones. This year we expected the first batch. Practical experience indicates that the battalion must become the basic rating unit. In our view, this will make it necessary for commanders to better train the company, the squad and the platoon. The former orientation toward wide-scale action was not always justified. It led to adopting a superficial view on the training of subunits. By concerning ourselves with the qualitative parameters in combat training, we must go down, we must look at whether everything there is as it should be. For example, what are the criteria on the basis of which the tactical training of platoons, squads and companies is evaluated? It is purely intuitive: one may like or not like it. More time must be allocated precisely to the training of subunits.

**Yesyutin:** This, however, will require improvements in material facilities....

**Khazikov:** Yes, in material facilities as well. Today we are using those which were developed in the 1960s such as, for example, target hoists. They are cumbersome, require a power feed cable and are difficult to handle. For that reason it is difficult to change the tactical situation. We have currently developed an essentially new compressed air hoist. It can be radio controlled. However, its completion is encountering a great deal of difficulty. We must speed this up! So far the training and material facilities are hindering the creative side of tactics as well.

It is true that this very year we would like to set up training grounds on which we would concentrate all of the equipment using laser simulators. The battalions will come here, learn to handle it and undergo training. The training-method center created here will participate in tactical exercises, in supervising personnel training and in rating.

In tactical training the efforts will be concentrated essentially on two-sided exercises. This will include a method such as counterposing battalions of different regiments against each other and, possibly, of different divisions. Within the themes of the exercises themselves we must eliminate the simple approach in which one of the sides usually attacks and the other defends itself. Combat is a complex many-faceted phenomenon. We must develop the most typical but understudied problems. We must take into consideration the increased capabilities of arms and equipment. We must more daringly increase the complexity of training and practice the joint training of subunits and units of the different arms and services.

**Yesutin:** Clearly, the changes should also affect the tactical aspect in the system of command training. In the opinion of some of our readers concentrating attention on the detailed study of field manuals and developed methods leads to the fact that what is being studied is already familiar....

**Khazikov:** There is little analysis of practical experience and exchange of views at command training. Yet this alone can develop independence, mental flexibility and taste for tactics as a combat art. The monotonous and frequently ostentatious background of many exercises has trained the people less to think than to obey blindly. The development of tactics will be provided with a powerful impetus whenever intensive mental activities on the battlefield will become the rule, and when every commander will have developed his own original combat style.

A great deal has been done on this level in the training of commanders. A new program has been drafted. It emphasizes more active forms of training. However, it is not a question of programs. Whereas rallies take place more or less normally, for they involve superior commanders, the training in the units and directorates, let us speak frankly, cannot withstand criticism. In that same unit I mentioned, more than one-half of the officers were rated only satisfactory at the final command training test. One of the battalion commanders told me frankly: "Comrade Lieutenant-General, throughout the summer I either had no time for holding command training classes or else the squad commanders whom I should have been dealing with were unavailable...."

**Yesutin:** How is the situation with methodological support for command training?

**Khazikov:** Many new and, in my view, quite useful aids have come out. They have been distributed among the troops in sufficient numbers. New field manuals are also being drafted. It is true that another predilection may be noted in the method. For example, it is recommended that as many as 70 percent of all commander training involve the use of combat equipment and in the field. No less than 30 percent must take place at night. By itself, however, finding oneself in the field, day or night, provides no results. Imagine: in winter, officer training in the field. Words freeze in one's mouth.... We have developed the following stereotype: If we are instructed to conduct more field exercises, I, as the commander, will try to hold all exercises in the field, whether this is necessary or not. I would not be blamed for conducting field exercises but as to training in the classroom, what can I say...

**Yesutin:** In this case the various types of investigating commissions are also making their "contribution." Recently our editors received a response to a critical article in which the author of the response accused us of the fact that in the headquarters where he served the words "commission" and "investigative" have been deleted from the vocabulary whereas they, the editors, write that.... Ignoring this is simple and it is more difficult to get rid of the habit of pushing and rechecking, and to trust subordinates. At the exercises which, incidentally, were headed by that same author, I witnessed the event that his deputy in charge of training, looking at the regimental commander's operational map, remarked: "That is not correct. Read the article in the manual...."

**Khazikov:** But then there is also the following circumstance: it is the commanding officer who is fully responsible for the outcome of the battle. The people who make such so-called switches bear no responsibility whatsoever for their opinions. However, they interfere, they make others adopt precisely the decisions which they support. The following question arises: Why is it that so many such people attend exercises? One would assume that they all have their own obligations. Such messengers of superior staffs are openly promoting that same ostentation. Their main task is to prove that the commander who is their ward is an able combat organizer.

**Yesutin:** What about the development of tactics as a science? Has some progress been made in this area?

**Khazikov:** There are those who believe that something new has appeared here. I, however, do not believe so. Anything that is new is temporary, and even more so in tactics. Yesterday this was new and today it no longer is. Tomorrow it will be old altogether. Tell me, what novelty is there in the fact that in defense, for example, as some theoretical tacticians have been suggesting to us, one should hold several positions and that in the defensive

stronghold positions for tanks and IFVs should be anticipated? To whom is it a novelty that each stronghold should be prepared for antitank battle? One should simply draw the attention to such matters and increase exigency.

**Yesyutin:** Today, however, something else as well is being talked about in the forces: mobile defense, for example....

**Khazikov:** As to mobile defense... we should think about it.

**Yesyutin:** The Red Army Field Manual, which was used during the Great Patriotic War, has an entire section on mobile defense. It stipulates that it means a series of sequential defensive battles along pre-established lines, combined with short and sudden counterattacks....

**Khazikov:** Yes, there was such a section but subsequently we no longer used it. Mobile defense presumes retreat, you see? At this point, we are still not clear: how many subunits should retreat, how many should hold their positions to the end and how many should be preparing themselves for a counterattack. This is as yet to be studied. We have currently developed in our Directorate a tactical development group. It has a major research program related to structural changes in the composition of the armed forces. It is dealing with that problem as well. Extensive research will have to be done in the area of tactics also in connection with the reorganization of

the armed forces and ascribing, as has already been made public, a purely defensive structure of our large units. In the course of the current and the next year, the size of our armed forces will be reduced by half a million men. Unilaterally we shall reduce our tank forces by 10,000, artillery systems by 8,500, and combat aircraft by 800 units. However, the security of the country must remain guaranteed at the necessary level. We must learn how to carry out the same assignments with fewer forces and means but through qualitative parameters of armaments and combat ordnance, the development of military science and the better training of armed forces personnel.

**Yesyutin:** Are you confident, Vadim Nikolayevich, that the steps you mentioned will result in strengthening the creative principle in tactics?

**Khazikov:** Once the problem has been identified and the approaches to its solution defined, it must be solved. I shall not undertake to give assurances. I shall say this: our Directorate has been seriously preparing itself for the new school year and we are greatly relying on it.

**From the Editors:** By instituting this dialogue in the section "Combat Readiness: Qualitative Parameters," we rely, dear readers, on your active participation in the discussion of this problems related to ensuring high ground, air and navel training of Army and Navy personnel, the professional training of officers and maintaining on the necessary level the combat readiness of large units, units and ships under the conditions of the reduction and reorganization of the armed forces.

**Akhromeyev Calls NATO Force Figures  
'Distorted'**

*LD2501103489 Moscow World Service in English  
1000 GMT 25 Jan 89*

[Text] The Warsaw Treaty countries will soon publish full information on the balance of forces between the two military blocs in Europe. This has been announced in an interview with the MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI—MOSCOW NEWS—by Marshal Sergey Akhromeyev, who described as distorted the figures NATO published on the balances of forces.

He said their data is incomplete, saying it included only the land forces and only part of the Air Force figures. The Soviet defense budget will also be fully published.

**Lushev Appointed Commander of Warsaw Pact Forces**

*LD0202160889 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian  
1600 GMT 2 Feb 89*

[Text] Army General Lushev has been appointed the new commander of the Warsaw Pact joint armed forces.

**Kulikov Released From Pact Duties**

*LD0202162989 Moscow TASS in English  
1626 GMT 2 Feb 89*

[Text] Moscow February 2 TASS—General of the Army Petr Lushev, first deputy defense minister of the USSR, has been appointed commander-in-chief of the joint armed forces of the Warsaw Treaty member countries by agreement of the allied governments.

The governments of the Warsaw Treaty member countries met Marshal Viktor Kulikov's request to relieve him of the duties of commander-in-chief in connection with his appointment as general inspector with the group of general inspectors at the USSR defense Ministry.

The allied governments commended him upon his services in the development of the armies of the Warsaw Treaty member states.

General Lushev, a Russian, was born in 1923. He graduated from the military academy of the armored forces and the military academy of the General Staff.

He commanded a regiment, a division, an army, troops of several military districts, and the Group of Soviet Forces Germany.

Since 1986, he served as first deputy defense minister of the USSR.

**Warsaw Pact: Correlation of Force Strengths, Armaments**

*PM2901234989 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian  
30 Jan 89 First Edition p 5*

["Statement of the Warsaw Pact Defense Ministers Committee 'On the Correlation of Warsaw Pact and North Atlantic Alliance Force Strengths and Armaments in Europe and Adjoining Waters'"]

[Text] The Warsaw Pact Defense Ministers Committee stresses the exceptional importance—for the cause of strengthening international peace, security, and trust—of the Soviet Union's unilateral steps to reduce its armed forces and armaments, including those in Europe, announced at the United Nations on 7 December 1988 by M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium.

Guided by the decisions of the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee conferences in Budapest (1986), Berlin (1987), and Warsaw (1988) and proceeding on the premise of the defensive nature of the pact's military doctrine, the committee considers the prevention of war, halting the nuclear and conventional arms race, and switching to consistent disarmament, to be of paramount importance in the modern age. The armed forces of the Warsaw Pact and North Atlantic alliance in Europe must be such that neither of the alliances, while reliably securing their defense, possess the means to launch a surprise attack on the other side or launch offensive operations in general. This is the goal that the participants in the upcoming talks on reducing armed forces and conventional arms in Europe should seek to achieve.

The participants in the session confirm their resolve to promote the earliest start to these talks and the resumption of the work of the conference on confidence- and security-building measures and disarmament in Europe. They advocate that these forums work toward an accord on the mutual elimination of existing asymmetries and imbalances on both a pan-European scale and in individual regions, substantial cuts in armed forces and armaments in Europe, and the development and expansion of already existing confidence measures in light of the limitation of military activity on the continent of Europe, and on the application of them to autonomous [samostoyatelnyy] air force and naval activity

The relevance of the proposal put forward by Warsaw Pact states back in March 1988 to carry out an official exchange between the two military-political alliances of numerical data on the armed forces and conventional arms of the Warsaw Pact and NATO countries in Europe increases in this regard. The NATO countries have not given a positive response to this proposal and have unilaterally published biased data based on a selective approach.

The Defense Ministers Committee continues to attach paramount importance to revealing the real data on Warsaw Pact and NATO Armed Forces and conventional arms in Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals.

At the same time it deems it necessary to show in a broader context the overall picture of the correlation of the military potential of the two military-political alliances in Europe. The armed forces form a single organism. The constituent parts—the ground forces, air forces, air defense forces, and naval forces—interact, supplement, and reinforce one another. Only a comprehensive analysis of them will permit a real correlation of forces to be made.

Proceeding from this, the Defense Ministers Committee has decided to publish numerical data on the number of the armed forces and the quantity of basic types of armaments possessed by the Warsaw Pact states, and also its assessment of the North Atlantic alliance's military forces in Europe and adjoining waters.

It is clear from the data cited in the tables (Appendixes 1 and 2) that while the ground forces and air forces are roughly equal the North Atlantic Treaty has a two-fold superiority over the Warsaw Pact in naval strength. The North Atlantic alliance is superior to the Warsaw Pact in terms of the number of strike aircraft of front-line (tactical) aviation and naval aviation, combat helicopters, and antitank missile systems. The Warsaw Pact side has superiority in tanks, tactical missile launchers, air defense forces combat interceptor planes, infantry fighting vehicles, armored personnel carriers, and artillery. As far as naval armaments are concerned, NATO enjoys considerable superiority over the Warsaw Pact in terms of naval combat aircraft and the number of large surface ships, including aircraft carriers and other aircraft-carrying ships. The Warsaw Pact has a certain superiority in submarines armed with missiles and torpedoes.

The data cited are not, of course, designed to be utilized in their entirety as the starting parameters at future talks, which should be conducted in accordance with their mandate, or to replace the subject of the talks. However, this kind of comprehensive approach to the assessment

of military forces in Europe should ultimately focus attention on the need to make the talks realistic in nature from the very outset and reject attempts to achieve unilateral advantages.

The military balance in Europe can, after taking all its components into account, be described as a rough parity which gives neither side the opportunity to count on a crucial military advantage. At the same time it is essential to radically reduce the present high level of concentration of armed forces and armaments in Europe in order to ensure stability in keeping with the principle of reasonable defense sufficiency.

The Defense Ministers Committee believes that the interests of European security demand the adoption of urgent measures aimed at removing existing imbalances and asymmetries, a substantial reduction of the most dangerous offensive kinds of armaments, the attainment of reduced levels of armed forces, and restructuring of the two alliances' military structures to make them purely defensive in character. The measures to reduce unilaterally armed forces and armaments previously carried out by the Warsaw Pact countries (Bulgaria, Hungary, the GDR, Poland, Romania, the USSR, and the CSSR) and particularly the new initiatives taken by the Soviet Union to reduce its armed forces unilaterally in the next 2 years, without any linkage to the talks, by 500,000 men and to substantially reduce the quantity of its arms and combat equipment—by 10,000 tanks, 8,500 artillery systems, and 800 combat aircraft, including the withdrawal of 6 tank divisions from the GDR, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary—serve as a graphic example of the readiness of the Warsaw Pact states to channel into practical actions their efforts to lower the level of military confrontation in Europe.

The Warsaw Pact Defense Ministers Committee expresses the hope that NATO countries will demonstrate a similar readiness to make very rapid progress toward strengthening stability and security in Europe, including the taking of unilateral measures to reduce their armed forces and armaments.

Tables of the Correlation of Warsaw Pact and North Atlantic Alliance Force Strengths and Main Weapons Types in Europe and Adjoining Waters (as of 1 July 1988):

Appendix 1. I. Correlation of Force Strengths (thousand men)

	Warsaw Pact	Correlation	NATO
Control organs: General (main) staffs, main and central directorates of defense ministries	30.2	1:1.6	49.47
Ground forces, airborne forces, and army aviation	1,823.5	1:1.2	2,115.36
Air defense forces	550.5	4.0:1	137.7
Air forces	425.1	1:1.1	482.3
Navies	338.0	1:2.0	685.0
Units under central command (intelligence, communications, electronic warfare, VUZ's, and others)	225.4	2.3:1	96.9
Rear services units and institutions	146.3	1.7:1	87.5
Civil (territorial) defense troops	34.1	5.7:1	6.0
Total of armed forces in Europe and adjoining waters	3,573.1	1:1	3,660.2

Note: Numbers of MVD (field gendarmerie) and border troops in Warsaw Pact and NATO Armed Forces not included.

Combat aircraft of front-line (tactical) Air Force aviation and Air Defense Forces and naval aviation  
Including: combat aircraft of front-line (tactical) Air Force aviation and Air Defense Force aviation  
Air Defense Force combat interceptors incapable of operating against ground targets  
Navy combat aircraft  
Total strike aircraft (bombers, fighter-bombers, ground-attack aircraft) within front-line (tactical) Air Force aviation aircraft and naval aviation aircraft  
Combat helicopters, including naval  
Tactical missile launchers  
Tanks  
Antitank missile Systems  
Infantry fighting vehicles and armored transports  
Multiple Rocket launch systems, field pieces (75 mm and above), and mortars (50 mm and above)  
Submarines (excluding submarines armed with strategic ballistic missiles)  
including nuclear-powered  
Large surface ships (aircraft carriers, battleships, cruisers, destroyers, frigates, amphibious warfare ships with a displacement of 1,200 tonnes and over)  
including:  
aircraft-carrying ships [aviansushchiye], aircraft carriers  
ships armed with cruise missiles  
amphibious warfare ships (with a displacement of 1,200 tonnes and over)

#### Explanation of Tables I and II

In computing the correlation of the forces in Europe and adjoining waters, the two military-political alliances' ground forces, air forces, air defense forces, naval forces, and troops ensuring operational and rear support, and civil and territorial defense, have been fully included in the overall number of the personnel and the quantity of armaments.

The forces of all the fleets stationed in the European zone, including the Soviet Northern, Baltic, and Black Sea Fleets, have been fully included in the calculation of the armed forces of the Warsaw Pact states. On the basis of an analogous approach, the personnel and equipment of the navies of all West European NATO countries have been included in the assessment of North Atlantic alliance naval forces. The number of personnel and the quantity of armaments of the U.S. Navy operating in the North Atlantic and Mediterranean are also included.

The number of personnel and quantity of armaments belonging to the United States and Canada located on their own territory, in regions of the Atlantic directly adjoining them, and in the whole of the Pacific and Indian Oceans have not been included in the overall balance of armed forces. The strength of USSR Armed Forces stationed in the Asian part of the country has not

#### Appendix 2. II. Correlation of Main Armament Types

Warsaw Pact	Correlation	NATO
7,876	1.1:1	7,130
5,355	1:1	5,450
1,829	36:1	50
692	1:2.4	1,630
2,783	1:1.5	4,075
2,785	1:1.9	5,270
1,608	11.8:1	136
59,470	1.9:1	30,690
11,465	1:1.6	18,070
70,330	1.5:1	46,900
71,560	1.3:1	57,060
228	1.1:1	200
80	1:1	76
102	1:5	499
2	1:7.5	15
23	1:11.9	274
24	1:3.5	84

been included in the overall balance. The personnel and the armaments of Soviet and U.S. strategic nuclear forces and missile formations and units being scrapped under the treaty on intermediate- and shorter-range missiles have not been included in the computations.

In view of the fact that British and French missile-carrying submarines, (S3) missiles on the Albion Plateau, and Mirage-IV bombers are not included in the overall balance, Soviet medium bombers of the Tu-22 type (except for naval aviation aircraft) are not included.

Workers and employees of the Armed Forces and military construction workers on both sides have not been included because they do not undergo military training in peacetime and do not carry arms.

The main types of armaments and military equipment found in the forces, at depots (in reserve), and in centers of combat use have been taken into account when comparing the armed forces. These comprise:

Combat aircraft of the following type:

In the Warsaw Pact, front-line bombers (Su-24), fighter-bombers (Su-22, Su-76, Su-17, MiG-17, and MiG-27), ground-attack aircraft (Su-25), fighters (MiG-29, MiG-23, MiG-21, and Su-27), Air Defense Forces fighter-interceptors (MiG-31, MiG-25, Su-27, Su-15, Tu-128,

and Yak-28), reconnaissance and electronic warfare planes (MiG-25, MiG-21, Su-17, Su-24, and Yak-28), naval aviation (Tu-16, Tu-22, Tu-142, Il-38, Be-12, Yak-38, Su-17, MiG-21, MiG-23, MiG-29, and Su-27);

In NATO, fighter-bombers (Buccaneer, Tornado, F-111, Mirage 5, F-4, F-15, F-16, F-18, Jaguar, Mirage III, F-104, Mirage 2000, F-100, F-35 Draken, F-5, F-84, and G-91), ground-attack aircraft (A-7, A-10, Harrier, and Alpha jet), fighters (F-16, Tornado, Mirage 2000, F-4, F-104, Mirage F-1, F-5), Air Defense Forces fighter-interceptors (Lightning), reconnaissance and electronic warfare aircraft (EF-111, RF-4, Tornado, Jaguar, Mirage F-IR, R-F5, Mirage IIIR, RF-16, Nimrod, Orion P-3, G.91R, RF-104, RF-84, EC-130, DC-8, Canberra, and Shackleton), naval aviation (A-4, A-6, A-7, F/A-18, Sea Harrier, AV-8, Etendard, Super Etendard, F-4, Tornado, F-104, F-14, Crusader, ASW aircraft, reconnaissance, and electronic warfare planes), and combat support aircraft;

Combat helicopters of the following type:

In the Warsaw Pact, gunship (Mi-24), assault transport (Mi-8), reconnaissance and fire adjustment [razvedka i korrekcirovka] (Mi-24 and Mi-8), electronic warfare (Mi-8), and Navy helicopters (Ka-25, Ka-27, Ka-29, and Mi-14);

In NATO, gunships (Apache, Huey Cobra, Cobra-TOW, Bo-105P, Lynx, Mangusta, and Gazelle), multirole (Iroquois, Black Hawk, Bo-105M, Alouette, Lynx, AB-204, AB-205, AB-206, and AB-212), reconnaissance (Kaiowa, Gazelle, and Alouette), assault transport and specialized (Puma, EH-IH, and EH-60), Navy helicopters (Sea King, Wessex, Lynx, Super Frelon, Alouette, AB-212, Sea Cobra, Sea Stallion, Sea Hawk, and Iroquois);

Tanks—all types of tanks with which the Warsaw Pact and NATO are equipped;

Antitank missile systems:

In the Warsaw Pact, ATGM combat vehicles of front-line, army, divisional, and regimental echelon and portable systems of the battalion echelon;

In NATO—systems similar in terms of designation and characteristics;

Infantry fighting vehicles, armored personnel carriers, combat assault vehicles, combat reconnaissance patrol vehicles, and combat reconnaissance vehicles;

Multiple rocket launching systems, field artillery pieces of 75-mm caliber and above, and mortars of 50-mm caliber and above.

[Footnote: The data disclosing the strength of the personnel and the number of armaments relative to each of the Warsaw Pact and NATO countries in Europe are appended (Appendixes 3, 4, 5, 6).]

### Appendix 3. Force Strengths of Warsaw Pact Countries in Europe (Thousand Men)

[PRAVDA publishes the following two tables as a single table covering half the width of the page. Columns are headed as follows: A—Warsaw Pact Total; B—Of Which, Bulgaria; C—Of Which, Hungary; D—Of Which, GDR; E—Of Which, Poland; F—Of Which, Romania; G—Of Which, USSR; H—Of Which, CSSR. A footnote to the table states: "The strength of the Ministries of Internal Affairs and border troops has not been included in the Warsaw Pact forces."]

	A	B	C	D
Command and Control organs: general staffs, main and central directorates of defense ministries	30.2	1.1	1.2	2.5
Ground forces, airborne forces, and army aviation	1,823.5	70.4	54.7	103.3
Air defense forces	550.5	17.6	19.8	29.9
Air forces	425.1	4.5	1.6	4.7
Naval forces	338.0	6.3	-	14.2
Units under central command (intelligence, communications, electronic warfare, VUZ's, and others)	225.4	14.2	23.5	5.5
Rear services units and institutions	146.3	2.7	6.0	13.0
Civil (territorial) defense troops	34.1	0.7	-	-
Total of armed forces in Europe and adjoining waters	3,573.1	117.5	106.8	173.1
	E	F	G	H
Command and Control organs: general staffs, main and central directorates of defense ministries	2.8	2.2	17.1	3.3
Ground forces, airborne forces, and Army aviation	169.8	110.0	1,187.2	128.1
Air defense forces	49.8	22.0	389.1	22.3
Air forces	40.9	5.4	345.0	23.0
Naval forces	22.2	6.4	288.9	-
Units under central command (intelligence, communications, electronic warfare, VUZ's, and others)	21.1	12.0	133.2	15.9
Rear services units and institutions	33.5	12.0	75.1	4.0
Civil (territorial) defense troops	6.9	1.0	22.4	3.1
Total of armed forces in Europe and adjoining waters	347.0	171.0	2,458.0	199.7

**Appendix 4. Force Strengths of NATO Countries in Europe (Thousand Men)**

[PRAVDA publishes the following four tables as a single table covering half the width of the page. Columns are headed as follows: A—NATO Total; B—Of Which, Britain; C—Of Which, FRG; D—Of Which, France; E—Of Which, Norway; F—Of Which, Denmark; G—Of

Which, Belgium; H—Of Which, Netherlands; I—Of Which, Luxembourg; J—Of Which, Italy; K—Of Which, Greece; L—Of Which, Portugal; M—Of Which, Spain; N—Of Which, Turkey; O—Of Which, United States in Europe; P—Of Which, United States in Atlantic; Q—Of Which, Canada in Europe; R—Of Which, Canada in Atlantic; S—Of Which, Iceland. A footnote to the table states: "The strength of field gendarmerie and border troops has not been included in the NATO forces."]

	A	B	C	D	E
Command and Control organs: general staffs, main and central directorates of defense ministries	49.47	1.0	1.8	5.0	0.08
Ground forces, airborne forces, and Army aviation	2,115.36	143.9	342.0	238.2	21.2
Air defense forces	137.7	13.0	31.3	15.0	2.0
Air forces	482.3	74.9	71.3	70.7	6.9
Naval forces	685.0	71.0	36.0	62.0	8.0
Units under central command (intelligence, communications, electronic warfare, VUZ's, and others)	96.9	2.7	6.5	38.5	1.7
Rear services units and institutions	87.5	4.7	5.0	13.1	1.2
Civil (territorial) defense troops	6.0	-	1.1	-	-
Total of armed forces in Europe and adjoining waters	3,660.2	311.2	495.0	442.5	41.08
	F	G	H	I	J
Command and Control organs: general staffs, main and central directorates of defense ministries	0.06	1.0	1.0	0.03	17.0
Ground forces, airborne forces, and Army aviation	17.3	59.2	60.4	0.71	234.75
Air defense forces	1.5	5.1	4.0	-	21.2
Air forces	4.5	15.7	13.4	-	51.4
Naval forces	6.0	4.0	18.0	-	45.0
Units under central command (intelligence, communications, electronic warfare, VUZ's, and others)	0.1	4.2	2.75	0.3	19.65
Rear services units and institutions	1.5	2.8	1.5	-	6.0
Civil (territorial) defense troops	-	-	0.8	-	1.0
Total of armed forces in Europe and adjoining waters	30.96	92.0	101.85	1.04	396.0
	K	L	M	N	
Command and Control organs: general staffs, main and central directorates of defense ministries	0.3	1.9	2.3	18.0	
Ground forces, airborne forces, and Army aviation	135.4	43.6	185.0	420.0	
Air defense forces	11.4	-	12.0	12.0	
Air forces	15.2	9.0	23.1	44.2	
Naval forces	22.0	13.0	48.0	52.0	
Units under central command (intelligence, communications, electronic warfare, VUZ's, and others)	4.3	1.0	8.8	5.1	
Rear services units and institutions	1.2	1.5	3.3	44.5	
Civil (territorial) defense troops	0.2	-	0.5	2.4	
Total of armed forces in Europe and adjoining waters	190.0	70.0	283.0	598.2	
	O	P	Q	R	S
Command and Control organs: general staffs, main and central directorates of defense ministries	-	-	-	-	-
Ground forces, airborne forces, and Army aviation	208.8	-	4.9	-	-
Air defense forces	9.2	-	-	-	-
Air forces	80.1	-	1.9	-	-
Naval forces	32.5	261.5	-	6.0	-
Units under central command (intelligence, communications, electronic warfare, VUZ's, and others)	-	-	1.3	-	-
Rear services units and institutions	0.9	-	0.3	-	-
Civil (territorial) defense troops	-	-	-	-	-
Total in armed forces in Europe and adjoining waters	331.5	261.5	8.4	6.0	-
	593.0			14.4	
	[combined U.S.]			[combined Canadian]	

**Appendix 5. Quantity of Main Armament Types of Warsaw Pact Countries in Europe**

[PRAVDA publishes the following two tables as a single table covering half the width of the page. Columns are

headed as follows: A—Warsaw Pact Total; B—Of Which, Bulgaria; C—Of Which, Hungary; D—Of Which, GDR; E—Of Which, Poland; F—Of Which Romania; G—Of Which, USSR; H—Of Which, CSSR.]

	A	B	C	D
Combat aircraft of front-line (tactical) air force aviation and air defense force and naval aviation	7,876	234	113	307
including:				
combat aircraft of front-line (tactical) air force aviation and air defense force aviation	5,355	234	113	283
air defense force combat interceptors incapable of operating against ground targets	1,829	-	-	-
Navy combat aircraft	692	-	-	24
Total strike aircraft (bombers, fighter-bombers, ground-attack aircraft) within front-line (tactical) air force aviation aircraft and naval aviation aircraft	2,783	69	-	65
Combat helicopters, including naval	2,785	51	96	74
Tactical missile launchers	1,608	72	27	80
Tanks	59,470	2,200	1,435	3,140
Antitank missile Systems	11,465	360	270	620
Infantry combat vehicles and armored transports	70,330	2,365	2,310	5,900
Rocket-propelled salvo-fire systems, field pieces (75 mm and above), and mortars (50 mm and above)	71,560	3,990	1,750	2,435
Submarines (excluding submarines armed with strategic ballistic missiles)	228	4	-	-
including nuclear-powered	80	-	-	-
Large surface ships (aircraft carriers, battleships, cruisers, destroyers, frigates, amphibious warfare ships with a displacement of 1,200 tonnes and over)	102	-	-	-
including:				
aircraft-carrying ships [aviansushchiye], aircraft carriers	2	-	-	-
ships armed with cruise missiles	23	-	-	-
amphibious warfare ships (with a displacement of 1,200 tonnes and over)	24	-	-	-
	E	F	G	H
Combat aircraft of front-line (tactical) air force aviation and air defense force and naval aviation	480	380	5,955	407
including:				
combat aircraft of front-line (tactical) air force aviation and air defense force aviation	480	156	3,682	407
air defense force combat interceptors incapable of operating against ground targets	-	224	1,605	-
Navy combat aircraft	-	-	668	-
Total strike aircraft (bombers, fighter-bombers, ground-attack aircraft) within front-line (tactical) air force aviation aircraft and naval aviation aircraft	108	128	2,276	137
Combat helicopters, including naval	43	220	2,200	101
Tactical missile launchers	81	50	1,221	77
Tanks	3,330	3,200	41,580	4,585
Antitank missile Systems	435	400	8,840	540
Infantry combat vehicles and armored transports	4,855	5,000	45,000	4,900
Multiple Rocket Launching systems, field pieces (75 mm and above), and mortars (50 mm and above)	3,065	6,600	50,275	3,445
Submarines (excluding submarines armed with strategic ballistic missiles)	3	1	220	-
including nuclear-powered	-	-	80	-
Large surface ships (aircraft carriers, battleships, cruisers, destroyers, frigates, amphibious warfare ships with a displacement of 1,200 tonnes and over)	-	1	101	-
including:				
aircraft-carrying ships [aviansushchiye], aircraft carriers	-	-	2	-
ships armed with cruise missiles	-	-	23	-
amphibious warfare ships (with a displacement of 1,200 tonnes and over)	-	-	24	-

**Appendix 6. Quantity of NATO Countries' Main Armament Types in Europe**

[PRAVDA publishes the following three tables as a single table covering half the width of the page. Columns are headed as follows: A—NATO Total; B—Of Which, Britain; C—Of Which, FRG; D—Of Which, France; E—

Of Which, Norway; F—Of Which, Denmark; G—Of Which, Belgium; H—Of Which, Netherlands; I—Of Which, Luxembourg; J—Of Which, Italy; K—Of Which, Greece; L—Of Which, Portugal; M—Of Which, Spain; N—Of Which, Turkey; O—Of Which, United States in Europe; P—Of Which, Canada in Europe; Q—Of Which, Iceland]

	A	B	C	D	E	
Combat aircraft of front-line (tactical) air force aviation and air defense force and naval aviation	7130	835	850	880	100	
including:						
combat aircraft of front-line (tactical) air force aviation and air defense force aviation	5450	740	680	680	100	
air defense force combat interceptors incapable of operating against ground targets	50	50	-	-	-	
navy combat aircraft	1630	45	170	200	-	
Total strike aircraft (bombers, fighter-bombers, ground-attack aircraft) within front-line (tactical) air force aviation aircraft and naval aviation aircraft	4075	410	615	460	50	
Combat helicopters, including naval	5270	700	450	700	-	
Tactical missile launchers	136	12	26	36	-	
Tanks	30690	2000	4900	3190	370	
Antitank missile systems	18070	1480	2760	2000	150	
Infantry fighting vehicles and armored transports	46900	5480	6840	4520	190	
Multiple rocket launching systems, field pieces (75 mm and above), and mortars (50 mm and above)	57060	3320	3190	8510	2320	
Submarines (excluding submarines armed with strategic ballistic missiles)	200	28	24	17	11	
including nuclear-powered	76	16	-	4	-	
Large surface ships (aircraft carriers, battleships, cruisers, destroyers, frigates, amphibious warfare ships with a displacement of 1,200 tonnes and over)	499	66	16	54	11	
including:						
aircraft-carrying ships [avianesushchiye], aircraft carriers	15	3	-	2	-	
ships armed with cruise missiles	274	31	13	40	5	
amphibious warfare ships (with a displacement of 1,200 tonnes and over)	84	10	-	9	3	
	F	G	H	I	J	K
Combat aircraft of front-line (tactical) air force aviation and air defense force and naval aviation	100	170	200	-	450	450
including:						
combat aircraft of front-line (tactical) air force aviation and air defense force aviation	100	170	180	-	430	450
air defense force combat interceptors incapable of operating against ground targets	-	-	-	-	-	-
navy combat aircraft	-	-	20	-	20	-
Total strike aircraft (bombers, fighter-bombers, ground-attack aircraft) within front-line (tactical) air force aviation aircraft and naval aviation aircraft	50	110	11	-	160	230
Combat helicopters, including naval	-	70	20	-	540	130
Tactical missile launchers	-	6	8	-	12	-
Tanks	350	530	1250	-	2330	2000
Antitank missile systems	310	560	764	6	2130	320
Infantry fighting vehicles and armored transports	1090	2020	3240	-	6440	1720
Multiple rocket launching systems, field pieces (75 mm and above), and mortars (50 mm and above)	1750	1620	1410	10	5510	3950
Submarines (excluding submarines armed with strategic ballistic missiles)	7	-	5	-	10	10
including nuclear-powered	-	-	-	-	-	-

Large surface ships (aircraft carriers, battleships, cruisers destroyers, frigates, amphibious warfare ships with a displacement of 1,200 tonnes and over)	10	4	17	-	27	29
including:						
aircraft-carrying ships [avianesushchiye], aircraft carriers	-	-	-	-	-	-
ships armed with cruise missiles	5	4	17	-	19	8
amphibious warfare ships (with a displacement of 1,200 tonnes and over)	-	-	-	-	3	9
	L	M	N	O	P	Q
Combat aircraft of front-line (tactical) air force aviation and air defense force and naval aviation	150	295	640	1960	50	-
including:						
combat aircraft of front-line (tactical) air force aviation and air defense force aviation	150	280	630	810	50	-
air defense force combat interceptors incapable of operating against ground targets	-	-	-	-	-	-
navy combat aircraft	-	15	10	1150	-	-
Total strike aircraft (bombers, fighter-bombers, ground-attack aircraft) within front-line (tactical) air force aviation aircraft and naval aviation aircraft	130	140	410	1150	50	-
Combat helicopters, including naval	-	160	310	2180	10	-
Tactical missile launchers	-	-	-	36	-	-
Tanks	470	1850	4320	6980	150	-
Antitank missile systems	40	190	2350	4940	70	-
Infantry fighting vehicles and armored transports	280	1720	5270	7590	500	-
Multiple rocket launching systems, field pieces (75 mm and above), and mortars (50 mm and above)	1870	5010	4900	3520	170	-
Submarines (excluding submarines armed with strategic ballistic missiles)	3	8	17	57	3	-
including nuclear-powered	-	-	-	56	-	-
Large surface ships (aircraft carriers, battleships, cruisers destroyers, frigates, amphibious warfare ships with a displacement of 1,200 tonnes and over)	17	29	31	173	15	-
including:						
aircraft-carrying ships [avianesushchiye], aircraft carriers	-	1	-	9	-	-
ships armed with cruise missiles	-	13	10	109	-	-
amphibious warfare ships (with a displacement of 1,200 tonnes and over)	-	6	7	37	-	-

### Soviet Commander, Envoy on Hungarian Withdrawal

LD0302030789 Moscow Television Service in Russian  
2206 GMT 2 Feb 89

[From the "Novosti" newscast]

[Text] A news conference devoted to the recently published statement of the Warsaw Pact Defense Ministers Committee has taken place in Budapest. In publishing data about the correlation of the numerical strengths of armed forces, Comrade Stukalin, the Soviet Union's ambassador to Hungary, stated that the USSR and its allies are convinced that an objective and complete picture of the correlation of the two military-political alliances in Europe is necessary today for the strengthening of peace and security on the continent.

In accordance with the Soviet Government's decision on a unilateral reduction of armed forces and weaponry, Colonel General Burlakov, commander of the Southern

Group of Forces, stated that 22 units are being withdrawn from Hungarian territory: a full tank division, a tank training regiment, an airborne assault battalion, a fighter aircraft regiment, a chemical defense battalion, and other individual units. All the troops, combat equipment, and weapons subject to withdrawal will be transferred to the Soviet Union by the end of 1990. The journalists learned that the overall area of the territory in military stations being handed over will come to 95 hectares, as well as around 40 installations, worth over R38 million, built by the Southern Group of Forces.

Great interest was prompted by this detail. With the aim of fulfilling a defensive doctrine, there has been a decision on the removal of Soviet units from the Hungarian border with Austria. The withdrawal of units from the towns of Szombathely and Gyor will not be a bad example in the business of the practical creation of a zone of security. [video shows Stukalin and Burlakov addressing meeting]

### Georgian Opinion Poll Considers Draft Avoidance

18010251 [Editorial report] Tashkent ZARYA VOSTOKA in Russian on 13 April 1988 carries on page 1 a 1700-word GRUZINFORM article entitled "WORTHY REINFORCEMENTS FOR THE COUNTRY'S ARMED FORCES" published on the occasion of a joint meeting in the Georgian Central Committee between the party aktivs of the Georgian Republic and the Transcaucasian Military District. The article includes results of a public opinion poll conducted by the Center for the Study of Public Opinion of the Georgian Communist Party Central Committee. The article states: "75.2 percent [of those polled] continue to hold the opinion that not all young people fulfill their civil duty, that in the fulfillment of the general military obligation serious violations are permitted. And 35.5 percent consider that many young people, capable of service, are not conscripted into the army. A significant part of those questioned connect this with protectionism at various levels, 25.5 percent see the reason in the poor state of military-political upbringing."

### Some Military Collectives Fail to Use Electoral Opportunity

18010351a Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
17 Jan 89

[Article by Yu. Shevchenko: "Lessons of the First Stage"]

[Text]An important stage of the electoral campaign is drawing to a close—the nomination by social organizations of candidates for people's deputies of the USSR. What did this phase show, what lessons for the future should we derive from it? Our correspondent Col. G. Barnev had a discussion with Col. Yu. Shevchenko, deputy director of the political administration of the Transbaykal military district, director of the operations group for the preparation and conduction of elections.

"Yuriy Fyodorovich, I had the opportunity to attend a number of Party and Komsomol meeting for candidate nominations. As a rule, an atmosphere of true democracy reigned, in which were created the conditions necessary to nominate an unlimited number of candidates. Yet there were collectives where, as they say, there was peace and harmony. The people were passive, as if waiting for some supplementary instructions. I got the impression that having obtained the right to real elections, they didn't know how to deal with this right sensibly."

"Your observations are correct. The law on the election of USSR people's deputies has excited the people's interest in the electoral campaign, and brought out unprecedented activity in pre-election work. The nomination of candidates from their own ranks allows the Party and Komsomol organizations to critically comprehend their activities, to detect narrow and weak spots in them, to mobilize people to resolve the key questions of

military preparedness, to manifest the true leaders of perestroyka, who enjoy the trust and support of the military collectives. But this took place in those sections and subsectors where Party and Komsomol organizations engaged in the electoral campaign with full force, as they say. They studied the documents in depth, carefully planned pre-electoral agit-prop work in phases, and steadfastly proceeded toward the realization of the program.

If the truth be known, such a picture is not ubiquitous. There are incidences, and unfortunately, not infrequent ones, where the party organization practically did not participate in the pre-electoral fight. I will at least cite the political organ where officer Yu. Komogorov serves. Not a single candidate for deputy was nominated here. This was not because no worthy people were found; they were simply not sought. The chief of the political organ expressed his position on this matter in a telegram to the political administration. The telegram states that he considered the nomination of candidates from the Party organization sections advisable. The political organ where officer A. Cherkasov serves practically blocked up the work of nominating candidates for deputy. Citing the high level of activity, and preparation for the new academic year, this political department wreaked such sluggish havoc with the pre-electoral campaign that all the deadlines were missed."

"A question in connection with that: in some places, people often cite the very short time allowed for the the organization of work to nominate candidates from social organizations. What is your opinion on this matter?"

"Yes, that's the case. There was very little time indeed. Thus, any sort of swing was all the more impermissible. Precision, operational capacity and complete mobilization were needed. Unfortunately, many and many of our Party organizations failed to manifest these qualities, and were practically outside of the pre-election fight.

"The same can be said of certain Komsomol and trade union collectives, and almost all the women's councils. Even if the Party organizations had a poor showing, they still nominated as candidates 31 communists, the Komsomol, four, and the women's councils were completely out of the pre-electoral work. Obviously, the stereotype of old thinking and of traditional approaches to election campaigns were evident."

"There is a serious lack of electoral literature in some places. In voters' reading rooms, created in sections and subsections, you will not find a brochure with the text of the USSR Constitution. The Law on Elections of People's Deputies can be found only in a newspaper variant. There is no other literature on the power structure of our government. And yet this is so necessary to the army voter. Especially if you consider that many soldiers are participating in elections for the first time..."

"Such a problem does exist. Here, the central publishing houses are under obligation to the voters. But naturally, the appropriate Party organs must take their fair share of the blame."

At a recent political administration Party meeting, a pointed discussion was held on this very topic. Communists of the of the propaganda and organizational Party work sections were criticized. You can't say that these section officers were outside the electoral campaign. They visit often visit the troops to lend assistance. But the fact remains, this help can and must be more active and substantive. By no means do we fully utilize the potential of the high-circulation district newspapers.

The electoral campaign is gaining momentum. It seems that the foremost task of each political organ and Party organization is to do everything necessary to make the electoral campaign a powerful source of activation of socio-political life in the district's military and labor collectives, leading us to qualitatively new frontiers of democracy and perestroika.

#### **Draft Criminal Laws: Proposals on Military Authority**

18010351b Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
17 Jan 89 First Edition p 4

[Article by Col. V. Bakharev: "Based on Experience"]

In the "Fundamentals of Criminal Legislation" project brought up for discussion, there are undoubtedly included many cardinal measures for the implementation of a course to strengthen law and order, as noted by the 19th All-Union Party Conference. In my view, however, a few of the laws of the new redaction of the "Fundamentals" need to be refined.

Thus, the project does not foresee the application of the rules of the Disciplinary Code of the USSR Armed Forces (Articles 45, 46) for military transgressions committed by servicemen. I think that it is necessary to include these laws. After all, the primary responsibility of commanders of military posts and ships is to provide for legality and law and order.

I propose that the "Fundamentals" project provide the military post commander with a possibility, such as a board of inquiry, to determine the impact of the reduced circumstances and consequences of certain types of military crimes: to give the material to the military prosecutor or to limit it to disciplinary punishment. Such a system has existed to this day, and, I think, was justified. In my view, it allows avoidance of cases of a formal approach under the agitation of criminal proceedings, and increases the authority of the post commander, who, in times of war and peace, bears personal responsibility not only for military discipline, but for the education and political-moral condition of the personnel.

I consider the "Fundamental's" project version of article 34 (limiting freedom) to be a failure. It states that this measure of punishment is not administered to compulsory term servicemen. Does that mean that it is applied to officers, ensigns, midshipmen and extended term servicemen? And they can be directed to locations, "determined by the organs cognizant of the execution of the sentence," that is, the organs of the Ministry of Internal Affairs?

I propose a supplement to the above article, to determine its application to servicemen:

"For sentenced officers, ensigns, midshipmen and extended military servicemen, limitation of freedom will be implemented at the military unit for a term of 6 months to 3 years in cases as provided by the law. While serving the sentence, the convicted serviceman's freedom is limited in that he does not have the right to leave the garrison, other than departures involving the execution of service assignments; he cannot be promoted in rank or responsibility, and his time served under sentence does not apply to the period needed to advance in military rank. Unit commanders, institution and military school chiefs monitor the behavior of those convicted."

I feel that Article 35 (arrest) needs some work. In the first place, it states that servicemen must serve their arrest in the guardhouse. This, I think, can lead to a number of negative consequences, above all, in the educational sphere, as the arrested ones in the guardhouse are watched by officers, sergeants and soldiers of combat units, not by specially trained personnel. I suggest that the "Fundamentals" projects specify that servicemen under arrest be contained in disciplinary battalions in the guardhouse.

Secondly, I suggest that the aforementioned article specify that pregnant women and women with children under age 8 not be subject to arrest, in units where applicable. This rule should be expanded to include all women in military service. Their confinement under arrest is impossible due to the lack of female troops in the guardhouse. Should special female watches be created?

I propose that Article 37 (Limitation of service) be completely excluded by the "Fundamentals" project, since limitation of service is an incorrect interpretation of the very concept of military service of the officer corps, the active military service of ensigns, midshipmen and extended term servicemen. In comparison to the civilian, the military man already has a number of limitations connected with the fulfillment of his service duties. The punitive measures indicated in Article 37 deprive the military unit commander of his empowerment to independently make decisions regarding his subordinates.

Additionally, withholding accrual of time in rank and promotion in rank and responsibility, which are proposed for convicted servicemen, cannot be viewed purely as a punishment. For objective reasons, this frequently happens in life.

I submit that it is also inadvisable to withhold 10-20 percent of the convicted serviceman's pay and reduce leave time by half. In any event, such punitive measures are not taken against civilians. Withholding monthly salary can have a significant effect on the material

well-being of the servicemen's families, where frequently wives are not employed, and quite a sum goes to sub-leasing an apartment.

I discussed all the aforementioned statements with other specialists involved in projects of new general military codes, and with many unit commanders, political workers from the Moscow military district, and people from the military prosecutor's office. The overwhelming majority supported the opinions above, based on the practical experience of their work with the troops.

### KMT-10 Mine Clearing Device

81440389a Moscow *TEKHNICA I VOORUZHENIYE*,  
in Russian No 8 Aug 88 p 9

[Article by Lt Col Ye. Osadchiy and Capt M. Kozelskiy:  
"Suspending the KMT-10 Mine Clearing Device"]

[Text] Having cleaned the place where the mine clearing device is to be fastened to the BMP frontal armor plate, the stoppers are unscrewed from all sheets and booms located on it. The stoppers are placed in the ZIP [spare parts and accessories] kit, which prior to mounting is strapped in a convenient place inside the vehicle.

The stoppers are unscrewed and the washers are removed from the outlets of the BMP pneumatic system. After the bolts have been removed from the right and left sections of the mine clearing device, one internal and one external lug each are taken and mounted on the frontal plate, and are fastened with M16X1 and 5X40 bolts (not tightening them completely by 1 - 1 1/2 turns). Low-headed, countersunk bolts are set in the holes.

Stoppers, nuts and washers are removed from the pneumatic hoses of the frames and locking mechanisms, the bolts are taken out of the blade section lugs, and the pins connecting the operating element with the safety device of the blade sections are removed. The right and left locking mechanisms are mounted on the booms located on the BMP frontal plate, and are fastened with M16X1 and 5X30 spring washer bolts.

Then the blade sections are suspended on the vehicle: the right and left frames are set manually, in turn, into the lugs on the BMP frontal plate, are bolted, and are fastened with cotter pins. The BMP commander holds up and guides the frame, watches for misalignment, ensures that the holes in the frame and the lugs coincide, and leads the actions of the crew. The driver-mechanic holds the section behind the blade in a horizontal position, and swings it slightly if necessary. The third crew member sets the frame at the level of the lug, and once they coincide connects them with a pin, fastens it with a cotter pin, and completely tightens the bolts fastening the lug to the frontal plate of the BMP.

Then lug-safety device assemblies are mounted to the eye-rings on the frontal plate, bolted, and also fastened with cotter pins. Connecting the working elements and safety devices, the pins are installed with the threaded part to the outside (i. e., toward the track), and the cables limiting the lower extent of tracing and those that lift the mine clearing device must be reliably fastened with cotter pins. Particular attention should be paid to fastening the pneumatic hoses of the mine clearing device frame to the vehicle. They are installed in such a way that there is a sag below the fastening clamp to support the lowest position of the frame. The pneumatic hose couplings are connected to the outlets of the vehicle pneumatic system, only after checking its presence.

The manual shift pedal is pressed to check the operability of the locking mechanism. The frame fastener must turn on its axis (the third crew member holds the pedal in lowest position until the fastener returns to the initial position). After this the pedal must also turn independently to the initial position. The reliability by which the fastener is locked is tested by pressing on it.

In order to install the cable limiting the lower extent of tracing, the cotter pins are first removed (disconnected) from the side of the locking mechanism and turned one revolution, so that when the blade section is lifted it does not get between the plane of the frame and the lower BMP hull plate. From the side of the track, the cable eye ring is inserted into the hole in the towing grapple and fastened with a cotter pin. The correctness of the installation is checked by lifting the knife section.

During installation of the screen, the M16X1.5X80 bolts are given 3 or 4 turns into the lower booms on the BMP frontal plate. Then the screen is threaded into the bolts, and lifted all the way into the upper booms, after the holes in the screen have been aligned with the threaded holes in the booms, and the bolts are turned in them completely.

Anti-hull floor mine clearing devices (UTPM) are mounted to the knife sections only when making passages in minefields. To do this the frame bushing cotter pins are removed, and the UTPM are mounted in turn to the right and left knife sections. The long probes are directed to the middle of the vehicle and switched to operating position.

Once the mine clearing device is suspended, the operability of the locking mechanism pneumatic system is tested (air pressure of no less than 60 kg/square cm is created in the system), and the knife sections are switched to travel position (valve handle is turned to "Lift" position). The right and left sections are to be lifted up, and the frame guides are hooked with the fasteners of the locking mechanisms. Without lifting the valve handle, the absence of an air leak is checked by sound.

To switch the knife sections to operating position, the valve handle is turned to "Operating" position; however, for the purpose of checking, it is recommended that the sections be switched by pressing the locking mechanism pedal.

Let us remember that before using the device it is necessary to clean it of dirt, and remove all foreign articles. Then the reliability of fastening of all parts and assemblies is checked, as well as their operability, the condition of threaded connections, cotter pins, fastening bolts of knife section frames, safety device lugs, locking mechanism cables, etc. As necessary, bolts are tightened, and cotter pins are made fast or replaced, using the individual ZIP kit.

### MT-LB Film Trainer System

81440389b Moscow *TEKHNICA I VOORUZHENIYE*  
in Russian No 8, Aug 88 p 18

[Article by Lt Col V. Subbotin: "MT-LB Driver-Mechanic Film Trainer System"]

[Text] With its assistance one can both form initial skills in controlling the prime mover, and improve driving technique under various road conditions.

The main functional parts of the trainer system are: film projector with stand; cabin with cradle and frame; exercise leader's control panel; and film screen. The film projector with stand and the control panel are mounted on a control platform, where the power unit is also located.

The film projector makes it possible to show films at a projection speed of 0 to 48 frames per second, and to reverse the strip. It has heads for reading two topograms from the film, on one of which is written the curvature and on the other the route profile. Projection speed depends on the position of the control elements (position of the drive shift lever and amount of fuel feed), and the resistance to movement of the vehicle. The latter is provided by a topogram that corresponds to the subject of the film, and the coefficient of cohesion of the track with the ground, which is introduced from the control panel. The capacity of the projector bobbin is 600 m.

The base (stand) makes it possible to turn the projector to an angle of + and - 5 degrees in the horizontal plane. A servo-drive turns the projector. Signals to the drive are generated by comparing the size of the signal read from the film topogram (road curvature), and from the vehicle steering control levers position sensor. If the student reacted in a timely manner to the turns in the route and kept the vehicle on the road, the signal is equal to zero. Displacement of the picture on the screen to right or left occurs, and movement off course is simulated, depending on the amount of deviation from the route. In this case the signal also goes to the leader's control panel, where an error is registered.

The cabin is of welded construction, and its interior completely duplicates the MT-LB control compartment. Forces on the control levers and pedals are identical to those in the real vehicle. Levers and pedals are kinematically connected to sensors, the signals from which go to the control panel. Monitoring and measuring instruments, and pre-start engine warmup control elements, are electrically linked with the control panel. A dynamic loudspeaker is mounted in the cabin, through which simulated noises are transmitted (engine, startup heater, etc.). Their level can be set from the control panel and can reach 100 or more decibels at the driver-mechanic's seat. The student and instructor are linked through R-124 intercom devices.

The cabin is fastened on the cradle, and together with it forms the rocking part. An electro-hydraulic servo-drive mounted on the frame causes cabin vibrations in the

longitudinal-vertical plane. Control signals go to the drive from the film topogram (route profile). They correspond to the speed of movement and dynamic characteristics of the tracked vehicle's suspension.

The exercise leader's control panel consists of a monitoring panel, and units for registering errors and computing average speed. With the aid of instruments located on the panel, the instructor monitors the position of the control elements (fuel pedal, turn levers, gear shift, etc.), determines the average speed of movement, and sets normal and emergency operating regimes in terms of pressure and temperature of oil and coolant; coefficient of cohesion with the ground; and engine start regimes (summer, winter). The error registration unit makes it possible to evaluate the actions of the student. The number of deviations from the route, attempts to start the engine while in gear, rolling down hills at a speed of more than 5 km per hour, more than two contacts with the transmission, and other errors are lighted up and counted on the unit. The average speed computation unit, along with the error registration unit, makes it possible to determine the level of readiness of the driver-mechanic.

The electronic part of the control panel models the operation of tracked vehicle assemblies; computes speed of movement, angular speed of turn, angular body fluctuations (maximum cabin turn angles in the longitudinal-vertical plane are + or - 10 degrees; maximum angular speed of fluctuations is 40-50 degrees per second; of acceleration is 180-220 degrees/second squared); determines the procedure for starting the engine and heater; and models assembly noises and instrument readings.

Special training films on various topics are used. In making them, simultaneously with the picture on the film strip, topograms establishing the route curvature and profile are recorded on various sides of the frame.

The trainer system is mounted in a heated classroom with exhaust ventilation. The room must have dimensions of 12 X 6 X 3.5 m, and is operated at air temperatures of from +5 to +40 degrees C. Dimensions of the trainer system are 7.6 X 3.1 X 3.2 m; its weight is 2,600 kg. A foundation is required for installing the cabin. The trainer system power supply is from a 3-phase, alternating current, 380 volt circuit. Power consumption is 4.3 kw. The training films are stored in a storage cabinet that is included in the trainer system set.

### Examination of BREM-1 Armored Repair/Recovery Vehicle

18010287 Moscow *VOYENNIYE ZNANIYA*  
in Russian No 9 Sep 88 pp 26, back cover

[Article by Col. G. Korotov and Col. (Res) V. Knyazkov: "The Armored Repair/Recovery Vehicle"]

[Text] During combat training the tank company executed a bold maneuver, moving rapidly down a hill. The "enemy" faltered. Just then the umpire "disabled" two

tanks: in one a track was "broken," while in the other the engine was "damaged." Hurried conversations were heard on the radio: What to do? The question was answered by the appearance of a squat tracked vehicle. Maneuvering quickly under "enemy" fire, it rode up to one of the tanks, and soon afterward the split track was back in place. It also quickly took care of the other tank: a tow cable was skillfully attached and the recovery vehicle's engine roared to tow the "damaged" tank to safety.

That was how the BREM-1 armored repair/recovery vehicle proved itself in "combat," fully living up to its name—it's crew repaired one tank and recovered another.

What are its features? Designers started out with the basic T-72 tank design, which they endowed with many important combat and special qualities. Thus, the BREM-1 is a combination of a powerful tank prime mover and service vehicle. It can carry out repair and recovery operations and service various kinds of vehicles under field conditions. It has a crew of three. Specialists give high ratings to the BREM-1, justifiably considering it to be a new type of maintenance vehicle in use by tank troops.

The above is not an exaggeration. This can be seen in the variety of jobs it can perform: repairing armored vehicles including replacement of sections; lifting, parts repair and electric arc welding; towing damaged and disabled armored vehicles; recovery of mired and submerged armored vehicles; carrying replacement parts and materials on the cargo bed; excavation work; ground leveling preparatory to carrying out repairs; removal of rubble.

The vehicle carries onboard equipment to accomplish the above. For example, this includes the main winch, which develops a force up to 25 tf. Its length is 200 mm and bursting strength 42 tf. Interestingly, this strength point can be exceeded if necessary by use of blocks. There is an auxiliary winch (traction rating of 0.5 tf and cable length of 400 m) that is used as an adjunct to the main winch for recovering mired armored vehicles.

Mention must be made of the BREM-1's anchoring device. To free a mired tank, for example, enormous force must be used, but the recovery vehicle proper must hold onto something. This is especially true in the case of soft ground. This purpose is served by the anchoring device. In practice, the base of the cargo bed is thus utilized. In addition, the crew can use the so-called bulldozer spade, which is 3,100 mm wide.

The above integral feature has two functions. One is holding the recovery vehicle in place while the main winch is in operation (imagine the bulldozer spade—similar to a giant hoe, with a blade larger than 3 m, plunging almost half a meter into the ground). The other is preparing excavation work. In this case the BREM-1 becomes a powerful bulldozer, in 20 minutes digging a

standard tank shelter in clayey soil. In sandy soil and sandy loam, it can do this even faster—in 12 minutes. If necessary, the BREM-1 can cover up a disabled armored vehicle and even dig a reliable shelter for itself.

Briefly about towing. The BREM-1 is designed to tow a disabled armored vehicle, with a choice of options. The crew can use two tow cables each 5.5 m long or two tow rods (1,680 mm in length).

Located on the hull is the crane, which is fairly compact in travel position. When needed, it can be converted to the operating position in 34 seconds. This unit is rated at three loads—3, 12, and 19 tf. At 3 tf, maximum boom reach is 4,400 mm with 360° rotation. If the 12 tf position is required, boom reach is reduced to 2,970 mm, with rotation limited to 45° toward the stern. Maximum load—19 tf—is attainable by using a running block, with no boom rotation. This kind of technical flexibility of the crane makes it possible to carry out various hoisting operations in the field.

The vehicle is also equipped with a hydraulic jack developing up to 30 tf. The crew can use it to effect quick repairs of heavy assemblies and units.

The BREM-1 is also provided with a welding unit. The crew has the highest opinion of this equipment: it is compact, convenient to use, movable, and makes it possible to perform welding in vehicle locations that are difficult of access. Especially important is the possibility of performing arc cutting of metals. This feature cannot be overestimated. In a combat situation, when every second counts, a hacksaw will not do the job. The unit has a weld current range of 100 to 315 amperes, while the diameter of welding and cutting electrodes is 3 to 6 mm.

And that is not all. A cargo bed designed to carry replacement parts, materials, etc., is mounted on the vehicle's "shoulders." The all-metal bed is removable and has drop sides. Rated at 1.5 tf carrying capacity, the dimensions (in plan) are 1,706 X 1,400 mm.

Two boxes carried on the BREM-1 contain specialized tools and accessories for performing adjustment, metal repair, and replacement operations. This is understandable, since a modern tank is a complex machine. The dynamic loads to which its mechanisms, systems, assemblies, and units are subjected can cause maladjustment. Whereas in a full-service environment they are repaired as the vehicle moves successively from one repair station to another, in the field the principle of "taking service to the vehicle" applies. A tank is placed into a shelter and concealed; ammunition, fuel, and other supplies are replenished; the BREM-1 commences service work as soon as it arrives.

One can understand that repair personnel must display special skills and high mastery in the field, since a tank which stalls while headed for battle becomes a good target for enemy fire. For this reason, the BREM-1 possesses many combat characteristics of modern tanks.

First, since it has the same armor protection as the T-72 tank, it can maneuver and carry out combat missions under enemy fire. Second, it is equipped with a collective protection system that protects the crew and equipment from the light radiation, ionizing radiation, and shock wave of a nuclear explosion, and from radioactive and toxic chemical agents. Third, the same high level characterizes the vehicle's maneuverability factors—mobility, ease of handling, and cross-country capability—all assured by the 780 hp engine.

On unpaved roads the BREM-1 travels at an average speed of 20 km/hr, while on paved roads it can attain 60 km/hr. Its range is also good. Thanks to the auxiliary fuel tanks it can venture 500 km on unpaved roads and 760 km on paved roads. If the vehicle is to tow a tank, for example, the onboard fuel supply is sufficient for it to travel 220 km on unpaved roads.

Can the BREM-1 follow armored vehicles and overcome obstacles while on the move? Of course. For example, it can cross a trench 2.6 to 2.8 m wide and overcome a wall up to 0.85 m high. It is fully capable of descending or climbing a hill at an angle not greater than 30°. Maximum cant is 25°.

A fairly serious obstacle is a river—the vehicle cannot float. However, if fording depth does not exceed 1.2 m, the vehicle can overcome the barrier without preliminary preparation. It is another matter when river depth is greater and no crossing means are available. In this case, it is necessary to prepare the snorkel (OPVT). It enables the BREM-1 to cross rivers, canals, etc., which are up to 1 km wide and up to 5 m deep. In this case, the vehicle travels underwater on the river bottom, while the snorkel protrudes above the water surface to supply air to the crew and engine.

Not all types of combat can be described in an ideal tactical plan, of course, with tanks engaging in combat and the BREM-1 performing repair and recovery. If the situation warrants, the tankers do know how to handle tools and repair personnel can hold their own, since they are armed with a powerful 12.7 mm antiaircraft machinegun capable of firing against aircraft as well as ground targets. It is belt-fed, with 60 rounds to the belt and the entire basic load amounting to 840 rounds.

The crew is also armed with three AKMS assault rifles with their 900-round basic load and with 18 F-1 hand grenades.

With respect to observation devices, each crew member is provided with them to enable him to observe the terrain at night as well as in daylight while located inside the BREM-1.

The BREM-1 is furnished with efficient communication means. The crew members are able to communicate with each other via an intercom system (TPU). External communication is made possible by the R-123M ultrashort-wave radio operating in microtelephone mode at distances up to 20 km. The radio, designed to operate on fixed frequencies, makes it possible to establish communication without hunting, free from the necessity of fine tuning. You will agree that this feature is important in combat.

The successful combination of many tactical and technical characteristics render the BREM-1 a universal armored vehicle capable of accomplishing a wide variety of repair and recovery operations in various types of combat.

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#### **Change to Defensive Doctrine Disrupts Regimental Officer Training**

*18010312 Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
15 Dec 88 First Edition p 2*

[Article by Regimental Commander Gds Col Yu. Pakhomov under rubric "Competition Initiators Sum Up Results": "But Someone Did More"; first paragraph is KRSNAYA ZVEZDA introduction]


[Text] For two years the triple-order guards tank regiment of the Kantemirovka Guards Tank Division imeni Yu. V. Andropov has been the recognized competition leader in the Ground Forces. Today its commander, Gds Col Yu. Pakhomov, has reason to say that the tankers worked famously, but it is not about fame that the commander is thinking.

Yes, we were the formal (I will return to this definition later) competition leaders in the Ground Forces over the past two years. Therefore I believe that our regiment's officers have substantial grounds to judge both the effectiveness of competition under army conditions and the methodology of its organization. We also have certain observations concerning the existing system of having initiators in branches of the Armed Forces.

Well, just what did we achieve as competition initiators in the Ground Forces?

I honestly admit that I read the article by the commander of the submarine which initiated competition in the Navy and experienced a dual feeling: one of pride in my regiment and its people, and one of bitterness.

**BREM-1 ARMORED REPAIR/RECOVERY VEHICLE**



**Key:**

a-BREM-1 in travel position;  
b-BREM-1 in operating position;  
1-snorkel;  
2-tool box;  
3-cargo bed;  
4-antiaircraft machinegun;  
5-crane;  
6-bulldozer blade;  
7-idler wheel;

8-track;  
9-road wheel;  
10-drive sprocket;  
11-hook;  
12-cable;  
13-crane boom;  
14-hydraulic lift mechanism;  
15-auxiliary fuel tanks

We did not have a regulated workday, and there was not always a prescribed day off. Insofar as I remember, in the summer training period we had a total of four days off. The abundance of tasks, including unscheduled ones—yes, initiators also have to accomplish unscheduled tasks—required the people's maximum exertion of all efforts, but the guardsmen held out and did not waver even in this not so simple situation. No one lost heart or brushed aside what had been planned in pledges. I believe that this—heightened responsibility—is our best indicator.

Secondly, we succeeded in placing young officers in formation in the shortest possible time. As KRASNAYA ZVEZDA already has written, at the beginning of this training year some 40 of the most experienced officers departed the regiment for other units, usually for advancement, and we received new people in their places. This was done with full awareness, to counterbalance the opinion existing at that time that special conditions are created for an initiator. Of course this brought additional difficulties into our life. It was especially difficult for the battalion commanded by Gds Maj A. Sherstyuk, where almost half of the officers were replaced, but we also overcame this.

Finally, a great deal was done to improve the training facility. Suffice it to say that today we can practice essentially all missions as a crew without traveling to the gunnery range, tank training area, and tactical field. Motor pools, barracks and other regimental facilities are in exemplary condition.

All this unquestionably contributed to the fact that in weapons and tactical training, in combat vehicle driving and in a large number of other disciplines, for example, we received that very "five" behind which there is not the slightest stretching of a point.

And now about the feeling of bitterness. The regiment still did not fulfill its pledges—it did not become outstanding. We did not make it in drill training, and there are omissions in the officers' professional training.

It is especially disappointing with regard to the first point. Some would ask doubtfully: Does drill training determine a tank regiment's combat readiness to that great an extent? If for example Gds Sgt Ye. Kuznetsov, the best tank commander, does the parade step insufficiently precisely is he really less ready for combat because of this? And the same goes for Gds Pvt S. Solovyev, our best gunner, and for dozens of other gunners and drivers who are just as excellently trained. In short, I confess that we did not fulfill the drill training program. There was a shortage of time and other tasks were pressing.

With respect to commander training, the scheduled classes and drills were held completely, but the officers did pitifully little independent training—that same time shortage was felt. It is common knowledge, however, that

demands on the officers' professional level are growing. If just two out of five company officers did not receive a "five" the company can no longer lay claim to the title of outstanding. I consider that approach justified. In the final account the success of the subunit or unit which an officer commands depends specifically on his professional preparedness. What does it matter if a gunner confidently hits the target and a driver operates the vehicle over any terrain at the necessary speed and with the necessary maneuver if the company commander does not make the most sensible decision?

The reader has the right to ask: Just what time shortage is Pakhomov talking about? What kind of unscheduled activities are these that diverted the tankers from combat training?

I will explain. It was a demonstration battalion exercise for district unit [chast] commanders. In connection with our military doctrine being given a defensive character it was necessary to "shift" new doctrinal requirements to the organization of the training process directly in the regiment, battalion and company. You will agree that this was not a simple task and a great deal of experimenting had to be done before showing others the results of our searches.

It was also a large number of other demonstration classes on operating and maintaining combat equipment, on organizing routine duty activities, on strengthening discipline and so on. There is no need to mention the numerous drills preceding these exercises and classes—our actions were observed by defense ministers of Warsaw Pact member states, by defense industry representatives and by commanders of all large units [soyedinye] of our Armed Forces. It is no secret that we prepared very thoroughly for each such exam, and for us these were definitely exams. It was not only in combat training that we exerted ourselves. It is said that a good housewife will invite guests only into a clean house, but it seems to me that there was much more "floor sweeping" than required—our old habit and ostentation is still affecting us.

By the way, the organization of so-called demonstration classes and exercises also prompts other reflections. Why were several such activities in a row held specifically at our facility? Is it that we are objectively better than others with respect to organizing the training process and routine duty activities? In our district perhaps, but how about in other districts and groups of forces? Perhaps there the very same problems connected, let us say, with training troops in operations in the defense were mastered enormously better and more innovations were introduced to organization of the training process? When a convincing answer to these questions is not received one automatically begins to think: Is our selection dictated only by the circumstance that our regiment is closer than others to the Ground Forces Main Staff and that the Staff is hardly informed about successes of other competitors?

In this connection I will return to the discussion about a formal leader in the Ground Forces. I make bold to share my conclusions about the need to improve competition organization.

Well then, we were the initiators for two years, but whether or not we were winners in the Ground Forces based on last year's results is unknown to anyone. The only result was what was important—the regiment became outstanding at that time. The fact is, however, that there were also outstanding regiments in other districts and groups of forces. Why were our achievements not compared? Is it that difficult to perform simple calculations such as that one regiment's average grade in weapons training is 4.65 and another's is 4.72? Or to calculate results in tactical, technical and physical training and so on just as scrupulously? And announce this: here is the true leader and the one to emulate!

By the way, then those conversations with respect to "designated initiators" would disappear of themselves. A need hardly would arise to publish the pledges of the next regiment to have a go at the next level in competition. I think it will be fully sufficient to publish results of the best regiment in the Ground Forces based on the present year's results. This is much more graphic and much more convincing: here is what the best achieved and here is the reference point for others.

I also dream of direct rivalry. I understand that it is hardly realistic to figure on an opposed-forces regimental exercise with my unit on one side and, for example, the best from the Carpathian, Belorussian or some other district on the other side. The expenses probably are too great, but I am sure that we can and must hold an opposed-forces command and staff exercise. In addition to the task of identifying the more precise and reliable command and control of a regiment, other tasks would be accomplished here—a mutual exchange of experience in working out battle plans, organizing a fire plan in that same defense, employing technical equipment for controlling subunit operations, and so on.

Why am I still in favor of such a graphic comparison of what has been achieved? Well, because our present grade of "four" cost enormously more than last year's outstanding grade. Let the reader not think I am saying that Pakhomov casts doubt on the exactingness and principle of inspectors in another district. No, I simply would very much like to be sure that somewhere someone did more.

#### **Far East MD: Officers' Map Ability, Training Weak**

18010301 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
28 Dec 88 First Edition p 1

[Article by Maj N. Astashkin: "Officers Manage to Get Lost in Three Pine Trees If They Do Not Pay Attention to Map Work in the Unit"]

[Text] Far East Military District—It was late evening when acting battery commander Capt V. Shikhaliyev received the order to move to another position area.

Finding the area where they were supposed to set up the new position on the map, Shikhaliyev said to himself that he was familiar with the places. And 40 kilometers is no distance for vehicles, even in the roadless taiga.

Glancing at the map once again, the captain stashed it in his map case and prepared to pack up the rocket launchers. The column set out a short time later.

The vehicles traveled at a high speed at first. But they slowed down noticeably after just a few kilometers. Captain Shikhaliyev looked uneasily at the night trail snatched from the darkness by the light of the headlights, a trail that now seemed overgrown and unfamiliar. At practically every road crossing, the lead vehicle slowed down, for the officer began to check the map, looking for the right direction.

He "missed" the turn where the column was supposed to get on a country road. They turned at another point. Having gone around some hills, the vehicles again came out on the original trail. Shikhaliyev decided to try his luck at a different turn. But the road ran into a wall of forest. There is no telling how long the antiaircraft gunners would have wandered around the hills if they had not received help from an officer of the unit staff, who took the subunit to the assigned area.

When the inspecting officers reviewed the exercise, they noted this fact and observed that in the command training of regiment officers one is seeing a discrepancy between the level of their theoretical knowledge and their practical skills in organizing combat in terrain and the inability of some officers to work with a map and to orient themselves, especially under night conditions.

It would seem that this relatively old incident ought to serve as a good lesson for antiaircraft gunners and prompt them to work with maps and increase their knowledge of military topography. As events show, however, the proper conclusions were not drawn. Otherwise the occurrence analogous to the one cited above would not have happened. The column headed by the launch battery commander Maj V. Lyubimov ended up in a gravel quarry instead of the assigned area.

"We got lost in three pine trees, that is, on three roads," Lyubimov sadly joked about himself and explained: "And all because we very rarely worked with the map during the march."

"The conditions do not exist for map work. For the mission is not marked on the map and the officers are not required to give any accounting. Even on the road, there is no need to get one's bearings, because the battery usually goes to the field with the regiment. You always see the lead machine or its profile lights ahead and you can take your bearings from them," said Capt N. Ageyev, commander of a technical battery. "I got a map only two or three times last year...."

"The last time I personally held a topographic map in my hands was 2 years ago," said A. Polikarpov in support of his fellow officer. "I remember that I took it to the field but no one required that I plot the situation. So it stayed in my map case just for show. Who needs such window dressing? Now almost every officer in the regiment has a working map in the 'secret case.' But look, how are they handled? This is nothing but formalism...."

I would like to give the statement of still another regimental officer, the deputy battery commander Capt Yu. Onopko:

"In our regiment, unfortunately, we have forgotten that combat and any march begins with a map. Before heading out or making any decision, it is necessary to analyze the tactical characteristics of the terrain carefully. This will determine the conditions of movement, camouflage and concealment of actions... But instead of a map, we are often given only a diagram of the route, where only the roads and some population centers are noted. It is no accident that some young regimental officers, including myself, cannot quickly take their bearings in unknown terrain."

It should be added that it will be much more difficult to do that in a combat situation because of the high nervous tension and the acute shortage of time. This means that

it is necessary to have constant training and exercises in military topography and to study the experience of the best specialists in this subject. So why does the regiment have such a—let us be direct—disdainful attitude toward military topography? This question was given to Lt Col V. Lysenko.

"When can you teach," said Vladimir Konstantinovich with a gesture of surprise, if the system for commander training does not provide for exercises in military topography...."

Indeed, there is no provision for special exercises but the subunits often do have to go out for field exercises. Must not the senior commanders teach their subordinate officers and warrant officers to move along azimuths, to orient themselves by map when traveling, to regain their bearings after losing them, and to maintain their direction under different terrain conditions and during the hours of darkness? What prevents the command from organizing additional exercises in this important training discipline? And why are questions of military topography not included in the plans for the independent work of officers to raise their proficiency? By the way, many questions have accumulated in this regard in the collective headed by Lt Col V. Lysenko. And until they are resolved, there is no certainty that the next battery will not get lost in three pine trees in the next exercises.

**Air Force: Results of 1988 Socialist Competition Mixed**

*18010280 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
10 Dec 88 First Edition p 2*

[Article by Air Regiment Commander Col V. Maskayev under rubric "Competition Initiators Sum Up Results": "The Right to Independence"]

[Text] Even a cursory glance was enough to see that Team Chief Sr Lt O. Vershinin was puzzled by something.

"The people put out fully today in the drill," the officer began, "but still saved less time than planned."

Well, I could fully understand the distress of one of the regiment's best aviators. As a matter of fact, the aviators had tried to prepare equipment as quickly as possible for performing the flight assignment, but the result turned out to be not what they had counted on. Unfortunately, that was the case not just for Sr Lt Vershinin. For many specialists the improvement in results was becoming less and less from drill to drill.

Of course that state of affairs with the fulfillment of socialist pledges could be explained by the fact that the aviators had reached the maximum indicator ceiling, as the saying goes.

Not very long ago this would not have caused special concern, for we finally had approached the planned objective of an eight percent reduction in time periods for placing equipment in combat readiness. It would seem that one only had to rejoice, but all aviators with whom I had occasion to chat were of a different opinion.

"What good is it if the tempo has slowed?" Maj V. Breusov asked me, for example, and there was a hint of anxiety in the experienced engineer's words.

It was becoming clear that further improvements were not to be achieved by previous methods, but only by maximum exertion of physical efforts. New approaches were required which would permit progressing considerably faster. The unit command element and regimental party committee called on all aviators to resolve the problem through common efforts. A working group was formed which included the most authoritative specialists. They were faced with the task of gathering and studying all suggestions which would come from the personnel.

Over a hundred suggestions aimed at reducing time periods for preparing aviation equipment were received in a short time. They included the most diverse proposals, ranging from the idea of creating new aircraft systems, for example, to the fabrication of a very basic device helping to ease the personnel's work. All of them

were studied thoroughly. As a result around 30 percent of the suggestions received were deemed productive and were recommended for adoption.

For example, because of Lt Col A. Panov's suggestion the time for preparing missiles for combat employment was cut almost in half by altering the pattern of the teams' work. Now each team readied two missiles each at the same time in place of the previous one missile. The specialists had to master related operations for this purpose.

Other suggestions by the aviators also produced no small amount of gain in time. This is what permitted reducing the overall time for preparing equipment for a sortie by 13 percent of the standard established for an outstanding grade. In analyzing results of the past training year now, I cannot help but single out the chief factor that helped us accomplish this difficult task. It is independence.

Judge for yourselves. Only the final objectives were defined for us here. We ourselves determined all the rest—ways, methods, means. Hence the personnel's initiative and energy. They felt themselves to be not simply performers, but active creators, and they experienced the joy of recognition when they saw that their concepts were being turned into specific results. The regiment completely fulfilled pledges made for the year.

But here I have to note regretfully that the example given earlier is more the exception than the rule and the past training year for us went basically under the sign of rather rigid coddling. This was manifested in different ways, but one thing was invariable—diktat from above.

Here is a typical picture. The regiment is readying to perform flight operations. Everything has been planned, features of accomplishing the upcoming mission have been taken into account, dozens of specialists are engaged in preparing the missile-armed aircraft, and pilots and navigators are thoroughly working out different versions of operations. Suddenly at the very last moment when it remains only to give the command for take-off an order comes from higher headquarters to break off the flights. Why? For what reason? Finally it is clarified that somewhere in one of the units a crew made an error in executing a flight assignment. The incident of course was unpleasant and the guilty parties got what they deserved, but why must we, who have never even seen the negligent aviators, also have to suffer with them? The fact is that now we too have to sit at the airfield, wasting time studying incoming instructions and repeating what already had been considered a completed phase.

Such a practice is encountered constantly. Of course information about flying violations gives reason to sharpen attention to certain matters, but why not give

the regimental commander the right to decide for himself the degree of reaction at the unit level? He can more accurately determine the necessary steps based on specific conditions and the level of aviators' training.

Now, however, any choice is categorically prohibited. Instructions from above are structured according to one immutable format: study, hold additional classes, and urgently report execution. As a result, after receiving such an instruction the regiment's adjusted procedure begins to be hastily recarved, as it is not that simple to find a "window" for conducting the prescribed measure.

Here is a specific example. A message from higher headquarters announced that in one of the naval air units the crew where Capt V. Tsran was commander temporarily lost its bearings while performing a night flight under adverse weather conditions. Headquarters demanded that classes be held with the personnel to analyze infractions of flight safety rules with respect to navigation over the last 10 years! By the way, a class already had been held in the regiment on a similar topic, but there was nothing to do but hold it again. When we consider, as experience shows, that up to 300 instructions are received in the regiment in a month's time one can easily imagine how things go under such conditions. What kind of independence is this?

In such a situation the regimental commander is transformed into a simple transmission link. The fetters of excessive supervision hamper him in making maximum use of his experience and displaying creativeness and initiative. The regimental commander is forced to coordinate every matter concerning our daily life in numerous echelons, where the matter often drags on.

For example, documents removing Lt I. Skrynnik from flight operations were drawn up in the regiment almost a year ago. By that time the young officer was "renowned" among colleagues for his attraction to alcohol. In such cases the conversation now is brief and strict: there is no place aboard a missile-armed aircraft for those who love liquor. It seems everything is clear, but the procedure for approving the decision made in the regiment has dragged on to this day. The work suffers as a result because people see that their commander, it seems, essentially decides nothing. After this what kind of authority will his word have?

Questions of incentives for persons who are the leaders in training also are included here. A strange picture sometimes takes shape where aviator nominees worthy of reward are discussed collectively in the regiment and decisions are made, but then a correction is made in higher echelons: something is clarified and some names are stricken. Does this mean that the opinion of the collective and the unit command element is an empty formality? And take material incentives for the best personnel. Once we made a simple calculation and learned that under the most favorable circumstances there will be no more than 50 kopecks for each person

who distinguishes himself. I am sure that if the regimental commander had a more substantial sum of money for material incentives for leaders in training he would be able to give new impetus to raising the personnel's activeness. For now, however, the authority of honest, strenuous military labor basically is proclaimed only in words.

And furthermore it is hard for me to look subordinates in the eye when they come to me with a request for help in solving housing problems. I am powerless here. There now are over 100 families in the regiment without apartments at all and another 40 need improved housing conditions. For now there is no hope that the situation will change in some way. And is it really normal that on days of flight operations aviators are forced to get to the airfield in trucks intended for entirely other purposes? Those in higher headquarters know about all this, but for now we do not sense any assistance in solving our needs and problems.

Time now imperiously demands a restructuring of thinking and a restructuring of activity. Forward progress is impossible without this. This also concerns the question of a commander's independence.

#### **Aviation Training Said to Violate Rule of Radio Silence**

18010350 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
17 Jan 89 First Edition p 1

[Letter to editors from Lt Col V. Molchanov, Air Defense Forces: "Importunate Control"]

[Text] Respected Editors, the matter I want to raise will appear at first glance to be of secondary and limited significance. By not resolving the problem, however, we are causing considerable harm to the combat training not only of the fighter aviation but also of those who are learning how to counteract an air enemy. I refer to the excessive saturation of the air with radio commands.

I cite the following incident. The air regiment commander was assigned the mission of hypothetically destroying a control air target while maintaining radio silence. From the moment the engine was started up until the aircraft left the runway, however, there was a "vigorous exchange of opinions" between air and ground—that is, between the control tower and the fighters. Is this simplification? Basic simplification. Why have we reconciled ourselves to it? Allegedly for purposes of ensuring flight safety: Prompting, they say, is sometimes unavoidable. In real combat this cannot be, however!

In order to cover up its own blunders the air unit's command element seems to be interested in lowering the evaluation of the radiotechnical subunit supporting the flights. The ground communication and control specialists, in turn, try by hook or by crook to demonstrate that the equipment entrusted to them is in good order and

that the crews are performing properly.... At one time no commands went through the instrument guidance equipment to the aircraft for two whole weeks, as a result of which the evaluations dropped. The matter never went beyond reciprocal recriminations, however. Finally, the equipment at the control tower was checked out by Maj D. Babenko, the air unit's engineer, who determined that the radio equipment was not precisely tuned.

And how are flights organized with reduced radio traffic and limited use of the electronic equipment? In addition to the fact that such flight shifts are at times conducted rarely, they are also far from exemplary. On the first

takeoff everyone properly observes the preflight instructions, to be sure, and it is relatively quiet on the air. During the second, two or three "weak-nerved" individuals "will appear," who have to speak out, and during the third everything returns to normal. Even when the crews are being guided in for a landing no 2 seconds go by without radio traffic.

With respect to flights with limited use of the electronic equipment, we adhere to the infamous principle of "playing it safe" and permit only the immediate or the distance homing radio to be turned on.... In short, the urgent problem of importunate control in the air must be resolved without delay.

**Commander, Northern Fleet Criticizes  
Commanders, Staffs, Political Organs For Lack of  
Realism in Training**

18010294 Moscow *KOMMUNIST*  
*VOORUZHENNYKH SIL* in Russian  
No 19, Oct 88 pp 9-16

[Article by Vice Admiral F. Gromov, Commander of the  
Red Banner Northern Fleet: "Critically Assess What Is  
Achieved in Work"]

[Text] If we set ourselves the goal of briefly and broadly  
formulating the main ends and tasks of perestroika in  
the Fleet, than in my view they will look as follows.  
Perestroika is first of all a significant increase in the  
quality of the training and indoctrination process. It is  
intensification of combat training as the basis of the life's  
work of the naval forces. It is assurance of the maximal  
return from every officer, warrant officer, petty officer,  
and seaman in mastering the complex contemporary  
models of weapons and equipment. It is primarily the  
activation of the human factor, including instilling in the  
seamen a sense of responsibility for deepening pere-  
stroyka, and their liberation from apathy and estrange-  
ment.

Much has been done in the Northern Fleet in recent  
years, if we take as our starting point the April (1985)  
Plenum of the CC, CPSU, which proclaimed a course  
aimed at perestroika of all spheres of our lives. We are  
fully justified in applying to ourselves the evaluation of  
the sociopolitical situation prevailing in the country as  
given by the 19th All-Union Party conference. The winds  
of renewal have tempered the moral health of the Soviet  
people, including those who now serve their hard service  
at the northern frontiers of the Fatherland. In the fleet  
collectives, democratization has released a powerful  
stream of ideas, emotions, and initiatives. Affirmation of  
truth and glasnost have cleared the social atmosphere,  
inspired the men, emancipated consciousness, and stim-  
ulated active work.

All this positively affects the progress of perestroika, and  
brings a quite tangible increase in the results of labor of  
tens and hundreds of Northern Fleet seamen. In the last  
training year, they won eleven of twenty prizes of the  
Navy CINC in varieties of training. The submarines on  
which officers V. Yefimov and Yu. Cherkasov serve won  
the title of best for missile fire, the cruiser "Alexander  
Nevskiy" won for artillery proficiency, and the aviation  
squadron commanded by Lt.Col. Ye. Yatsko won for  
antisubmarine proficiency. The ship on which Capt. 3rd  
Rank A. Lebedev serves came away the victor in com-  
petition and was named the best in its type of training.

The Military Council, staff, and political administration  
analyzed what precisely had ensured such rapid growth  
in the level of proficiency of crews, both those named  
and certain other progressive ships. There was nothing  
unusual here. Generally there was routine hard work by  
ship commanders and their closest assistants, and almost

all crew members. And also there was close contact  
between the leaders of the collectives and the Party and  
Komsomol organizations, able reliance on them, and  
mutual assistance and support. Thus the familiar truism  
was again proven correct: the most weighty results in  
combat training are achieved in the military collectives  
where the Party organizations look deeply and objec-  
tively into the questions of commander's and special  
training, continuously monitor the training and team-  
work development of the ship's combat and antisubma-  
rine crews and the crews of the main command post, and  
effectively influence the training of the deputy level and  
the mastery of related areas of responsibility.

On the missile cruiser "Marshal Ustinov", for example,  
from the first day of the cruise there was much work  
during execution of combat service tasks to prepare for  
proficiency-rating testing. For in the opinion of the  
command and Party committee, the proficiency rating is  
a concentrated expression of the level of mastery, the  
ability to service the equipment at a highly effective and  
quality level under the most difficult conditions, and to  
exploit all of its design potential. Therefore specialty  
classes, drills, and ship and unit combat exercises were  
subordinated to the task of raising the proficiency rating.  
The aspiration to raise the practical orientation of all  
forms of training and to impart lasting operating skills to  
the specialists required the ship command to revise the  
established methods, to bring the training process as  
close as possible to real life and to the execution of  
combat training missions.

The Party Committee, in the person of Capt. 3rd Rank  
Ye. Koval and other activists, supported the line of the  
command. At sessions of the Party Committee the  
progress of combat training was profoundly and closely  
analyzed, and each incident of simplification or reduc-  
tion of the effectiveness of the training process was  
examined from every aspect. The work of the Commu-  
nist commanders of combat units and services in train-  
ing the deputy level, passage by officers of tests for the  
next-highest position, the growth of master-rated and  
high proficiency-rating specialists were under the unflag-  
ging supervision of the Party Committee. Activists  
resolved these questions using a whole arsenal of means  
of influence: receiving the reports of Communists, anal-  
ysis of the state of affairs in a particular collective,  
assistance to Party organizations of the subunits and to  
Party groups, synthesis and dissemination of the experi-  
ence of outstanding members. Thus the Party Commit-  
tee, after analyzing the work of the command of the  
engineer department acknowledged the best in the fleet,  
developed specific recommendations to raise the quality  
of the training and indoctrination process.

Largely thanks to the clear-cut position taken by the  
Party activists, it was possible to ensure that the  
increased socialist obligations were met on the ship, and  
that the number of high proficiency-rating specialists

grew. Ultimately all this was reflected in the accident-free work of the equipment and successful execution of the tasks of combat service. And there are many such ships, units, and subunits in the Fleet.

Nevertheless the Military Council, staff, and political administration of the Fleet were not fully satisfied. One still too often encounters an uncritical assessment of the state of affairs in the work of many commanders, political organs, staffs, Party and Komsomol organizations, and there is still strong inertia, adherence to stereotypes, a tendency to report-mania and false fronts, which inevitably affect the quality of combat training and the effectiveness of the training process. And ultimately affects a multifaceted concept such as combat readiness, which as we know includes the necessary means of conducting combat actions, the proficiency of the personnel, and their level of morale and political conviction.

In the last training period, some of the ships did not achieve any noticeable progress, and some lost ground completely. This happened on the missile cruiser "Vice-Admiral Drozd." Not everything was done here to ensure a high level of the training and indoctrination process, to raise the quality of personnel training, and strengthen military discipline. Last year the work of the Party organization of the ship was recognized to be unsatisfactory. One would think this would have compelled the Communists to step up their work, to raise their return and effectiveness, to resolutely abandon the outmoded approaches. This did not happen, however. The ship did not eliminate all hands working methods or formalism in carrying out scheduled combat training measures. Certain leaders still think and act in the old ways, without a creative search for new training methods and tactical solutions.

This may be explained largely by the passivity of the ship command, its desire to perform new tasks using old methods. But we cannot relieve the Party organization of responsibility; it pays insufficient attention to the formation at the command level of initiative, an inquiring mind, and a creative approach in their work. To this day activists clearly remain in the thrall of yesterday's ideas: cultivation of unthinking activity, timidity of thinking, expectation of instruction and guidance at every step.

Meanwhile we have examples of a different type, demonstrating how great the role of the Party organization is in educating Communists, including the leaders. Some time ago on the best ships in the Fleet, then commanded by Captains 1st Rank V. Ivanov and V. Grigoryev, at Party bureau sessions the practice began of receiving reports from commanders on the development of initiative in subordinates, and the formers' personal contribution to the resolution of worthwhile problems. And although initially the reaction to this innovation in the field was unmistakable, it was supported by the political administration. The proposed measure raised the role of the Party organization of the ships, and raised the

commander's responsibility to the Communists. The issue was not the personal deeds of the commanders, but analysis of their work as Communists. However, the experience was not widely disseminated, unfortunately. Just like certain other undertakings. Many questions of expanding democratization, glasnost, and activation of the human factor run up against the old criteria, which slow the development of beneficial changes, and without them it is impossible today to achieve radical improvements in combat training, to raise the proficiency of the personnel to a new qualitative level.

In analyzing the results of the last training period, the Military Council proceeds on the idea that the Fleet has entered the second stage of perestroika, the stage of shifting of political solutions to the plane of practical deeds. It has critically analyzed its work in the most important areas from the positions of contemporary requirements, and after studying the work to prevent negative tendencies, it synthesized the experience of the best. And it was forced with all frankness to acknowledge that the failure of the Fleet staff and political administration to carry their work to completion was the basis of many omissions in the field. In some cases we clearly lost sight of vitally important questions, in others we did not show the due persistence and exactingness, in others still, we tried to force new phenomena of life into the framework of the old ideas.

In the resolution of the problems facing the ships, an important place is given to each link in the complex Fleet mechanism, beginning with the administrative organs and all types of combat support, and ending with the ship's combat or antisubmarine crew. Nevertheless the decisive role belongs to the ship commanders, who bear personal responsibility to the Party and state for the weapons entrusted to them, for the training and indoctrination of personnel, for the maintenance of high combat readiness. This responsibility is all the higher because our ships are performing their missions far from their home bases. In independent cruises all responsibility for execution of tasks lies on the shoulders of the ship commander. His combat readiness, will, competence, and independence, his ability quickly and firmly to make broad, well-founded decisions, finally, his lack of compromise in analysis and evaluation of the state of affairs in the crew, are subjected to a harsh test. This is why the Military Council, staff, and political administration pay tireless attention to the ideological tempering and military-technical training of ship commanders. Indeed, not only they, but also commanders and staffs of formations, political organs, and Party organizations. Especially since the average age of ship commanders in our Fleet is scarcely more than thirty. A solicitous attitude toward them, and hard work to instill genuine command qualities in them have always been a good tradition in the Fleet.

However in recent years, unfortunately, it has ceased to be the determining factor in the work of certain commanders of tactical formations and staffs. And as a

result, the level of professional, naval, and tactical training of certain ship commanders does not meet the demands imposed. Some of them, for example those like Capt. 2nd Rank G. Baryshkov, have proven incapable of good execution of the tasks imposed on them in accordance with their combat function, or of maintaining strong military discipline in subordinate collectives. The drop in the prestige of the commander's position, which has caused some shortage of cadres, is arousing serious concern. Among the many reasons for such phenomena, there are some that previously did not come into the field of view of the Military Council due to their outward triviality. It seems that there are frequent cases when ship commanders are required personally to supervise cleaning details and support work, and disciplinary practice with regard to them is not established. All this negatively affects their performance of duties, and lowers the quality of commander's training of ship's officers. This was strictly pointed out at the session of the Military Council when the report of Capt. 1st rank (now Rear Admiral) P. Svyatashov was received. In many staff Party organizations there were businesslike discussions of the role of the commander in the struggle for high quality of the training and indoctrination process. The political organs did a great deal of work to implement the decisions of the Military Council. Already there are grounds to conclude that the situation is changing for the better, although it may not happen as quickly as we would wish.

Here is something else we cannot help but see today. The present-day ship commander is inconceivable without the ability to effectively utilize modern automatic command and control systems. However certain ones prefer to sail by the old methods, and do not fully exploit the capabilities offered by computers. For instance, during execution of a fire exercise, the commander of a nuclear-powered submarine, with no need to do so, ignored the recommendations of the command and control system operator, Sr. Lt. V. Senchenko, and this resulted in serious consequences. Nor was this incident an exception. A similar phenomenon has also been observed among certain commanders of diesel-electric submarines in the tactical formation where Capt. 1st Rank V. Yurchenko serves. Often one can see that the commanders do not use the capabilities offered by modern computing systems. And as the equipment grows more complex, the more apparent this kind of "computer phobia" becomes in some of them.

It has happened that these most intelligent machines have even not been turned on to calculate the maneuvers of ships and targets, the attack approach, or different variants for the execution of exercises. It should be noted that for objective and subjective reasons initially these tendencies did not draw a sharp reaction from specialists of the Fleet staff and headquarters. Now we have begun to pay greater attention to centralized training of commanders, and classes with them by flag officer electronic specialists. In addition, in assessing the tactical aspect of the actions of a commander, we also try to take an

indicator such as efficient use of computers into account, since it is clear that neglect of it leads to contraction of the operational-tactical horizon, and ultimately to schematization of actions and simplification in combat training. But generally in cadre policy we adhere to the fundamental directive of the 19th All-Union Party Conference, which pointed out that we must struggle for an administrative staff of a new type, based on high professionalism and mastery of contemporary information technology, capable of advancing economic (and under our conditions, military) and social progress. And people who have a good grasp of the foundations of the science of command and control should work in this staff.

Here is another alarming problem. Analysis has shown that, although last year the success of execution of fire exercises improved somewhat, a large number of them were executed at medium and minimal range. This ratio indicates that the psychological mindset for a high mark, and not for victory (which naturally are not one and the same) has put down deep roots. Including in the work of the Party organizations. Even in those cases when deliberate simplifications have been permitted, as for instance, a fire exercise by a group of small missile ships against stationary targets instead of self-propelled ones, neither the shipboard Party organizations, the staff Party organization, nor even the unit political department gave a due assessment. And all had the same excuse: supposedly the elements of oversimplification were dictated by safety considerations.

To be sure, in peacetime training it is impossible to create the situation of a real battle, with its genuine emotional and physical stresses. At the same time, often the very organization of combat training does not encourage this. For example, the ship prepares for a performance-graded exercise according to a prior plan, and then the staff comes and assesses a thoroughly orchestrated spectacle, which in no case is an index of the ability of the men to perform in extreme circumstances. Nevertheless, in places where the demonstrative aspect of the matter prevails, a high mark might be awarded for such a "spectacle," without violating either methodology or instructions. And the men who care about their work, who complicate the situation by attempting to model conditions after a real battle, find themselves in a less favorable position.

Something like this has also been observed in the performance of fire exercises. A commander deliberately performing the fire under the most complex conditions, at maximal range, i.e. precisely as he would perform in a real battle, may receive a score of two if there is a failure. So he faces a dilemma: either to utilize a new technique for the sake of true proficiency, complicate the situation and thus risk a good mark, with all the consequences that entails, or to act according to a well-worn scheme and obtain the desired score. It seems to me that the problem is worthy of more careful study at all levels, for we ourselves are not capable of changing all of the existing methods and instructions.

Given the current state of affairs, there is little to stimulate inquiry, risk, and innovation, which should be the basis of combat training in peacetime, since in the modern war there will be no time to learn "as you go." But if the evaluation becomes a goal in itself for commanders, political workers, and Party activists, then it is easy to again find oneself in the thrall of illusory well-being. There may be hypothetical targets, hypothetical shell holes, hypothetical opponents; only combat readiness does not have the right to be hypothetical. And Communists first of all should be concerned about this, should implement the demands of the CPSU Central Committee on the need to maintain high combat readiness. Lack of perfection of norms, criteria, and methods should in no case become a blind behind which one hides one's Party conscience. The duty of every Fleet Communist, without fear of lofty words, is to find the strength to resist the temptation to achieve a high grade with minimal effort. And a positive evaluation should only bring satisfaction when it reflects the proficiency of the crew, the daring of the commander and his high tactical proficiency, and most importantly, when it is achieved under conditions maximally close to those of combat.

This depends largely on the capable organization of multi-faceted exercises and integrated practice of the tasks of training courses. And that in turn is determined by precise planning, which we can boldly call the foundation of quality accomplishment of their assigned tasks by staffs and ships, and a guarantee of successful *perestroika* of combat training. Not so long ago, after long searching and experiments, we developed a harmonious system of planning at all levels, beginning with proposal of steaming plans by the ships, and ending with confirmation that the proposals have been included in the general Fleet plan. But it would be an exaggeration to say that the new system has worked without a hitch. We can point to the caprices of the northern weather, to difficulties with material and technical support, but the fact remains: we still have not succeeded in ensuring that a comprehensively thought-out and weighed plan becomes the rule for all authorities. Many deficiencies have been due to the lack of coordination of measures of staffs and ships, and the poor organization of monthly, weekly, and daily planning. We can see from the example of the military collectives where officers V. Sobgayda and A. Kovalchuk serve that expenses in planning inevitably lead to formalistic organization of combat training, and give rise to storming and a lack of system, and this most negatively affects the quality of the training process, command training, and specialty classes.

There are several causes for these omissions. They include poor participation in planning by staff specialists, insufficient attention on the part of commanders of units and tactical formations, the large number of measures planned by higher staffs, the paperwork load on ship and staff officers, the low activity of Communists of staff Party organizations in resolving these problems. I stress that the Party organizations of staffs have still not

become an effective instrument in the struggle for *perestroika*. Their return is very low in resolving an urgent problem such as the struggle with paper generation.

The question of the reduction of all types of paperwork has been posed repeatedly by the Fleet command to the commanders and staffs in the most urgent form. Some progress in this area was noted in the offices of the staff senior navigation officer and technical officer. But the roots of this disease have proven to be so deep that we can still not speak of any substantial movement forward. What is more, a recent analysis showed that in the submarine formation where officer R. Chebotarevskiy serves, the stream of paper has increased by a factor of three in the last few years. The fact is rather noteworthy, graphically proving that for certain staffs, political organs, and most importantly, officers of special directorates of the Fleet, the armchair-paper style of work still remains. And this forces the Fleet command to seek new means and methods of combatting this vicious phenomenon. Now we have arrived at an unequivocal conclusion: we need to combat not only the paper itself, which is just a consequence of the bureaucratic work style, but direct our main efforts to breaking the psychology. And I say bluntly, without active and energetic help of Party organizations, the task will remain hard to resolve.

The bureaucratic approach, superciliousness, and formalism are terrible in any job, but perhaps they do the most harm in work with people. For it is precisely these social ills that once were the cause of most misdeeds and offenses committed in the military collective where Capt. 1st Rank A. Penkin serves. When the inspections were done, they revealed that ideological indoctrination work in certain subunits of the formation was detached from reality, and was abstract in nature. Recently the Fleet Military Council, when receiving reports of commanders, noted that the conclusions from lessons of last year and the first months of the winter period of training were correct there. The formation developed a harmonious system for preventing unauthorized mutual relations, raising the role of social organizations, expanding *glasnost*, and developing the social activity of the men. By activating an inquiring attitude, they were able to make a significant step forward there in improving the forms and methods of educational work, which have already begun to show positive results. Carefully analyzing the experience of this work, the Military Council decided to recommend it for broad use in the Fleet. Although of course there were doubts: a lagging formation and then suddenly... progressive experience. However I believe that dogmatism and adherence to stereotypes should find universal rejection. The main criterion can only be life, and it has proven the effectiveness of the measures they took.

A close connection with life, with the revolutionary changes occurring in society, acquires special importance in ideological work aimed at forming in the seamen a Marxist-Leninist world view, high responsibility

for execution of their constitutional duty, and a dialectical approach in evaluating the socioeconomic processes taking place in society. At a recent session of the Fleet Military Council devoted to analysis of the state of ideological and political indoctrination work, a very strict and exacting evaluation was made of the effectiveness of this work, and the correspondence of its forms and methods to the demands of today. It is becoming increasingly obvious that work in this direction should be oriented chiefly toward the specific person. Under conditions of expanding democracy and socialist pluralism, increased demands for continuous improvement of work methods are imposed on the ideological cadres and agitation-propaganda activist ranks. The Military Council noted that recently the creative quest of leaders of groups for Marxist-Leninist training of officers, and political training of warrant officers and personnel, has stepped up considerably, and that there is less bureaucracy, formalism, and ideological cliché. Thanks to the political administration's abandonment of command and coercive methods of leadership, their independence and initiative have grown. New forms of work have become acclimated in the Fleet. In our view, the top-to-bottom planning of Party political work on ships and in units meets the demands of the times, and makes it possible to exert uniform and integrated influence on the resolution of specific combat training tasks of a whole group of forms and methods of Party political, agitation-propaganda, and cultural mass work.

However a Military Council session nevertheless noted with concern that Party organizations still do not use all their potential to raise the effectiveness of this work, do not know how to keep their finger on the pulse of life, and are not in condition to define their Party attitude toward the contradictory facts of reality, and at times simply are afraid to do so. Many Communist-leaders participate weakly in explaining Party decisions and avoid in every way a frank talk with the men on political subjects. They are hampered by timidity of thinking, the readiness, learned over decades, to pick up any slogan, and boundless acclamation of individual personalities. But you see, in ideological work as nowhere else, today reliance should be on a critically-thinking, bold, and socially-active personality, with a developed sense of his own dignity. Consequently this work should be conducted by personalities no less vivid, theoretically trained, possessing high culture and a mastery of the tools of dialectics. Presently there are few such personalities, but I am convinced that with each step of perestroika, with each day that passes, there will be more and more of them.

In a complex and crucial time it is often truly difficult to understand all the many and diverse opinions and assessments, and to find the sole correct decision. But it becomes more easy to do this the more precisely we assimilate the decisions of the 27th CPSU Congress and the 19th All-Union Party Conference, which set a course toward combatting the phenomena of stagnation, toward all possible development of democracy and glasnost, and

activation of the human factor. It is precisely from these positions, and not from the viewpoint of ramshackle dogmas and stereotypes, that we should evaluate the facts and phenomena of life. And here democratization and glasnost in no way contradict the nature of our Soviet Armed Forces. Democracy and discipline are two sides of the same coin: without respect for the person, without attention to the personality and the collective, without strict observance of civil rights, it is impossible to achieve firm and conscious discipline, and strict observance of regulations. And without them, as we know, there can be no high combat readiness, and high quality of combat training is impossible.

It is impossible to resolve these problems, to raise the quality of combat training, radically to change the work style of command cadres, without a radical improvement of Party political work, and constant improvement of the work of political organs and Party and Komsomol organizations. Here the focus is on the problem of competence of the political staff, which is inconceivable without very extensive naval training and high technical proficiency. The essentially correct slogan, widely disseminated in recent years, that the political worker's ambition should not be the handles of the periscope, but specific people, in my view was carried to an extreme in a number of cases, and disoriented the political workers. And this affected their prestige and the effectiveness of Party political work. Now the Fleet Military Council and the political administration are taking significant steps aimed at raising the level of technical training of the political staff. We proceed from many observations that show: where the political workers know the ship weapons and systems to perfection, there the work is done in close association with life. Where the ship political staff receives the right to perform the duties of the ship duty officer or watch officer, or assume independent control of the ship, their work is more weighty and prestigious. To achieve this goal, technical tests, and special classes are conducted for political workers in the system of commander's training.

Preparation for the modern battle cannot be conducted by yesterday's methods. And this obliges all, from the admiral to the seaman, to critically assess the results of their work, to constantly seek more effective ways of resolving worthwhile tasks. This we can achieve only by resolutely ridding ourselves of outmoded schemes, simplified approaches, and inertia. The Military Council, staff, and political administration of the Fleet consider this the most important part of their work.

**Northern Waters Naval Buildup Denied**  
*PM3001093189 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA*  
*in Russian 28 Jan 89 First Edition p 5*

[Article by Major General V. Tatarnikov under the "Military Expert's Opinion" rubric: "Conjecture and Fact"]

[Text] Reports have recently been appearing in the Western press claiming that a substantial strengthening of the Northern Fleet's forces—its modernization and

buildup—is under way. West Germany's DIE WELT, in particular, states that Soviet naval forces in that region have received "substantial reinforcement—a heavy cruiser and helicopter carrier" and dozens of improved bombers.

The thesis that the USSR Northern Fleet's commissioning of the aircraft carrier "Baku," the cruiser "Mikhail Kalinin," and new Tu-22M aircraft changes the balance of forces in the Soviet Union's favor is patently far-fetched and does not stand up to criticism. U.S. and NATO superiority in naval armaments, including in the North, is so considerable that the appearance of several units of combat equipment in the USSR has no influence at all on the overall naval balance in northern European waters. The North Atlantic Alliance maintains a considerable superiority there, and this is universally recognized. NATO naval superiority over the Warsaw Pact on a global scale is also a universally recognized fact.

The Northern Fleet's commissioning of new ships and planes must be seen in the context of the replacement of obsolete naval armaments. In recent years the Northern Fleet has decommissioned several tens of combat units, including large submarines and combat planes, particularly Tu-16 bombers.

Articles in the Western press show that a certain confusion and anxiety clearly exist in NATO circles regarding

our naval activity. The Soviet Union also has very serious concerns regarding NATO countries' naval activity in the North.

It seems to us that the best way to remove these anxieties is to hold specific talks where an attempt could be made to achieve a common or close understanding of the reasons for each other's actions and the disposition of forces between Warsaw Pact and NATO navies, and to compare the sides' views on the ways and means of enhancing stability here. The Soviet Union has proposed starting consultations between the Warsaw Pact and NATO. A meeting of military experts from both military-political alliances, preferably with the participation of Sweden and Finland, could initially be held by way of preparation for the consultations.

Moreover, the Soviet Union calls on all interested states to begin talks on limiting and reducing the scale of naval activities in the North. Our program to reduce naval activity and provide confidence-building measures in the region, which was formulated by M.S. Gorbachev in Murmansk and given concrete expression by N.I. Ryzhkov in Stockholm and Oslo, has lost none of its relevance, and we will be continuing to seek its implementation. The USSR is also ready to constructively discuss all proposals by other countries both on the nature of the actual problem and in regard to the negotiating forums at which it could be examined.

**1st Deputy CINC on Restructuring,  
Missile-Artillery Troops Day 1988**  
18010293 Moscow *KOMMUNIST*  
*VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian*  
No 20, Oct 88 pp 45-51

[Interview of Col Gen Yu. Yashin: "Restructuring is Verified by Deeds"]

[Text] November 19th is Missile Troops and Artillery Day. On the threshold of the holiday our correspondent interviewed Col Gen Yu. Yashin, 1st deputy commander, Strategic Rocket Forces.

*During the course of restructuring, which has embraced all aspects of the life and activity of the army and navy, many new things have appeared in the training and indoctrination of the personnel, and the work of commanders, political workers and party organizations. What changes have taken place in the Strategic Rocket Forces in particular? In other words, with what are the missilemen greeting their professional holiday?*

The Rocket Forces are constantly being changed and improved. Equipment is changing, the forms of combat employment and the method of training and indoctrinating the personnel are being improved. But these changes are taking place in different ways in the military collectives. We are striving to see that the processes of qualitative improvement of combat readiness that are going on in the best of them extend to the Rocket Forces as a whole. Quality is the main ingredient in restructuring.

Do we understand what needs to be restructured in the Rocket Forces? Yes, but as yet not entirely. Restructuring is not a simple matter. Did everything become clear and understandable immediately? No, even today there are many problems. But, some things have already been done on the basis of what is understood.

What has been done in the first stage of restructuring?

In the forces today an irreversible process is underway of creating a new moral-political atmosphere in the military collectives, which is characterized by a search for modern approaches to solving the tasks that face us, a sharper and more objective assessment of the state of affairs, and intensification of the struggle against negative phenomena in army life. The accustomed stereotypes of thinking and obsolete views that have been held for years are being swept away. Already, according to the real results of this training year, which is nearing an end, it can be judged that many practical questions in all areas in the life and activity of the forces have begun to be solved more effectively, with greater understanding and knowledge. Characteristic of the current period of renewal is an attack on bureaucratism, red tape and "paper creativity." Today senior level officers spend more time in the units and subunits, concentrating their efforts on organizational work and on rendering direct assistance in eliminating shortcomings that have been discovered.

Resolute overcoming of a disrespectful attitude toward officers by individual leaders has become another characteristic feature of restructuring. The military soviet, main headquarters, and political directorates are today seeking to ensure that fair demands, efficient organization of all aspects of service and a growing concern about the living conditions, spare time activity, and social needs of the officers and their families, are inherent in the style of activity of each communist leader.

As for the results of this year... I believe that the Strategic Rocket Forces fulfilled their military training tasks. Sixty-five percent of the units achieved good and excellent results, and the number of excellent subunits markedly increased. All training missile launches were carried out successfully. And I want to note immediately that the demands placed on military discipline, and quality of knowledge, skills and abilities this year was rigid. Communists are in the vanguard of the struggle for high end results. Thus, communists lead 100 percent of the units and subunits that obtained excellent ratings, as well as all of the excellent launch crews, and 32 percent of them are masters of military affairs.

In short, we are having changes for the better. At the same time, today we are striving to see and evaluate beyond the figures in what respects the dynamic of qualitative and quantitative indices is related to the process of real, stable improvement in combat readiness, and in strengthening the discipline and self-discipline of the personnel. The decisions of the 19th All-Union Party Conference, and the tasks that it gave to the Armed Forces direct us to do this, and demand that we interpret in a new way all of our positive and negative realities, and assess more critically and constructively our errors and unsolved problems.

What have we not yet succeeded in doing? Questions of improving the organizational structure of the forces and the control system, and raising the level of operational and combat training, are being solved slowly, and at times not always energetically and at a high qualitative level. Not all commanders and political workers are sufficiently insistent and purposeful in uncompromisingly rooting out window-dressing, indulgences and oversimplification in personnel training and indoctrination, and tearing away people from military training. Nor can we say that we have already achieved a high level of political and technical knowledge on the part of all officers in the Rocket Forces. The culture of an international community is not being formed actively enough in the military collectives. Questions of affirming everywhere in the life of all subunits and units the principle of social justice, on the basis of democratization and glasnost, have not been solved completely. We know and are solving all of these problems. But, unfortunately, the end positive result is not being achieved as quickly and effectively as the time of restructuring demands.

*Missile Troops and Artillery Day is a traditional holiday; it began back in 1944. Since that time, as the saying goes, there has been much water under the bridge. And some things have been erased from the memory, forgotten, and some flashed for an instant, a moment, leaving a barely visible trace. But, we must not forget anything, we do not have the right. Therefore, we certainly cannot fail to touch in our conversation the history of the creation of the Rocket Forces, and the path they have travelled.*

Yes, in 1944, 2 years following the start of the Soviet counteroffensive at Stalingrad, to mark the prominent contributions of artillery in the war years, 19 November was declared Artillery Day by edict of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium. In connection with the qualitative advances and fundamental transformations in military affairs that took place in the post-war years, the appearance of nuclear missile weapons and their entry into the army and navy armament, and the creation of a new service in the Soviet Armed Forces—Strategic Rocket Forces—since 1964 this holiday has been called Missile Troops and Artillery Day.

Soviet artillery, as we know, began its combat path in October 1917. During the years of the Civil War, the Communist Party and V. I. Lenin, deciding questions of military organizational development, paid constant attention to the establishment and development of this branch of arms. Measures were undertaken to organize the production of artillery weapons and ammunition, and train command cadres, and the combat employment of artillery units and subunits was improved.

In repulsing the onslaughts of international intervention against the young Soviet Republic, in fierce clashes in the Civil War at Tsaritsyn, on the Eastern Front, at Petrograd, Volochayevka, Kakhovka, in the assault at Perekop, and in many other battles, our artillery passed with honor the harsh test of combat maturity. Its personnel were models of heroism, staunchness, valor and military skill.

During the years of the Great Patriotic War, artillerymen covered themselves with eternal glory in their defense of the hero cities of Moscow, Leningrad, Odessa, Sevastopol, Minsk, Kiev, Stalingrad, Tula, Novorossiysk and Kerch. Artillery was the steel shield against which the furious attacks by enemy tank and infantry units were smashed. In the battles at Moscow, the 296th Arty Regt alone destroyed 88 fascist tanks. On the Volokolamsk Axis, along with other units, the 289th Antitank Arty Regt barred the way to the enemy, destroying 37 enemy tanks on one day alone, 25 October 1941.

In the post-war years fundamental changes took place in Soviet artillery and equipment, and in raising the level of military skill of the artillerymen. In December 1959 the decision to create the Strategic Rocket Forces was made, in response to intensified imperialist aggression, and the increased military danger from imperialism.

The process of the establishment and development of the youngest service in the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union was concentrated and complex, and historically new in all respects. In it were clearly and vividly displayed the wisdom of the military policy of the Communist Party, the capabilities of the socialist economy, the talent, creativity and industry of all the Soviet people, scientists, designers, technicians and workers, and their unshakable resolve to defend the great gains of socialism. In this process is found a history of military valor, and of the daily military feats of the missilemen.

Our country took its own path in solving the entire set of problems of creating rocket equipment. The history of domestic rocket construction and the use of military rockets in the Russian Army, as no doubt many know, began in the 19th Century. Then was the experience of producing solid fuel rocket missiles and the combat employment of field rocket artillery—the legendary “Katyushas” and aircraft rocket weapons—and there were the experimental models of liquid fuel rockets, the first launch of which took place in August 1933. Our homeland had its great sons, K. E. Tsiolkovskiy, F. A. Tsander, N. I. Tikhomirov, and many other pioneers in research in the field of rocket propulsion.

Virtually the whole country worked on the new weapons. And, of course, it is difficult to talk about everything. I will recall only some particular moments. In July 1946 the first rocket unit was organized on the base of one of the Guards mortar regiments; Maj Gen Arty A. Tveretskiy was named its commander. Then new units began to be organized, led by M. Grigoryev, P. Kolesnikov, G. Nebozhenko, M. Chumak, M. Shubnyy and A. Didyk. They became a kind of testing and experimental base for the operation and employment of the new equipment. On 18 October 1947 the first ballistic missile was successfully launched. Today everyone knows about the obelisk erected at the site of this launch. Ten years later, in 1957, the world's first intercontinental, multi-stage missile was launched. The myth about the technical backwardness of the USSR, zealously propagandized in the West in the post-war years, was dispelled for once and for all.

Visiting the museum of the Rocket Forces, I look again and again into the faces of those to whom the homeland is obligated for the upsurge of thinking in science and technology, and for progress in rocket construction: S. Korolev, I. Kurchatov, M. Keldysh, N. Pilyugin, M. Yangel, A. Isayev... I am happy that I saw, knew and know many of those whose names are inscribed in gold letters in the history of our armed service. They include commanders-in-chief M. Nedelin, K. Moskalenko, S. Biryuzov, N. Krylov, and V. Tolubko, and political directorate chiefs P. Yefimov, I. Lavrenov, P. Yegorov and P. Gorchakov.

I must say that making the Strategic Rocket Forces an independent armed service required rapid solutions to many most complex problems: the selection of the areas

of their deployment and construction of rocket complex launch positions; development of the foundations for the combat employment of the forces and their control; creation of a network of training institutions for missile specialists; as well as the need to solve questions of everyday life and living conditions. There were enough difficulties. You see, everything was being done for the first time and was new, and thus mistakes and serious shortcomings were not avoided. Based on study of the military capabilities of the new weapons and exercise experience, the principles of combat employment of the Rocket Forces were developed, and continuous standing of alert duty was established. Since that long ago time, soon 30 years already, at the designated time a solemn ritual is conducted in missile garrisons, which is accomplished by the precise and strict words of the military order: "To ensure the security of our homeland—the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics—Take Over Alert Duty!"

*As is known, the effectiveness of the Soviet defensive structure at the present stage must be ensured primarily by qualitative parameters, both with respect to equipment and personnel. Tell us, please, how this principle is being realized in the Strategic Rocket Forces.*

All of the content and thrust of the work of command and political cadres, party organizations, and all of the personnel of the Rocket Forces to maintain their combat readiness is determined today by the basic political instruction to ensure effective accomplishment of assigned tasks primarily through qualitative parameters. This concerns especially such vitally important problems for missilemen as improving and modernizing rocket equipment itself; effectiveness in standing alert duty; reducing the normative time required to accomplish equipment maintenance operations; improving the maintenance and operation of military equipment; developing automated control systems; and strengthening the survivorship of missile weapons complexes and forces. All of this requires a steady improvement in the level of military skill and a high level of technical ability on the part of the personnel. In addition, the time factor prevails on us constantly, for our actions are measured literally in seconds. If a crew is seconds late in its actions, the mission may not be accomplished. This is the reason for the special demands placed upon people, on their military training and ability to be trained, their moral-political makeup, and their moral principles.

This year a new method of training alert shifts, and checking and evaluating alert duty was introduced. It has been developed taking into account the opinion of the forces and experience. Practical techniques for training combat crew members have begun to be used more actively. The amount of personal participation of leaders in training alert shifts for alert duty has increased. Party influence on key combat readiness positions was intensified by strengthening the party organizations. Today

100 percent of the Number 1 and 83 percent of the Number 2 crew members, and more than 60 percent of the chiefs of communications shifts, are communists.

If we speak about the main directions of building up qualitative indices that ensure maintaining our combat might at a level that excludes military superiority over us, I would distinguish the following.

In equipment: increasing reliability and improving the fighting qualities and field performance of weapons. Here we are required to make more active use of the achievements of scientific and technical progress in correctly determining the main developmental tendencies in all of military affairs. One more important direction is finding a good solution to problems of automation and control of weapons and troops.

In science: the development and assimilation of new concepts of military art in accordance with the defensive nature of Soviet military doctrine, and scientific support for solving tasks of improving the qualitative indices of combat readiness, combat effectiveness of the forces and of alert duty, troop control, personnel training, self-discipline and discipline. That is, arming command and political personnel with modern methods of troop leadership depends on the degree of development of scientific thinking.

In personnel: The main task for us is to do everything to ensure that the human factor begins to operate truly actively and everywhere, without which, as the USSR Minister of Defense emphasizes, realization of qualitative parameters with respect both to equipment and military science, and to the composition of the Armed Forces, is impossible.

*Apropos of this, speaking about the role of the human factor, we certainly cannot avoid attention to such a matter as the role of party organizations in modernization and restructuring. As was already stated, a great, great deal depends on them. Is their influence being felt on the life and military training of missilemen, and to what degree?*

Openness, glasnost and true persistence in their work distinguishes a great number of party organizations in the Rocket Forces. They demand not assurance, but concrete deeds and tangible results of each communist from every minute of working time. In order to achieve this, questions of party duty, officer's honor, morality, and principled party demands are being given priority. For a long time there has not been in practice such a phenomenon as when, at the decision of the communists themselves, at the end of last year 62 new party organization secretaries were elected, and 576 members of electoral party organs were replaced, including 276 who were not coping with the duties assigned to them. This could be carried out only under the influence of restructuring and democratization of party life.

However, we also cannot fail to see the fact that far from everyone finds it easy to restructure his work from positions of expanding glasnost. Visiting in the forces one sees that some party committee secretaries are timid in assimilating the new approaches, and are copying the administrative activity of command and political personnel. They are lacking in independence, comprehension of the depth of the problems being solved, and in applying the requirements of the 19th Party Conference to the specific task of party organizations in the military collectives. They frequently overlook the main thing in their activity—ensuring that communists set the example in the most important sectors of alert duty, military training, assimilation of modern equipment and strengthening of military discipline.

Such shortcomings are characteristic of the party committee in which Officer G. Porvadov is a member. The activists lack initiative, independence, specificity, purposefulness and persistence. Work with communist officers suffers from monotony. Preference is given to various kinds of speechifying. It is no accident that here no fundamental improvement in military discipline has been achieved, or that they have reconciled themselves to satisfactory marks for alert duty. This is what is paradoxical. The party committee secretary himself is a disciplined, hard working officer, but as an activist he lacks depth of knowledge of the state of affairs or the ability to analyze phenomena, or seek and together with party committee eliminate the causes of omissions, and he is also not sufficiently principled in evaluating the activity of those party members who promise much, but do little.

Life shows that this happens most of all where vital work with the party aktiv and the secretaries, and concern about their political and professional growth and about giving them practical assistance, are placed on the back burner and replaced by management by decree, and where the moral-political and professional qualities of communists and the party aktiv are studied hastily and superficially.

Restructuring requires leaders, and, through the public opinion of communists, it eliminates from its path those who are not able to raise people up to selfless military labor.

*There is no doubt that one of the main directions of restructuring in the Armed Forces is democratization of army life. As studies and analysis of the mail received from readers show, many people have a rather good impression about how democratic changes should take place in such spheres as, say, relationships among military personnel, socialist competition, and intra-party life. But the combining of such concepts as democracy and military discipline causes doubt in some. It is known that in this area the Strategic Rocket Forces have acquired a certain experience. Tell us about this please.*

I want to note immediately that these are not easy questions, and that it is difficult to give unambiguous answers to them, and even more so recommendations applicable everywhere. This year we truly paid particular attention to the study and working out of such important problems as the commander and the party organization, democratization and sole responsibility, and democracy and military training. Let us take just the question of strengthening military discipline. There are still very many shortcomings here. Now, as the saying goes, the doors of our barracks have been opened. Neither accidents on the equipment, nor non-regulation relations can be hidden from people. Only such incidents are not always being made known.

Most often this comes from inertia, and from lack of understanding of the essence of military discipline. There are those who are inclined to identify it solely with internal order in the barracks and external lustre in the unit. But this, as you know, is far from the case. Regulatory order is meaningless without efficient organization of military and political training, constant concern about effective operation and exemplary maintenance of equipment, and the formation of correct attitudes among service personnel, without strict observance of the daily schedule, exemplary standing of alert duty, guard and internal service, and intelligent organization of the leisure time of the personnel. Are these truisms? Possibly. But for some reason many do not want to understand the fact that, when regulatory demandingness and concern about people are undermined by conferences, meetings or dressings down, "pep talks," humiliation of the personnel, or administrative measures, they ruin what is most sacred in service: faith in our regulations, our army laws, and faith in their truly democratic origins.

And here I must say the following. Success in the struggle for firm military discipline, and this means for building up the qualitative parameters in military training, depends largely on the communist leader. It depends on his positions, and his personal example in everything. What authority, for example, can Officer V. Kocheshkov enjoy among his subordinates, if during the course of a year communists made six serious critical comments about him, and he did not react to a single one, ignoring their opinion. And he was a party committee member. Such an attitude led him to the path of deception and fraud, and to discrediting himself as a commander.

Nor can we overlook the fact that there are still communist leaders who display haughtiness toward their subordinates, and sometimes even crudity, and are inattentive to their needs and requests. How can this not conflict with the process of democratization, and with a Leninist understanding of the essence of Soviet sole responsibility. Thus, in the collective led by Officer V. Semyakov, approximately 60 percent of the officers have punishments. Such an attitude toward people at times engenders the desire in young officers to leave military service

altogether. And in the Rocket Forces the average age of officers is 28 years. It is a time of daring attempts. Unthinking all-permissiveness in dealing with subordinates is not our principle.

A dialectical dependence exists between the democratization of military life and the qualitative state of the Armed Forces. Including the masses of military personnel in active, interested, responsible solving of the tasks facing military collectives, democratization contributes to the most complete use of the intellectual and spiritual capability of all democratic institutions. It does not contradict the military structure, corresponds fully to the socialist nature of our Armed Forces, and actively serves to strengthen sole responsibility, law and order, and discipline. In short, it is legitimate and natural for us.

*On holidays it is customary to "sum up" the path travelled, and give an accounting of successes and failures. But a holiday is undoubtedly also a line from which one can look to the future.*

The Strategic Rocket Forces are constantly at a state of high combat readiness. Even in peacetime they fulfill a task of statewide importance—they continuously stand alert duty. All missile units, everywhere, at any time of year, day and night, under any weather conditions, are prepared to make a crushing retaliatory strike.

Missilemen take up war in days of peace. Does this correspond to the spirit of the times on the plane of international relations? I can answer in the words of M. S. Gorbachev: "While the danger of war is retained, and while social revanchism remains the core of the strategy and militaristic programs of the West, we will continue in the future to do everything necessary to maintain our defense might at a level that excludes military superiority of imperialism over socialism."

The destiny of our homeland, with its at times contradictory, difficult, but undoubtedly heroic history, is dear to us. Our freedom and independence, paid for with the sweat and blood of millions of Soviet people, are dear to us. Restructuring, with its revolutionary renewal of socialist reality, and the new political thinking, which is making its way in the world arena and already having specific results in stabilizing the military-political situation on the planet, are also dear to us.

But, the processes of easing tension do not yet have a guarantee of irreversibility, and military danger is the harsh reality of life on our earth. Therefore, improvement of combat readiness, alert duty, professional training, self-discipline and discipline remain the main requirement for all categories of missilemen.

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**Military Transport Directorate Responds to Complaint on Guards Facilities**

*18010316 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
4 Jan 89 First Edition p 1*

[Letters by Lt Gen Yu. Vorontsov, chief, Central Military Transport Directorate, and Col V. Novikov, chief, Military Transport Service, Kiev Military District]

[Text]

**Central Military Transport Directorate**

[Vorontsov] The letter by Capt S. Bondarenko, published on 13 October 1988 under the title "The Same Sufferings..." has been examined at the USSR Ministry of Defense Central Military Transport Directorate. The issues of material-domestic and political support of the guards providing security for and escorting military goods are acknowledged to be pressing ones, which require solutions, including a re-examination of a number of normative documents.

In October and November, officers of the Central Military Transport Directorate, and okrug and line VOSO [Military Communications Service] organs checked a number of military units on the questions of material-domestic and political support of guard personnel. The specific proposals worked out in the course of this check were presented to the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy, and the USSR Ministry of Defense Central Food Directorate.

New train cars for guard details have been developed and undergone successful testing. The Ministry of Railways plans to manufacture 2,000 such train cars by 1995.

This will improve the living conditions for guard personnel enroute. Issuance of food certificates by VOSO commandant's offices, a question also raised in the letter, is not established by regulating documents, and is the responsibility of garrison military unit commanders.

**Kiev Military Transport Service**

[Novikov] The questions raised in the letter have been studied in all Kiev Military District VOSO establishments, and an investigation has been conducted concerning the facts indicated therein.

Every day 50-80 guard details pass by on district railroads. Unfortunately, not all of their units provide them food, and money for food, for their entire round trip. At our initiative, such guard details (there were several hundred last year alone) are given money for food by officers in the commandants' offices, since this money can be obtained in the garrison, as provided for by guidance documents, only during working hours. The guards travel year-round, day and night, without days off or holidays.

Capt Bondarenko also found himself in this situation.

In order to prevent such instances, by agreement with the district finance service, the limitations set for station military commandants' offices on receiving monetary advances and food certificate blanks have been removed (up to 100 rubles and an entire booklet of blanks may be received, instead of 20 rubles and four blanks).

The train car preparing and equipping points for military guard details have been inspected.

**Airborne Troops Transport Money, Valuables  
From Leninakan**

18010297 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
21 Dec 88 First Edition p 4

[Report by Maj V. Zyuvn, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA  
special correspondent: "A Special Trip"]

[Text]A group of airborne troops have carried out an  
especially important mission to evacuate money and valu-  
ables from earthquake-damaged Leninakan.

When our column had left behind Leninakan's cramped  
streets and the ruins of its buildings and picked up speed,  
Gds Maj A. Breus, sitting next to me in the hatch of the  
armored personnel carrier, said:

"We shall go through the pass. It is a country road, but it  
suits us better."

Until that moment all information on the operation had  
been kept in strictest secrecy. When the column set out,  
he alone had known the route. He and no one else. And  
this was understandable: he, Gds Maj Breus, bore com-  
plete responsibility for protecting the cargo.

In addition to him, the special-purpose group included  
Gds Lt Col V. Ozerov and Gds Capt S. Ponikarov,  
commander of a reconnaissance company. And there

were ten airborne troops from that company. The cream  
of the crop. I could not help glancing at Gds Sgt Dmitriy  
Ilchenko and Gds Pvt Viktor Gusev, sitting next to me  
with semiautomatic rifles at the ready. They were pre-  
pared for any surprise. Everything was peaceful on the  
road, however. Excavators, bulldozers, cranes and  
trucks... sped by to the left of our small column, consist-  
ing of two armored personnel carriers and a Uazik  
carrying Gosbank workers. A river of metal. I knew that  
we had long since driven out of range of contact with  
other units. We could only count on ourselves now: 12  
semiautomatic rifles, 36 magazines, four pistols—not a  
lot, considering the fact that sacks containing around 25  
million lay at our feet. Incidentally, fightingmen from  
this regiment found 7,106 rubles in the ruins and  
returned it to the state. Gds Pvt V. Fedotov alone  
retrieved bonds worth 950 rubles and 250 rubles in cash  
from beneath the debris. All of the valuables were turned  
over to the regimental chief of staff: from gold items  
down to a crumpled 3-ruble note. It was a matter of  
honor. The same was true in other units. As of 17  
December, fightingmen in the zone had found and  
returned to the state valuables and money totalling  
4,453,400 rubles.

It was dark when we entered the city of Echmiadzin, the  
end of our route. We drove up to the savings bank office.  
Gds Capt Ponikarov posted a cordon....

### Ministry of Radio Industry to Produce Refrigerators

18010165 Moscow *EKONOMICHESKAYA GAZETA*  
in Russian No 48, Nov 88 p 4

[Interview granted by Yu. Vysokosov, deputy chief, USSR Ministry of Radio Industry Main Scientific and Technical Administration, conducted by V. Zaramenskikh: "Refrigerators for the APK"]

[Text] Radio engineering and... food supplies. Until this year these two concepts had never been put side by side. In 1988, however, the USSR Ministry of Radio Industry assumed the production of refrigeration equipment for the agroindustrial complex and trade. In other words, the Ministry of Radio Industry was assigned to make a substantial contribution to the solution of the food problem.

How did the sector undertake the implementation of its new obligations? On behalf of *EKONOMICHESKAYA GAZETA*, V. Zaramenskikh spoke with Yu. Vysokosov, USSR Ministry of Radio Industry chief of the ministry's Main Scientific and Technical Administration.

[Zaramenskikh] Yuriy Vladimirovich, I observed a winter scene. Fresh-frozen strawberries appeared for sale in one of Moscow's main streets and immediately a waiting line formed, because of their scarcity. We frequently see on store shelves even in the capital fresh-frozen strawberries, fruits and vegetables. If they are packaged, the wrappings bear foreign tags. In other words, we are forced to buy fruits abroad although we keep hearing about tremendous losses in our own home crops.

[Vysokosov] What can I tell you, facilities for the freezing of strawberries, fruits and vegetables are also in short supply. To this day fast-freezing equipment has been produced only for the manufacturing of pelmeni [Siberian meat dumplings] and very little at that. Someone may object that in order to produce more pelmeni one should produce more meat. However, if we had more equipment for the production of pelmeni meat losses (as you know, we lose annually about 1 million tons) would decline substantially.

What frozen products are considered ordinary? Fish. The reason is that the fishing vessels are equipped with proper facilities which, alas, also come from abroad. The availability of fast-frozen products per capita in our country is so low compared to the European countries and the United States that even mentioning it is embarrassing. [Zaramenskikh] What will change now, when your ministry has been assigned to organize the manufacturing of refrigeration equipment? [Vysokosov] For 20 years scientific and technical progress did not affect the area of refrigeration equipment. Today we must change this situation drastically. This is a major responsibility. The better refrigeration equipment we produce, the lesser will be our losses of farm produce.

Twenty-five types of new refrigeration equipment (63 models) must be developed, tested and mastered between 1988 and 1995, and by 1995 output must increase by a factor of 3.4.

We started by taking organizational steps. This is very important, for the way we plan our work now will determine the speed at which the problem will be solved. As early as last March we set up a sectorial staff headed by the minister. It includes deputy ministers, and chiefs of functional administrations. Groups of ministry specialists visited various areas.

We have been assigned to manage 13 plants, some of which are more than half a century old.

In particular, we must reconstruct the Kharkov Kristall Production Association, the plant for refrigeration machinery in Yaroslavl and the Kompessor Plant in Riga. Our main concern today is the technical retooling of the enterprises. Albeit modest, I can already report a success achieved at the Marikholodmash Production Association (V. Oleynik, general director): the production of seals on an assembly line basis, using a new technology. The material used in the past—foam plastic—has been replaced by foam polyurethane, which is a modern product. For many years this was the stumbling block for the plant personnel, as described, among others, in an article in *EKONOMICHESKAYA GAZETA* ("A Foggy Future," No 9, 1988). Now the refrigerators produced by this association will come very close to the level of the best world models.

A contract was concluded with the Italian Fata Company last September for building the Sovitalprod mash joint enterprise. In 1991 that plant should begin production and by 1995 its output will be worth 300 million rubles. The plant will produce a variety of refrigeration equipment, such as boxes, compartments and evaporators, a total of six different items.

By 1995 we must produce 1,000 fast-freezing systems. Unfortunately, this work is being obstructed by the USSR Gosagroprom which, one would think, should be very interested in such equipment but which, so far, has not even submitted technical specifications for it, not to mention engineering documentation. This is a very strange position. [Zaramenskikh] In my view, radio engineering goods do not have very much in common with refrigerators. Obviously, the sector did not have refrigeration specialists in the past.... [Vysokosov] They are still few. Today the cadre problem is one of the most important ones. So far we have only two SKTB—in Kharkov and in Yoshkar-Ole. On their basis, however, we are planning to establish scientific centers. Naturally, there will be design bureaus for new equipment, and research laboratories at the enterprises. We shall be needing specialists in refrigeration everywhere, such as engineers, researchers and experienced practical workers. As long as this type of production was not being developed, there

were no cadres. In recent years, for some reason, virtually no VUZ graduates had been assigned to this sector. The poor availability of housing and social amenities for the personnel also played an adverse role. For that reason, let me emphasize that the funds which have been appropriated for the Ministry of Radio Industry for such purposes in 1989 for building housing and sociocultural facilities will be used also for the personnel of the refrigeration equipment enterprises, to their fullest amount.

Let me point out that specialists in our sector are quite interested in this new area of work. A number of managers consider retooling for the production of refrigeration facilities their prime concern. They include association general directors Yu. Svirin and Yu. Badalov.

In short, today we are excited by refrigeration equipment as much as by radio engineering.

#### USSR State Statistical Committee Data

#### Results of the Selective Investigation by Trade Inspectorates of the Quality of Consumer Goods for the First Half of 1988

	Number of Inspected Items	Of These Rejected or Reduced in Grade	
		Quantity Commodities (Thousand Tons)	Percent
Meat and poultry	51.4	2.9	5.6
Delicatessen and smoked goods, all varieties	14.2	0.9	6.3
Fish and herring	49.5	4.6	9.3
Butter	15.5	0.6	3.8
Vegetable oil	5.0	0.2	4.5
Margarine	11.0	1.2	10.9
Meat and dairy products	47.3	2.0	4.3
Cheese	7.2	0.4	6.0
Confectionery goods	16.7	1.0	6.0
Canned meat, million standard tins	8.3	0.3	3.6
Canned fruits and vegetables, million conventional tins	162.9	16.7	10.2
Canned fish, million conventional tins	45.2	4.4	9.8
Canned dairy goods, million conventional tins	11.4	0.5	4.5
Nonalcoholic beverages, thousand decaliters	2107.4	309.2	14.7

#### Chernyshev Weighs Problems in Industrial Conversion

LD0202141689 Moscow TASS in English  
1350 GMT 2 Feb 89

[Text] Moscow February 2 TASS—By TASS Military Analyst Vladimir Chernyshev:

Conversion of military production, which is one of the principal elements of disarmament, is bound to proceed along different lines in different countries. There are a number of factors in the socialist states that tend to facilitate this process. These countries lack social strata which wax rich on the arms race. They know no pursuit for high or super-high profits, typical for private arms manufacturers. The defence industry workers are not afraid of losing their jobs, since many sectors of socialist economy experience a chronic shortage of labour.

Economic development in socialist countries proceeds according to plan, and this makes it more fit for the elaboration of large-scale national projects, such as the conversion programme, for instance. Centralised planning of structural changes is already effected in the national economy. While many Soviet defence enterprises are quite experienced in manufacturing civilian goods. The immense scope of the ongoing perestroika processes and the available huge commodity market facilitate the choice of the civilian production that has to be turned out by these or other enterprises.

In spite of the indicated factors, however, which facilitate conversion in the USSR, this does not mean at all that it will not give rise to economic, technological and social problems in a planned economy. Many of the modern military enterprises are narrowly specialised, employ specific kinds of military technology, special raw materials and semifinished goods, which complicates their direct regearing to national economic needs.

Not everything will run smoothly with the personnel of military enterprises. Conversion to civilian production will cut into their wages, bonuses and awards, and what is even more important—they will lose the priority right to receive financial and material resources at short notice. Reoriented to the civilian market, they will have to give up the principal "end result at all costs," which is natural for several military sectors. This will require not only technological regearing, but reorganisation of production and sales management, too. Although we experience a shortage of manpower, it is bound to decrease substantially in the new economic conditions, envisaging self-accounting and self-financing. This means that economic resources are not inexhaustable in this respect, too. An important shortcoming, moreover, is our lack of sufficiently accessible information on military economy, which creates substantial difficulties in the theoretical elaboration of conversion problems both at national and sectoral levels.

Despite all these difficulties, obviously present in the USSR, the carried out studies and accumulated experience warrant the conclusion that conversion of military industry is not a utopia, but a concrete alternative to the militarization of national economy.

**Yazov Views Restructuring of Military Training**  
*PM3001160589 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA*  
*in Russian 28 Jan 89 First Edition p 1*

[Unattributed report: "New Quality Military Education. Ways To Deepen Restructuring of Military Schools Defined at 24-25 January Conference of VUZ Leadership Staff in Moscow."]

[Text] What new developments demanding introduction in practice have emerged in the course of the restructuring of military education, what is stopping progress, and where should efforts be concentrated in order to deepen restructuring processes in VUZ's and fundamentally improve the training of officer cadres? Army General D.S. Sukhorukov, USSR deputy defense minister, devoted his report to an analysis of these questions.

The tasks of VUZ political organs and party organizations in further improving the restructuring of the teaching and education process in line with the 19th All-Union CPSU Conference decisions were the subject of a report delivered at the conference by Admiral of the Fleet A.I. Sorokin, first deputy chief of the Soviet Army and Navy Main Political Directorate.

Comrades V.N. Konchits, I.B. Urlin, A.S. Goryainov, A.F. Shcheglov, V.I. Petrov, N.F. Kizyun, V.Ya. Kremlev, G.V. Kalitko, and others took part in the discussion on the reports.

Army General D.T. Yazov, candidate member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and USSR defense minister, spoke at the conference. The importance of the conference, he said, is determined by the fact that the Armed Forces, just like our entire country, are at a crucial stage of restructuring. The content and orientation of restructuring were defined for us by the 19th all-union party conference's principled directive on ensuring the efficiency of defense building primarily along qualitative lines. As for the ways to restructure military education, they are rooted in the CPSU Central Committee February (1988) Plenum materials.

A decisive role in the restructuring of the Armed Forces, the defense minister stressed, must be played by the officer cadres. The basic criterion for judging the quality of their training is their readiness to impeccably perform their duties in the forces and fleets. It is obvious that this criterion also applies to the quality of work by military education establishments.

The majority of Soviet officers conscientiously perform their military duty. Examples of courage and skill are provided by their actions in Afghanistan, during the elimination of the consequences of the Chernobyl accident and the earthquake in Armenia, and in the performance of many other tasks in the most complex conditions. At the same time, there are numerous instances of military VUZ graduates being irresolute when making troop command decisions, being insufficiently confident

in their mastery of weapons and equipment, lacking firm habits in the organization of practical work on the personnel's political, military, and moral education, and frequently being unable to work efficiently in conditions of democratization and glasnost. Instances of incompetence by VUZ graduates, and their inability to properly organize personnel training and education or the performance of tasks facing subunits, units, and ships confirm the need for decisive restructuring of military education.

Army Gen D.T. Yazov formulated the basic demands regarding the restructuring of military education. The main one is the training of cadres capable of providing more effective solutions, with due consideration for contemporary demands, to tasks concerning the maintenance of combat and mobilization readiness, the building of the Armed Forces, the training and education of troops, and the strengthening of military discipline. In the planning, organization, and methodology of training this means a decisive turn away from the bulk approach in the direction of individual approaches, of enhancement of the role of independent study, and of further integration between education and the achievements of military science and military art. It means consolidating the VUZ's scientific and pedagogical potential, radically improving their material and technical base, and ensuring the best possible combination of centralized leadership of education with broad democratism and enhanced sociopolitical and military activeness by undergraduate and postgraduate students.

The defense minister pointed out that improving the quality of officer cadres' training is a most important task at the contemporary stage of defense building. In order to solve it, it is necessary to concentrate efforts along a number of main avenues.

The first one involves restructuring the system of military education. This is a matter of both the organizational structure of VUZ's and the teaching and education process. The primary aim must be to enhance the quality of officers' military professional training and raising the standards of their general culture, especially of their psychological and pedagogical culture. The broadening of military cadres' engineering horizons and computer literacy are becoming increasingly important. New qualities must be imparted to the nurturing of lofty ideological, political, and moral attributes among undergraduate and postgraduate students. It is fundamentally important to ensure that the entire teaching and education process is closely geared to the tasks of officers' practical activity.

The system of regular certification of military education establishments is designed to deepen the restructuring of military education. Just like the unionwide system being introduced in the country in line with the CPSU Central Committee decision, it must provide for comprehensive assessment of the standards of teaching, educational, and scientific work, the qualitative composition of lecturers, and the state of the material base. On the basis of

these assessments, VUZ's can either be given additional rights and privileges, or radical measures can be taken right up to their reorganization or closure.

The second avenue of the restructuring of military education involves measures to raise the standards of military cadres' tactical and specialized training. The training of officers for actions in combat conditions has been and still remains the VUZ's priority task. While subordinating the entire teaching and education process to the solution of this task, it is primarily necessary to bring theoretical and practical work fully in line with the nature of contemporary armed struggle and the defensive nature of Soviet military doctrine. This demand must be made profoundly clear to the leadership of VUZ's and to lecturers and undergraduate and postgraduate students.

In this context, the defense minister dwelt on several fundamental tenets. He emphasized the greater demands made in training in matters of combat readiness and the mastery of modern forms and methods to prepare for and conduct combat actions, one of whose most important features is their armywide and navywide nature. Modern weapons call for substantial changes in tactics and enhance the role of reconnaissance, skillful organization of firepower, and precise collaboration. Some VUZ's, however, at times hold on to formal applications of theory to practical work and fail to take the situation's specific conditions into account, instead of providing objective training in tactics and in the military art as a whole. This accustoms undergraduate and postgraduate students to stereotypes and schematism. Everything must be done to overcome this major evil in tactical training.

The basic demand concerning the methodology of this training is to ensure that studies and exercises provide conditions that bring students face to face with the need to seek and find the most expedient solutions and methods of action to surprise the enemy, display military cunning, and engage in bold maneuvers on the battlefield. This is achieved primarily through the lessons to be learned from the initial situation, and through the unfolding of military actions governed by the decisions and practical actions of the trainees. In the same way that in combat the enemy would "punish" any failure to organize good reconnaissance, inadequate firepower, a stereotyped approach, irresolution, weakness of will, or inability to look ahead—the effect of all this must be made felt in exercises. And this is precisely the sphere in which many VUZ's fail to adequately instruct their undergraduate and postgraduate students.

The quality of studies and exercises must be judged not only by the trainees' actions, but also by the methodological lessons to be learned from them. In this context, the methodological skills of lecturers themselves are especially important. The enhancement of these skills should be

promoted by improved content and methods in the command training of VUZ professorial and tutorial staff. Evidence of the urgent need for this can be seen in the stereotyped and formal tuition given by some lecturers.

Army Gen D.T. Yazov went on to dwell on questions of resolving the contradiction between the growing volume of knowledge and habits officers need and the limited time available for instruction. Life proves that the only way to resolve this contradiction is by intensifying the study process, primarily through utilizing the achievements of psychology, pedagogics, and computers and introducing advanced training methods. The main element in these methods is the individualization of training and the galvanization of trainees' activity. The only lasting knowledge is the knowledge a student acquires for himself. Military VUZ leaders and lecturers can find much that is useful in this regard in the materials of the all-union congress of public education workers. The concept of continuous education is fully applicable to military education. Whereas until quite recently officers were guided by the principle of "education to last a lifetime," nowadays they are hardly likely to perform their functions properly unless they restructure themselves according to a different principle—"a lifetime of education."

Unfortunately, most VUZ's have still not achieved a decisive turn away from the bulk approach in the direction of individual approaches and the shaping of each student's personality as a commander, political worker, or military specialist. They continue to apply a standard yardstick to all, geared to some "statistical average" undergraduate or postgraduate student. More often than not, individual approaches and individual methods exist only in words.

Traditional forms and methods of training also need to be improved in line with new pedagogical ideas. Specifically, it is necessary to firmly abandon the passive approach and introduce active forms and methods of training more widely. For example, lectures should be given only on new questions, and we should part company with unnecessary overorganization of the study process and the underrating of individual study by undergraduate and postgraduate students.

One of the most important tasks of VUZ's is to enhance the quality of undergraduate and postgraduate students' physical training. Smartness in drills must be persistently and firmly cultivated and neat appearance demanded.

The utmost improvement of officer cadres' training, the defense minister emphasized, is one of the key sources for enhancing the Armed Forces' qualitative condition while incurring virtually no additional material costs. Full use must be made of this source.

The third avenue for restructuring the work of VUZ's work concerns improving the general education of undergraduate and postgraduate students and training

them in methods of leading their subordinates. It is well known that an officer's military-professional training comprises a package of knowledge and practical habits in the leadership of subunits, units, and ships. Unfortunately, this training is often detached from the practical tasks being resolved by troops.

Inadequate teaching standards among officers poses a serious problem for the Armed Forces. They are not always capable of correctly combining one-man command with the expansion of democratism, the right to issue orders through persuasion, and high standards of demandingness with spiritual closeness to their subordinates. Officers' collectives provide examples of scornful and inattentive attitudes not only toward subordinates, but also toward each other, and of demagoguery and disregard for rank. All this dictates the need to persistently and actively nurture among undergraduate and postgraduate students clear and precise ideas of the officer's honor, dignity, and nobility, which are an officer's compass in his service and his life. A special role in this regard must be played by the personal example set by command and political cadres and VUZ lecturers.

Today, under the conditions of glasnost and socialist pluralism, the ideological and moral maturity of military cadres is more important than ever before. Hence the content, forms, and methods of the teaching of social sciences must be not only more active, but also more convincing and capable of arming cadres with the truth of life. Every officer, and primarily VUZ lecturers, must be capable of using convincing arguments to prove the correctness of the party line in defense building, and to demonstrate the importance of and need for military service—the historical purpose of the Soviet Armed Forces.

Army Gen D.T. Yazov gave much attention to the strengthening of military discipline. It is necessary not only to ensure that it is maintained at the highest possible level within the VUZ system, but also to persistently train undergraduate and postgraduate students in skillful work to instill strict regulation order. A number of VUZ's still experience incidents, crimes, and gross violations of discipline. The task of strengthening discipline and instilling order according to regulations in the forces cannot be resolved unless it is first resolved in schools and academies.

The fourth avenue of the restructuring of military education is the improvement of VUZ leadership. Many shortcomings in officers' training are attributable to the high degree of formalism in the leadership of VUZ's and the teaching and education process. Quite often the active and creative quest for more effective forms and methods is supplanted by sham efficiency and unnecessary paperwork for its own sake. Consequently, genuine progress is replaced by an illusion of movement, which is essentially nothing but marking time. The efficiency of

VUZ leadership work can be judged only by end results, by the way the main tasks of officer cadres' training are performed. What are these tasks?

First, to educate military school and academy graduates as active bearers of party policy in the Army and Navy, to instill in them lofty ideological, ethical, moral, and combat qualities. Second, to cultivate graduates' high professional standards and their ability to intelligently organize and confidently command combat actions by subunits and units, as well as their entire life and activity. Third, to inculcate in graduates firm practical habits in the education of subordinates, the rallying of multinational soldiers' collectives, and organizational and political activity in conditions of democratization and glasnost.

It is in the military education establishment that an officer must acquire the firm foundation of these attributes. And a key role in laying this foundation must be played by lecturers. It is necessary to constantly improve the work of raising their qualifications and perfecting the organization of practical training in the forces.

The dynamism of our time and the natural process of generations succeeding one another necessitate a more active and more objective concern for the scientific development of professorial and tutorial staff and the training of highly skilled scientists. The quality of scientific and pedagogical activity must come first and foremost.

An important position in restructuring the leadership of military education belongs to the expansion of VUZ rights and enhancement of their autonomy, and to objective work to ensure preferential development of the teaching and material base and improvement of facilities. Ensuring normal living and working conditions is a question of major political importance.

In conclusion, the defense minister said that important, but still only initial steps have been taken in the restructuring of military education. They must be consolidated and further developed.

Taking part in the conference's work were Colonel General M.A. Moiseyev, USSR first deputy defense minister and chief of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff; deputy defense ministers; A.N. Soshnikov, deputy chief of a CPSU Central Committee department; and V.Ye. Shukshunov, deputy chairman of the USSR State Committee for Public Education.

#### **Former Air Force 1st Dep Chief of Staff on Modern Military-Patriotic Education**

*18010299a Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 10 Nov 88 p 3*

[Article by Mar Avn G. Skorikov: "So As Not to Flinch in Combat"]

[Text] **Mar Avn G.P. Skorikov, prominent Soviet military leader, has a great deal of life and of combat behind him. He was born in the village of Tikho-Zhuravka, Rostov**

Oblast. He entered the Kharkov Military Air School of the Red Army Air Forces at the end of May 1940. He went to the front in August 1942. He took part in combat operations on the Kalinin, Volkhovo, Northwest, Voronezh, Steppe, 1st and 2nd Ukrainian fronts.

Since the war he has occupied the important positions of deputy chief of General Staff of Air Defense Forces, chief of the Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR, chief of Main Staff of the Air Forces and first deputy commander in chief of the Air Forces. Since 1985 he has served in the Group of General Inspectors of the USSR Ministry of Defense.

Mar Avn G.P. Skorikov is a deputy in the UkSSR Supreme Soviet. He frequently meets with the workers and with the youth of our republic. Today we are printing his commentary on the contemporary demands made of the military-patriotic indoctrination of the youth.

I recently phoned the Volga Higher Military Construction Command School. I asked how things were going for Cadet S. Skutelnik. I was told that he is successfully mastering the training program and is a model of efficiency and discipline.

It was nice to hear that. I recall well my trip last year to Kitsmanskii Rayon, Chernovtsy Oblast, on deputy business. There were many meetings and talks with workers and young people of the rayon. One of them was with 10th-grade students at the Kitsman Secondary School. This is where I met Sergey Skutelnik, his comrades Sergey Sivchuk and Aleksandr Tanaseychuk, and others. They asked many questions about the history of the Armed Forces and about the military service. I had things to tell them, of course. I donned the military uniform in '39 and am still wearing it. If I were to begin my life over again I would certainly link it to our Armed Forces. What more important and honorable duty on earth than to defend the homeland! The army is my pride, my love.

I told the kids these things. And my words met with a fervent response in them. They expressed a desire to enter the Army or Navy formation as rapidly as possible and be as useful as possible to the homeland. Some of the kids—Aleksandr Tanaseychuk, Sergey Sivchuk and Sergey Skutelnik, for example—decided to become career military men.

That made me happy, of course. I know that this kind of readiness to serve in the military is developed in the youth gradually. A great deal of attention is given to military-patriotic work at this school: lessons in courage, thematic evenings devoted to the revolutionary, combat and labor traditions of the Soviet people and their glorious Armed Forces, and meetings with war veterans are regularly conducted. The combat glory museum plays an important role. The museum contains extensive

information about participants in the Great Patriotic War and school graduates, today's soldiers, are honorably fulfilling their international military duty.

Lt Col (Reserve) Ye.I. Antofiy, military instructor, puts a particularly large amount of energy and effort into the military-patriotic work. He has raised the initial military training for the students to a high level with his selfless labor. The school has a military office and facilities for engaging in applied military sports. There are visual aids for every section of the training program. The classes in this department are lively and interesting, and are absorbed well. In addition to presenting information on military affairs, Yemelyan Ivanovich describes clearly and intelligibly the superiority of Soviet equipment and weaponry, and instills a love for the military service in the students.

Ye.I. Antofiy devotes a great deal of attention to extra-curricular work with the students. All of this has an impact on the preparation of the youth for military service, of course. The school receives letters from its graduates, today's defenders of the homeland, with statements such as these: "Thank you very much for the military science. It has been easy for me to train from my first days in the army." "I am well satisfied with my specialty and with the military knowledge acquired at the school. It helped me in the Army."

I encountered good preparation for service in the Armed Forces also in other rayon collectives.

Almost a year and a half has gone by since then. I was recently once again in Chernovtsy Oblast on deputy business. I asked about the military-patriotic work. The tone is set, as it was a year and a half ago, by Kitsmanskii Rayon. The main effort is devoted to making the young people aware of their civic duty and personal responsibility for the improvement of the homeland's economic and defense strength. There is active propaganda and extensive explanation to the workers of Lenin's concepts, documents and materials of the CPSU and the Soviet State on defense of the socialist homeland and on Soviet and proletarian internationalism, and clarification of the measures conducted by the CPSU and the Soviet Government to strengthen the nation's defense capability and enhance the combat readiness of the Soviet Armed Forces. Communist B. Bulega, P. Degtyarev, V. Kozak, M. Patsalyuk and others take an active part in this work.

Every speech to the youth is imbued with love for the homeland. An individual has only one homeland, just as he has only one mother. The feats performed by our contemporaries in the fulfillment of their international duty in Afghanistan are also extensively publicized for purposes of indoctrinating the youth. Names are published of those awarded combat medals: I. Simenyuk, Sr Sgt N. Lutsyak, Sgt V. Lupulo and others.

Draftee days are highly important in the military-patriotic indoctrination. They leave a deep mark on the hearts of the new recruits. We could say some good things about Communists V. Bagriychuk, Ye. Kirillov and other workers with the military commissariat, who strive jointly with DOSAAF members and Komsomol workers to make Draftee Day an exciting celebration.

The intensive military-patriotic work in the rayon favorably affects the training of the youth for the military service, of course, and their awareness of the role of the Armed Forces. It is not surprising that many people in Kitsmanskiy Rayon want to enter military schools. And they do very well there. I have already written about Komsomol members S. Sivchuk, A. Tanaseychuk and S. Skutelnik. They are learning the military sciences well. They are cadets. Young men from that rayon are serving with excellence in the military. They include Pvt O. Oleynik, whom I met last year at Shchipinetskiy Secondary School. He is now in the Far East. He was awarded a short leave for his success in the combat and political training. He took part in a large and festive celebration conducted in the rayon, a mothers' rally. PFC A. Anton-yak, Seaman V. Boychuk and others are fulfilling their military duty in a worthy manner.

The military-patriotic work has recently been markedly stepped up also in a number of other rayons in Chernovtsy Oblast: Kelmenetskiy, Putilskiy and Vizhnitskiy. Such activities as tours of sites of revolutionary, labor and combat glory, the Zarnitsa and Orlenok games and sports days for draftees have become truly mass activities.

"All of the military-patriotic work is directly supervised and monitored by party and soviet organs," V. Lenchinskiy, chairman of the oblast ispolkom, told me when I talked to him. "This makes it possible to perform the work in a purposeful and specific manner, to develop in the young people such qualities as a readiness to defend the socialist homeland, to give one's all to it, one's life if necessary."

Military-patriotic work is not a goal in and of itself. The comrades responsible for it know this very well. When I talked with them they offered suggestions for improving the preparation of the youth to serve in the military. The objective is a specific one: every draftee must thoroughly understand that what his older comrades are now doing in the military he himself will soon be doing, and he has an obligation to do it conscientiously, giving it his all.

### **Belorussian DOSAAF Membership Declines by 300,000**

*18010299b Minsk SOVETSKAYA BELOROSIYA in Russian 7 Nov 88 p 4*

[BELTA report: "Fewer, But Better"]

[Text]The list of the almost 5 million DOSAAF members in Belorussia has been reduced by 300,000 during the past 3 years. This fact, which quite recently would have been unequivocally assessed as a failure in the mass defense work, was cited as a positive thing at the republic seminar of chairmen of rayon DOSAAF organizations in Gomel.

Life today demands not the inflated figures achieved as a result of "enlisting" into the ranks of the defense society, teenagers, housewives and pensioners, but qualitative improvement of the specific work of preparing the youth to serve in the Armed Forces, of training specialists for the national economy and universally developing the applied military and technical sports.

During the 3 days of training, the seminar participants were acquainted with the work of the technical sports clubs of Gomel, the Sozh Sovkhoz-Combine and the Novobelitskiy Poultry Farm, and were shown new DOSAAF construction projects in the city and the rayon.

### **Plenum of Uzbek DOSAAF Central Committee**

*18010299c Tashkent PRAVDA VOSTOKA in Russian 16 Nov 88 p 1*

[UzTAG report: "Plenum of Uzbekistan's DOSAAF Central Committee"]

[Text]How to restructure the work of the defense society's organizations so that they truly measure up to their purpose and prepare worthy replenishments for the Armed Forces was the subject of discussion at a plenum of the Uzbek DOSAAF Central Committee held in Tashkent on 15 November.

A report was presented by Lt Gen A.M. Khodzhibayev, chairman of the UzSSR DOSAAF Central Committee.

Plenum participants noted that the restructuring of the work of DOSAAF organizations is proceeding slowly. Many of the technical sports clubs and schools where specialists are trained for the Armed Forces and the national economy still do not have the necessary facilities and lack experienced instructors and teachers.

The plenum adopted an expanded resolution outlining measures to fundamentally improve the work of the republic DOSAAF organizations.

**Kuybyshev Engineering School Fills Vacancies on Competitive Basis**

18010282 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
13 Dec 88FirstEditionp 2

[Interview with Maj Gen Viktor Ivanovich Ustinov, chief of Military Engineering Academy imeni V. V. Kuybyshev, by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent N. Kalmykov; date and place not specified; under rubric "News: Facts, Events, Commentary": "Competition is Announced"; first paragraph is KRASNAYA ZVEZDA introduction]

[Text] The first vacant positions of service members have been filled on a competitive basis as an experiment in the Military-Engineering Academy imeni V. V. Kuybyshev.

[Ustinov] Strictly speaking, the system of competitive elections must be viewed as the beginning of an experiment. For now it extends only to those vacant positions required to be filled by persons with academic degrees and titles: chiefs of chairs and their deputies, senior instructors, senior scientific associates.

[Kalmykov] But instructors represent the most numerous portion of pedagogs. Why not extend competitive selection to the filling of these positions?

[Ustinov] We are proceeding from the assumption that the process of restructuring and democratization in the Armed Forces has not yet gained sufficient depth and that it is premature to excessively expand the experiment at the present stage—there is a fear that elections will become a formality. It is not that easy to gather the number of claimants necessary for holding a full-fledged competition—we are placing heightened demands on them in the preliminary selection. It makes no sense for an Academy instructor to place his name in the hat for a position of equal value, and there is no great hope that officers from troop units, NII [research institutes] and military schools will take an active part in the competition. In our military environment it is not yet the custom to offer one's candidacy for vacant positions, especially to an academy, but we do not preclude the possibility that the situation will change in the near future and every officer who has been trained for pedagogic work will be able to take part in the competition. For now, however, instructor cadres will be brought up to strength as before basically through postgraduate study.

By the way, only two persons, Senior Instructor Col A. Lukyanchenkov and Deputy Chair Chief Col N. Komarov, took part in the competition for electing the chair chief. Both are candidates of military sciences and docents. Lukyanchenkov won. When the chief of one of the scientific subunits was elected, however, there already were four competitors.

[Kalmykov] How did the elections go?

[Ustinov] In a very interested and active and I would say even stormy manner. This was at all levels: in the discussion of nominees and their programs held in the chair and in the scientific subunit, at the session of the permanent certification commission, and at the session of the Academy's academic council. I admit that we feared that parochial interests and nonacceptance of outside persons might be manifested in the collectives, but the fears were not confirmed. The course of the elections showed that the people wish to have as their directors chiefs who are out of the ordinary; who think creatively; and who have interesting, specific programs for restructuring training, indoctrination and scientific activity. Today I have become convinced once and for all that only on the basis of competitive elections can we ensure that brilliant personalities and clear-cut leaders head up training and scientific collectives.

[Kalmykov] Elected as chiefs... You will agree, Viktor Ivanovich, that such a combination of words sounds unusual as applied to military people. The question automatically arises: What will happen with the principle of one-man command? Are its foundations not being violated here? I also wish to ask about something else: How did the Ministry of Defense leadership regard your innovations?

[Ustinov] There were no obstacles on the part of Ministry of Defense leaders; to the contrary, the idea received full support. With regard to the first question, in my view the competitive filling of vacant positions in no way contradicts the principle of one-man command. The fact is that the final word remains with the appropriate chief. Only after his confirmation of election results are documents prepared for the nominee's official appointment to the position.

[Kalmykov] This means the following version also cannot be excluded: the elected candidate for some reason does not suit the higher chief and he does not approve the voting results. The elections turn out to be ordinary fiction.

[Ustinov] Such a thing is possible, of course, but improbable. Today it is difficult to presume that a chief will be found who could ignore the collective's opinion and the results of secret balloting by such a representative body as the Academy's academic council. And what could be the reason here? Is the senior chief really no less interested than the higher educational institution's collective in seeing that key posts in his subordinate academy or school are occupied by the most competent, trusted officers?

[Kalmykov] And so elections of two new leaders have concluded in the Academy. What is next?

[Ustinov] A competition has been announced for filling vacant positions of deputy chair chief, deputy chief of a scientific subunit, and two senior scientific associates. The first applications already have been received.

### Role of Defensive Offense in 1944 Defeat of Germans in Ukraine

18010174 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
25 Jan 89 p 2

[Article by Col P. Repin, ret : "On Korsunskoye Field"]

[Text] Under the strategic conditions which had come about toward mid-January 1944, the liquidation of the Korsun-Shevchenkivskiy bulge became the primary task of the 1st and 2nd Ukrainian fronts. Not intrinsically simple, the task was complicated by conditions independent of human beings. January, and there was an unimaginable thaw. Cars, cannons, and transports were mired in heavy, viscous mud. The mud sucked boots off feet. This, in addition to the wetness of the snowstorm and the cold, raw wind...And today, 45 years later, it seems incredible that in this impassable mess, the armies of two fronts, under the command of generals I. Konev and N. Vatutin, managed to go on the offensive.

The offensive began on 24 January with a short, powerful artillery attack. The successful advance of the forward battalions allowed the main forces to be brought into action immediately. Fierce battles raged on the entire territory of the gap.

On 28 January, the 20th Guards Tank Corps headed toward Zvenigorodka with two battalions. The 233rd Tank Brigade and other forward units of the 6th Tank Army had broken through from the west. The encirclement had closed up. Tank T-84, elevated on a pedestal in the center of Zvenigorodka, is the symbol of that unforgettable meeting of the two fronts.

It is said that life is not so simple a thing as crossing a field. But this depends on the field. The fields we crossed in battle near Zvenigorodka claimed many lives. There lay, as the poet wrote, "seven of every ten dead." I had to cross these fields twice...

We broke through here with cruel, bloody battles from the border itself in the second half of July 1941. And in the early days of August, we were in a tight ring of fascist troops near Uman, in the troop personnel of the 6th Army of Lt Gen I. Muzychenko, together with the 12th Army of Maj Gen P. Ponedelin, and we broke through from Podvysokiy to Zvenigorodka. Then, almost out of ammunition, the pitiful remnants of our unit, worn out by a month and a half of ceaseless battle, could not break through the ring of fascist encirclement. We did not make it to Zvenigorodka.

Then, in 1941, we were surrounded by the combined German 17th Field Army of Col Gen Von Stulpnagel. Now, in 1944, in our ring were nine infantry divisions, one tank division, a motorized brigade with numerous means of reinforcement from the personnel of the "South" Armies 1st Tank and 8th Army.

On 8 February, our command issued Hitler's surrounding troops an ultimatum to avoid unnecessary bloodshed. The Wehrmacht's officers and men were guaranteed their lives and safety in exchange for ceasing their resistance. The fascist command rejected the ultimatum.

The decisive events unfolded on the outer front of the encirclement. Field Marshal Gen Manstein, having failed to lend a hand and break the blockade of Paulus's army encircled at Stalingrad, created a powerful tank group from the personnel of eight tank and six infantry divisions, and attempted to help those who had fallen into the "cauldron."

But all of the Hitlerites' attempts to break through the outer ring of the encirclement to the zone of the front were failures. On the night of 17 February, having lost all hope of assistance from the outside, Stemmerman, commanding officer of the surrounded group, undertook the final, desperate attempt to break out of the "cauldron" from the area of Shenderovka to Lysyanka. Having concentrated his main forces on a 4.5 km wide section of gap in the front, under cover of night, poor visibility, snowfall and blizzard, the enemy struck, but our artillery destroyed that plan as well. The anti-tank areas played their part, set up on all vital sections of the roads, in populated areas and on the heights.

The gunners showed themselves to be true masters of their work. By arms estimate of senior Sergeant A. Kharitonov, over 200 enemy soldiers and officers were killed, and a major German transport destroyed.

The artillery battery under the command of V. Podnevich entered a heated, unequal battle with Hitlerite tanks on the edge of the village of Kirillovka, where Taras Grigoryevich Shevchenko spent his childhood. The battery stood its ground even to the death, and triumphed.

And Lt Col V. Novikov, commander of the 438th Artillery Regiment...On famous Hill 239.0, it was especially hot that day. Up to one hundred Hitlerites had advanced almost right up to the gunners' firing positions. And the shelling stopped. Novikov rallied his people to counterattack. Hand-to-hand fighting was going on right at the guns. The enemy was destroyed...

I have named only a few gunners who were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union after the battles. I think that all those who fought on the Cherkassian earth in those days could be called heroes.

Soldiers, and even regimental commanders, seldom see the overall picture of battle. But I managed to see it then. Since the snowstorm that had raged during the last days of the "cauldron" had complicated visibility, I was ordered to take up a firing position for point-blank shooting under cover of night.

Fascist tanks attacked in the morning, at about ten o'clock, as the thick fog had just lifted. The gunners did not flinch. I sustained a head wound in this battle; I was shell-shocked and lost my hearing and power of speech. As I was taken, accompanied by a nurse, along the burning black-crimson earth, I willy-nilly saw this endless graveyard of Hitlerite technology. Automobiles and weapons stood in solid columns and several rows from Gorodishche to Korsun-Shevchenkovskiy stretching for 20 km—burned out, broken, blown up. It is now known that 55,000 soldiers and officers were killed or wounded, and 18,200 taken prisoner.

In the military field hospital where I was taken, my cot stood next to that of Lt Gen I. Managarov. He had been seriously wounded back on 5 December 1943 at the Dnepr bridgehead south of Kremenchug. Ivan Mefodyevich was interested in how his 53rd Army had performed in the Korsun-Shevchenkovskiy operation, under the command of Lt Gen I. Galanin. I regained my hearing only after 3 days, and then, still stuttering, I told Ivan Mefodyevich of the fearless fighting of our infantrymen, artillerists, cavalymen, tankists, pilots, combat engineers and messengers.

The element of surprise was widely employed by our side in this battle, along with knock-out blows, broad maneuvering, withdrawal to the rear, and frequent regrouping of troops.

Army commanding generals I. Smirnov, A. Zhadov, M. Shumilov, K. Koroteyev, I. Galanin, P. Rotmistrov and S. Goryunov showed themselves as capable, decisive military commanders. The Mobile Combined Units of the 5th Guard and 6th Tank Armies played a leading role. Moving swiftly toward one another, on the third day of the attack they united near Zvenigorodka. The artillery of our front, under the command of Gen. N. Fomin, worked well.

Later came the battles to liberate the northern right-bank Ukraine, the forced crossing of the Prut river, the Yassko-Kishinev operation...In the summer of 1944 we entered the Polish land and took an active part in cleansing it of fascist invaders in the Vislo-Oder, and Nizhne- and Verkhne-Silez operations. Gunners of the 406th Artillery Regiment, which I then commanded, had the honor of joint participation with the tankists of the 3rd Guard Tank Army under Gen Rybalko in the Berlin Strategic Offensive Operation and of ending the war with the liberation of Prague.

**Withdrawal of Vietnamese 'Volunteers' From Cambodia**

18010298 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
21 Dec 88 First Edition p 3

[Report by Lt Col V. Nikanorov: "Cambodia Sees Friends Off: The Current Phase in the Withdrawal of Vietnamese Volunteers From the People's Republic of Cambodia Winds up on 21 December"]

[Text] This photograph [photo not reproduced] was taken slightly more than a year ago. The event recorded on film is directly related to today, however.

...I was in Battambang last fall. A group of Soviet and foreign journalists visited this center of the province with the same name in connection with the beginning of the 6th withdrawal of Vietnamese volunteers who had been performing an international mission in Cambodia.

I remember well the city's festively decorated central square and the hundreds of people gathered there. There was an abundance of flowers, and children holding Cambodian and Vietnamese flags. How could one forget the touching scene during a meeting, when a tiny, excited Cambodian girl uttered words of gratitude and then, in a

sincere outpouring of a child's emotion, kissed the gray-haired general from the Vietnamese People's Army. How could one forget the wisdom-filled eyes of the elderly Cambodian who had come to see off the Vietnamese soldiers.

There were not many old people in the square. There are not many left in the country. Those who survived, however, those who lived through the terrible years of the bloody Pol Pot dictatorship, remember the ruthlessness with which the infamous "Red Khmers" destroyed their own people. They also remember how the Vietnamese soldiers came to the aid of the fraternal Cambodian people, helped them to overthrow the satraps and halt the genocide. The Vietnamese volunteers then helped them to build a new life in Cambodia, helped them protect it against armed attacks by the enemies of the revolution....

These memories are what prompted me to report on the completion of the latest phase in the withdrawal of the Vietnamese volunteers from Cambodia. A total of 50,000 Vietnamese returned to the homeland in this phase. The policy of national reconciliation proclaimed by the government of Cambodia and the efforts of that nation, Laos, Vietnam and other members of the world community are grounds for hoping that the conflict in that region will soon be eliminated. The continuing withdrawal of Vietnamese volunteers is undoubtedly helping to establish a climate conducive to this.

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